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ABSTRACT 
This study in the formation of foreign policy explores the 
difficulties encountered by Earl· Grey's Whig administration (1830-
1834) in reconciling the desire to promote 'the cause of liberty all 
over the world' 'vith an equally strong attachment to the principles 
of retrenchment and non-intervention in foreign affairs. 
It is demonstrated at the outset, by particui.a.r reference ia the 
. . 
opinions of Grey and Lord Holln.nd, the elde:rs of the party, thr~t the 
equivocations over foreign policy of the Whigs in office v1ere fore-
shadowed by inconsistencies in their attitude towards intervention and 
non-intervention whilst ~n opposition. After a discussion of the 
developing diplomatic situation i.n 1830 and the formation of Grey's 
heterogeneous administration, the Cabinet debates ove:f the wisdom 
or necessity of intervention abroad are considered in the context of 
four theatres of diplomatic conflict - the Netherlands, Poland, the 
Near East and Portugal. Study .()f these areas shows that fer all 
their traditional sympathies, many ministers were loath to SP.nction 
threats to intervene by force in the cause of national self-determin::~tion, 
still less in the pursuit of British strategic interests. When the 
contradictions implicit in the Whig approach preci.pitated a major 
Cabinet crisls, such as occurred over intervention in Portugal, 
natural caution and constitutional inertia prevailed. In conclusion, 
the Whig reluctance to embrace a view of foreign policy which w&s 
b<:>th dynamic and ideological is re-emphasised. The strength of the 
hostility towards such an approach is demonstrated by reference to 
the efforts made to exclude Lord Pal~erston from the Foreign Office 
in subsequent Whig administrations. 
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PREFACE 
I have attempted in this study to reconstruct, mainly from primary 
sources, the Cabinet debate underlying specific iss.ues in fo:r:eign policy 
(iv) 
. during the period of Grey's Premiership. To this end, I have concentrated 
on the private papers of members of Cabinet rather than the official records 
ot the Foreign Office. The latter have been authoritatively interpreted by 
Sir Charles Webster in Tlze Foreign Policy of Palmerston and the e}\-tent of 
my reliance on this source will be obvious. The most ~erious· difficulty 
involved in tracing ministerial attitudes is that presented by the lack of a 
consistent source of information as to the opinions expressed and the decisions 
taken at Cabinet meetings. William. IV's papers. have been destroyed and 
although some Cabinet minutes and a body of Royal Correspondence survive 
among Palmerston's papers~ we are dependent" for the most part on private 
material for information. Fortunately, the ·extent and accessibility of these 
sources affords considerable compensation. Of the major figures in the 
administration, the papers of Lansdowne and Durham alone are at present 
unavailable for consultation. · Amongst the available sources which I was able 
to consult in the limited time at my. disposal, the papers of Grey and 
Palmerston and in particular the Journal of Lord Holland were indispensable. 
It is a pleasure to be able to acknowledge the help I h2.ve received from 
archivists and librarians in the course of my research. I am particularly 
grateful to Dr. J. Fewster, Mrs. J. Drury and Miss M. McCollum of the 
Department of Palaeography and Diplomatic at the University of Durham, who 
guided and encouraged my extensive researches aml"'ngst the Grey Papers. 
Miss Felicity Ranger and the staff of the. National Register of Archive .. s showed 
great tolerance and kindness during my· study of the Broadlands Papers. I am 
indebted to the Trustees of the Broadlands Archives for allowing me to ·use 
this invaluable source. The late Rt~ . Hon. the Earl Spencer was kind enough to 
allow me, at very short notice, to consult the Spencer Papers at Althorp and 
to give me the benefit of his extensive knowledge of. the life and times of his 
ancestor the Third· Earl. I would also like to thank the staffs of the British 
Museum, .of the university libr·aries. of Durham and Cambridge and the D.M.S. 
Watson Library at University College, London .. The kindness shown to me at 
so many institutions serves to throw into sharp relief the rudeness and 
inefficiency of some members of the staff ofthePublic Record Office. 
My work has been supervised. by Dr. David Sweet, who has been unfailingly 
patient and constructive in guiding the studies of an inexperienced and frequently 
perplexed research student. I am also indebted to Mr. Graham Brook for 
allowing me to see drafts of relevant c~apters of his Cambridge Ph.D thesis 
on Britain and the Concert of Europe, and to Mr. Michael Brock, Dr. C. J. 
Bartlett and Mr. R. Mackworth-Young, who answered my queries about the 
location of rare secondary material. I am most grateful to my mother and· to 
Mrs. l\'Iarjol'ic l\Hllns for tb.eir expert typing of the first and final drafts 
respectively. I owe most to my fiance~ M!ss Anne Rahjohns, without whose. 
constant support this thesis would never have been finished. 
The value of political liberty and the cost at which it is to be obtained 
. constitute the nicest balance and o1ze which only those immediately int-
erested in the calculation are competent to decide. 
CANNING 
(v) 
1 
C-HAPTER ONE 
THE WHIG OPPOSITION Al\lJ) NON-INTERVENTION, 1815-1830 
When Talleyrand was asked to explain the real meaning of the term 
'nm~-interventiC.i1 1 • he replied: 
-:c'est un mot metaphysique et politique, qui 
signife a peu pres la meme chose qu' intervention .. 1 
Certainly non-intervention was a doctrine more often propounded than 
·explained.* Politicians on both sides referred to it as a great, even a 
sacred principle, whilst recognising that no nation, least of all Britain, 
with her wide-ranging strategic and commercial interests, could be 
indifferent to events in other countries. Confusion and disagreement arose 
when any attempt was made to prescribe situations in which a depar~ure 
from the letter, though not the principle, of non-intervention could be 
justified. In the years following the Vienna settlement, such calculations 
were complicated by Britain's position as one of its. principal architects 
and guarantors, which tended to implicate h-er in the actions taken by her 
continental allies to defend the European stutus quo. 
The response of Castlereagh and Canning to the problem of defining . 
British foreign policy in the post-Napoleonic situation may conveniently be 
.deduced from the State Paper of 5 May 1820, drafted by Castlereagh and 
subsequently. published by Canning, which demonstrated their fundamental 
*Throughout this study I have nsed the terms 'intervention' and non-
intervention' rather than 'interference' a.m! 'non-interference', because of 
· . the pejorative overtones which 'interference' has acquired in modern usage. 
Though Palmerston deplored the introduction of Gallicanisms into the 
language, he never suggested that there was any differenc·e in meaning 
between 'interference' -and 'intervention'. 
identity of view. Their difference in methods. has been confused with a 
difference in aims. Castlereagh favoured a collective allied approach to 
European problems, but emphasised that the Quadruple Alliance justified 
its post-war existence through the need to protect the dynastic and 
territorial settlement in F~anc.e. 2 It was France that he had principally 
in mind in January 1816, wheil he wrote in a despatch circulated to all 
British ambassadors abroad that, in the event of a breach of the peace, 
it was Britain's duty 
to combine the powers of Europe against that state 
whose perverted policy or criminal ambition shall 
first menace the repose in which all have a common 
· interest. 3 
He did not see it as the business of the Four Powers to correct the 
'internal eccentricities' of France. The most effective way for the 
Alliance to combat the possible danger of acts of e>..'ternal aggression 
2 
arising from domestic upheaval was 'the silent force of its own inactivity'. -i 
Castlereagh always allowed that, while intervention as an abstract principle 
was unjustified, a country could legitimately intervene in another country's 
affairs if its own interests and security were threatened. 5 However, in 
general terms, Britain's watchword should be 'non-intervention pushed .to 
an extreme'. 6 
Any of the above statements could have been ~de by Canning, but 
the different methods he was to employ appeared to mark a change in 
British policy. Canning never shared Castlereagh 's proprietorial interest 
in the Quadruple Alliance and he deplored the use of the Congress System 
as a vehicle for what he was to characterise as the 'Areopagitic Spirit'. 
In 1818 he was at odds with the rest of the Cabinet on the eve of the 
.3 
Congress of Aix-la-Chappelle in refusing to accept that the Quadruple 
Alliance of 20 November 1815· sanctioned a pe:r;-manent Concert of Europe 
as opposed to the short-term supervision of" France. He maintained that 
disengagement would protect Britain from embarrassment on the Continent 
and allow her t<:> pursue a non-interventionist policy the mo!.'e · e~sily. 7 
The dissolution of the European Concert, which ·wa~;; already apparent at 
the beginning of Canning's tenure of the Foreign Offi.ce, meant that new 
techniques would be required for the conduct of British dipl~macy. Whereas 
Castlereagh had relied heavily on his personal intimacy with Alexander I and 
Metternich in advancing the causes of peace and non-intervention, Canning 
adopted a more extrovert diplomatic style in pursuit. of the same goals, 
making the most of his flair for oratory and publicity. He waE: particularly 
adept at forcing his opponents into a corner and making them declare their 
· hands. An early P.xample of this was the episode of the PcEgnac Memorandum 
in which the French were lured into making categorical statements about 
their intentions with regard to Spain. 8 At home he used this technique with 
unfa:lling skill to ·highlight the inadequacj.es and inconsistencies of the Whig 
alternatives to the government's foreign policy after 1815. Though he 
encountered strong opposition to his policies both from his colleagues and 
the King, he was not ~ffectively challenged in Parliament during his tenure 
of office. 
-The Whigs had a foretaste of what they could expect from him in a 
speech he delivered during the Commons debate on the disturbances in 
Naples in lVlarch 1821. In response to calls from the oppositi.on benches 
for the government to embrace the cauE:e of the Neapolitai1 rebels, Canni::lg 
in his "turn insisted that the. Whigs declare their hand. If it was right to 
break alliances and make· war against the 'oppressors' with a view to 
furthering the progress of liberty, that policy shoald be avowed clearly: 
Let there be no mistake· about it; let the country 
be told: "although you are already heavily burdened, 
you must prepa~e for new exertions and new 
sacrifices. True, England is saved, but that is 
not enough, Europe must be regenerated, and at 
your expense." If this was to be done at all, it 
must be done openly and avowedly • • . away with 
the disti!lction between war and armed negotiati.on! 9 
4 
He went on to deride such romantic notions and to -urge neutrality between 
'the two contending principles' so that Britain could preserve her resources 
until the period should aris·e, if ever, when we 
might exercise our only legitimate right _to interfere, 
from being called to quell the raging floods that 
threatened to distract the balance of Europe. 10 
Although this speech was delivered before Canning rejoined the Liverpool 
administration, it already contained all the essential arguments with 
which as Foreign Secretary he defended his policies against criticism, 
and in the face of which opposition. usually wilted. It touched l;lpon most 
of the weak points of the Whig position. The state of disarray in which 
the Whigs found themselves after ~815 was more marked in foreign 
policy than in any other area. In home affairs, a measure of comtnO'l 
commitment to the cause of Roman Catholic relief and a degree of common 
sympathy for the cause of parliamentary reform provided some political 
cohesion for a party otherwise held togethe:r:- by social connection, habit 
and the memory of Charles James Fox. In foreign affairs the Whigs were 
seriously compromised by their record of equivocation over the British 
campaign in Spain and subsequently the Allied campaigns in Europe. 
5 
Throughout the 1820's when the question of intervention was discussed, 
government speakers could refer to Whig attitudes towards the Peninsular . 
War as a ·stick with which to ben.t their opponents. When Canning asserted 
that 'nations cannot afford to be chivalrous where their own interests are 
not directly involved,' 11 his acknowledged authority was none other than 
Lord Grey in a speee:h on Spain in 1810. 12 Among l~ading Whigs, only 
Lord Holland could boast undeviating support of the Spanish cause, which 
he advertised by co!lducting parties of Whigs round the battlefields himself. 13 
' In general, the Whigs tended to misjudge Britain's strategic and political 
interests in the struggle with France, partly because they could not divest 
themselves of their Foxite traditions and partly because they could not 
reconcile their belief in self-determination with the requirements of British 
self-interes~. The cautious and conciliatory attitude towards France that 
was shown by Grey and Hollnud after 1813, with strong emphasis on the 
. principles of peace and self-determination, contrasted strongly with the view 
of the Grenvillite Whigs. Since the collapse of the 'Talents' ministry, the 
followers of Fox and Grenville had maintained a measure of agreement in 
home affairs, although Grenville, admi"i;tedly, seemed to vall!e dynastic 
connection more highly than a common commitment to reform and Catholic 
relief. However, in foreign affairs there could be no compromise. When 
he joined with Fox in 1806 to fill the vacuum left by· Pitt's death, Grenville 
made it clear that his was a war party and so it remained. According to 
Grey, the only cause of real disagreement between himself and Grenville 
.was over the legitimacy of Britain's entry into the war against France 
in 1792, 1~ Lut this was a crucial difference in discussions about how the 
vanquished French should be treated. Only a timely prorogation in 1813 
. prevented the split from becoming fully apparent; in ~n,y case it clearly 
emerged in the debates on the spring campaign in 1815. 15 Grenville 
6 
supported the policy of Castlereagh and WellC:;sley, regarding the overthrow 
of Napoleon and the· restoration of the Bourbons as essential to European 
peace. The more radical of the Whigs, most notably Samuel Whitbread, had 
long advocated pe.ace on the basis of a French return to her original 
boundaries, and by 1814 Grey and Holland had taken up this cause. For 
them the expulsion of Napoleon and his replacement with Louis XV'III was 
not only unnecessary: it showed a blatant disregard for the sentiments of 
the French people. Sir Robert Adair, an old friend of Grey's and a former 
ambassador to Vienna, was a useful sou]x:e of information in Paris and 
assured Grey that the people were strongly Bonapartist in spite of the burdens 
of a renewal of war which Napoleon's return might precipitate. 16 
Even when Napoleon did re-appear and looked set to resume his 
accustomed military activity, Grey continually urged restraint. Not least 
amongst his motives was the fear of Allied defeat. As he had shown while 
Foreign Secretary in the 'Talents' ministry and was to show as Prime 
Minister, his caution and pessimism over military matters amounted to an 
obsession. In April 1815 he urged that the Allies ~hould pause before 
'hnrryi.ng in' against France: quite apart from the doubtful validity of a war 
undertaken purely to remove the Emperor, he feared that defeat was a very 
real possibility. 17 Luckily fpr Grey, Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo 
before he could deliver another pacific speech 18 and he was thus saved from 
a recurrence of the embarrassment he had suffered through his lukewarm 
response to Wellington's victory at Talavera five years earlier. 19 
Had the Whigs shown a more consistent attitude towards the prosecution 
7 
of the war· and the peace settlement we would be able to accept Dr. Mitchell's 
characterisation of their policy as 'Palmerstonian before Palmerston' in that 
they 'urged the twln principle~:! of national independence and national self-
determination.' 2 0 Such a description dignifies the Whigs - as it does 
Palmerston - with a coherence they never displayed. Just as it had been 
impossible to combine Foxite t,enets with a realistic strategic attitude during 
the wm~, so, equally, it was ingenuous to criticise the Vienna settlement 
purely in terms of morality_ and abstract principles. The desultory debates 
in both Houses on the 1815 Treaties testify to the inability and disinclination 
of the Whigs to mount an attack in ideological terms. The Foxite and Grenville 
Whigs could not agree on the issue of legitimacy and self-determination, but 
in any case the universaliy recognised need for retrenchment and guarantees 
against renewed aggression blunted the radical attack. 21. The union of Beigimn 
with Holland, an object of mach retrospective criticism in 1830, was never 
directly attacked.- Mackintosh, the best informed- of Whig speakers on Foreign 
policy in the Commons, delivered a series of tirades against the forced union 
of Genoa with Piedmoilt without pointing the p&.rallel of the Netherlands. 22 
His indignation was genuine enough: 
To unite a people by force to a nation against 
whom they entertain a strong antipathy is the 
most probable means to render the community 
unhappy and make the people discontented and 
the sovereign tyrannical • • • 23 
but it was never channelled into a coherent critique. The reason was clear: 
in the Netherlands British strategic interests were directly involved, ·which 
made national self-determination an impracticable policy. Grey realised the 
weakness of the Wh1g position all too clearly and characteristically declined 
to make the four-day journey from Bowick to London for the Vienna debate. 
8 
He knew that his main objection to the settlement was weak in parliamentary 
terms, for he accepted the need for strategic guarantees, but deplored the 
fcrm they took. He regarded the measures taken against France as expensive 
and ineffective, the standing army and the restoration of the Bourbons being 
positive incitements to internal disorder. In wider terms, by partitioning 
Europe without reference to· natural geographical divisi.ons, the Allies, he 
beU.eved, had acted 'on a false and dangerous principle . . . inconsistent 
with the ancient principle of the Balance of Power'. 24 Even after the 
revolutio~s of 1830, his criticism of the settlement was still couched in the 
same terms: 
instead of acting on the principle of the Balance 
of Europe which would protect the weak against 
the strong, we have departed from that principle 
and formed alliances upon principles of confis-
cation and division ... these transfers have 
never allowed to Europe an hour's security ... 
no man can regret more than I do the separation 
of Flanders from Holland but I ima.gin.e they cannot 
be united except by means the most vicious and 
unjust. 25 
He went on to deny that this breach of the Treaty of Vienna was a legitimate 
object for intervention, though for reasons of military prudence rather than 
sympathy with the Belgian cause. 26 
In such cases, the advantages of justifying a prudent non-intervention 
by reference to Foxite principles of international morality were clear, but 
in general Grey recognised that such universal and binding principles could 
not in practice be appli.ed. In a most instructive correspondence with 
Holland in the winter of lSJ.G-17, he attempted to lay down guide lines for 
Whig policy for the ne?ct session. Holland urged a categorical commitment . 
to non-intervention in France and everywhere else, 27 but Grey recognised 
9 
that France's strategic importance made such a policy impossible. No 
abstract principle could be laid down, and quite apart from the· possible 
damage which such a declaration might· do to British diplomacy, it would 
~ntagonise the Grenvillites irreconcilably. 28 Criticism of government foreign 
policy would have to be centred on the e"pense of the standing army in France 
-
to avoid a split. 29· Holland's reaction was typically forthright: 
Better to part company than sail in a convoy that 
has no determinate object. Retrenchment and 
recovery are mighty good things, but they reall.y 
are too indefinite, not to ·say contemptible obje~ts 
to bind together a large body of men without· any 
stronger tie. Hopes of power and an intention of 
exerting that ·power for some clear and definite· 
object of public policy are the principles- on which · 
a party must be kept together. 30 
However, there was no alternative to Castlereagh's ·policy: even in 1820, 
by which time the activitias of the Holy Al.U.ance invited Whig condemnatloP., 
and the. final split wit~ the Grenvillites had unmu7.zled the followers of Fox, 
Grey's advice to Holland (delivered as usual from the depths of 
Northumberland) was 'to observe the old oppoeition maxim of doing 
nothing.' 31 
The dilemma that the Whigs faced was that Foxite traditions in foreign 
policy could not be adapted coherently to the post-war situation. There was, 
in the words of Professor Davis, 'the deeply rooted belief of a Foxite Whig 
·that. strong language which is not support:::rl, and cannot be supported, by 
armed action is enough to intimidate. a wary and sagacious opponent.' 32 As 
joint guardians of the memory and traditions ·of Fox, Grey and Holland wer.e 
the chief offenders in the adoption of this ingenuous approach to foreign 
affairs. Thus, opposition speeches in Parliament attacking the Holy Alliance 
10 
tended to degenerate into mere name-calling, prompting Canning on one 
occasi()n to wonder whether such 'flowers of Billingsgate' served any 
useful purpose. Indeed it was unlikely that 'those 011 whom t~ey have been 
lavished have not been utterly unsusceptible of feelings of irritation and 
resentment~' 33 This was of course the intention, as most Whig speakers 
made it clear that they did not advocate actual intervention and had to 
settle for vigorous protests. Non-intervention was still th0 accepted principle, 
justified by extensive quotations from Vattel or Bynkershoek, then the 
acknowledged authorities on international Law, or by a ritual reference to 
a speech by Fox. Whig speakers did occasionally venture beyond the pale 
to urge the government to take direct action to frustrate the designs of the 
Holy A-lliance and to offer assistance to European liberal movements. 
Unfortunately, such a stance was even more fraught with contradictions than 
the Foxite approach, as it was not consonant with those most fundamental 
Whig principles of peace and retrenchment. Tierney, the nominal leader of 
the Whigs i.n the House of Commons from 1817 to 1821, illustrated this 
predicament perfectly in his reply to the Speech from the Throne at the 
beginning of the 1821 session. He congratulated the government on its 
'expressions of peace in view of the financial embarrassments of the 
country', but went ·on to· affirm that 
ministers would not be doing their duty if they 
. stood by in a neutral attitude and did not prevent 
the great powers ·from exerc~sing acts of 
· aggression. 34 
Whenever the opposition: attempted to blur the line between neutrality and 
intervention, governr.n.ent speakers unfailingly observed that the only alternative 
to neutrality was a d.etermined and expensive intervention. C~nning's riposte 
. 11 
has· already beer:t quoted; ·in 1823, Palmerston, in an unaccustomed role as 
· a ·speaker in a foreign affairs debate, emphasised the hollowness of the 
Foxite 'moralist' approach. He dep.lored ·the use of threats without the 
backing of armed force, and in any case 
of what use is it to dw 3ll upon abstract 
principles with those who are accused .of 
measuring right by power and of ruling 
their c_onduct by expediency and not by 
justice? One must appiy one's arguments 
to principles which they recognise. 35 
It was in the context of these ideological inconsistencies that the Whigs 
had to mount their attack upon the Holy Alliance and the government's 
policy in the debates ·on Naples, Spn.in an~ Port~gal iri the period of tmrest 
after 1820. To borrow Dr. Holbraad's terminology, the Whigs implicitly 
accepted territorial conservatism while opposing the dynastic conservatism 
that was its neces~:ary counterpart. 36 In his 'Letter to Lord Holland on 
foreign politics' which gained considerable currency during·.the 1820's, Lord 
John Russell attacked the 'compact of feudal lords' which had determinGd the 
shape of Europe. The worst aspect of the settlement in his view was the· 
possibility of Britain being bound to go to war to support the Bourbons and 
indeed to intervene in the internal c·oncerns of every state in .Europe. He 
deplored the passing of the balance of power system and the deprivation of 
the. rights and security of the weaker nations. 37 Even so, it was only after 
the revolutions of 1830 that the Whigs really attacked the territorial settlement. 
The Government's attitude of non-Intervention, support for the territorial 
status quo and neutrality as between the contending principles was more 
consistent .. 
Castlereagh's association with the autocratic powers abroad and with 
12 
repressive legislation at home led to a_ series of attacks on his personality-
and _policy which did his critics little credit. The pioneering work of 
Professors Temperley and Webster has served to emphasise the underlying 
continuity of policy between Castlereagh and Canning. In March 1821, 
Castlereagh was bitterly attacked in both Houses for his inactivity in the 
face of Austrian repression in Naples. Quite apart from the French naval 
thrt·at that could result from the disruption of the Neapolitan status quo, 
Castlereagh could justify non-intervention on the grounds that Naples was 
the domesti_c concern of Austria. Canning struck boldly in his defence by 
advocating strict neutrality on the dynastic issue and questioned the efficacy 
of _foreign example, let alone foreign arms, in fostering constitutional 
governments; Perhaps the Whigs- really wanted war? - but. here he was 
drowned by shouts of 'no, no' from the benc:hes opposite. 38 The Whigs, 
then, were for strong language but nothing more. Castlereagh 's weakness 
was not that his language was insufficiently strong, but that he was 
disinclined to raise his tone in the House of Commons. Lord Salisbury 
was to write of him: 
If only he had constructed a few brilliant 
periods about nationality of freedom, or 
given a little wordy sympathy to Greece 
or Spain . . . the world would have heard 
much less of the horrors of his policy. 39 
However, Castlereagh was not given to public expression of his feelings. 
His condemnation of the Troppau Protocol was unequivocal40 and his 
instructions for the Congress of Verona (which Canning passed on to 
Wellington unaltered) show that he was coming to realise that it would be 
necessary to recognise the· Spanish-American colonies and to allow for the 
13 
possible emergence of an autonomous Greek· government. 41 By their very 
nature, such communications made no parliamentary impact; it \Vas left 
to Canning to reap their political rewards. 
Canning was immediately faced with the French invasion of Spain, the 
logical outcome of the Verona Congress. The invasion was undoubtedly a 
resounding diplomatic defeat for Canning and seemed to be an opportunity 
for the Whigs to tax the government with a failure to take a stern moral 
tone towards the Holy Alliance. Grey wrote to Holland jn his most elevated 
Foxite vein. A declaration should be made to the Holy Alliance: 
"Your principle iS unjust and subversive to the 
independence of nations. Your attempt, if it 
succeeds, must bring Spain under the influence 
and power of France. We not only cannot 
approve but must resist measures founded en 
such p1·inciples and leading ·to such consequences. 
If you go to war therefore, you must expect to 
find England not a membei· of the Confederacy 
I:?ut the ally of Spain." 42 
This attacking impetus was not translated into parliamentary reality. Grey · 
himself decl~ned to come to London to organise the attack at the beginning 
of the s·ession and it was clear that little support would be found for war. 4 3 
Some Whigs were prepared to press for a bigger increase in the navy than 
the government proposed - in itself an une>qJected turn of policy44 - but, 
like the attempt to swell the Spanish rebel force by getting the Foreign 
Enlistment Bill repealed, the initiative came to nothing. lndividual speakers 
did make bold attempts to offer an alte:mative to government policy; indeed 
Grey, for the only ti~e in this whole period, advocated force in the shape 
of naval action to sweep French commerce off the .seas and to deprive France 
of her remaining island colonies. 45 Significantly, on this one occasion when 
14 
he deviated from a non-interventionist ~tance, Grey's motives were 
strategic rather than ideological, based,· as Canning's secretary and 
biog!"apher was to point out, en an overestimate of the power of France 
and the vulnerability of Britain's interests and institutions. 46 Only Hobhouse, 
the radical member for Westmj.nister, was prepared to fix his colours to the 
mast: 
Englishmen would be happy to afford the utmost 
support to a government bent on the preservation 
of the institutions of freedom • . . in the event 
of any war against the tyrant kings of Europe. 47 
There wr..s no support for such a crusade in either House. Lambton, 
Grey's son-in-in-law, and Sir Robert Wilson, the foremost Whig authority 
on military affairs, were full of fighting talk, but only to each other or 
to their respective constituents. 4 8 Russell commented on the disarray of 
the Whigs: 
. . 
We do nothing but abuse one another - the 
violent laugh at the moderate and the :moderate 
look grave at the violent. 4 9 
Canning took full advantage of the Wnig confusion and his speeches, 
not for the first time, swept the ground from under his opponents' feet. 
Using the sort of language that alarmed European diplomats and frequently 
embarrassed his colleagues, he attacked Louis XVIII's Speech from the 
Throne and the subsequent invasion of Spain. He 'earnestly hoped' that 
Spain 'would come triumphantly out of the struggle.' However, he would 
not devjatc from neutrality !mrcly to support the democratic principle: 
Britain's role was to assunw 'the attitudes. and the attributes of justice, 
holding high the balance and grasping but not unsheathing the sword. •50 
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By ruling orit intervention and appealing to the principle of neut~ality, he 
invited a resolute alternative from the Opposition which only Hobhouse was 
prepared to provide. Canning made it clear that there were only three 
situations in which he would consider intervention: if the French occupati.on 
of Spain was permanent; if any attempt was made to help Spain recover her 
colonies, or if France invaded Portugal. 51 It was .never clear whether the 
Whigs obj.ected to Canning's refusal to intervene, or his acquiescence in 
French intervention, and problems of definition bogged down most of the 
speakers. Lord Folkestone's speech on the repeal of the Foreign Enlistment 
Bill (a motion which had been enlarged into a criticism of British neutrality 
over Spain) was described by Canning as displaying 'all the various 
contortions of the Sybil without her inspiration.' Such a description was 
applicable to not a few opposition speeches at this time. The Tory Annual 
Register described Whig attitudes still more pointedly: 
'It was not easy to gather what was the precise 
nature of the charge against the ministry. Their 
voice was not for war, and yet it was not for 
peace. War. was to be avoided, but we had not 
gone sufficiently near to it; peace was to be 
maintained by us, but we had not sufficiently 
endangered it. 52 
Canning's success in the Commons over the Spanish issue was one of his 
. greatest oratorical triumphs. 53 Indeed his superiority was such that he 
feared too much encouragement might have been given to the Holy Alliance. 
Brougham, Canning's only rival as a Conlm.ons ~rator, 54 withdrew an 
amendment critical of government neutrality over Spain a"nd praised the 
Foreign Secretary for his condemnation of the French action. 55 Gratifying 
as this capitulation must have been, we are told that Canning 'actually 
prevailed upon some of his Whig acquaintances, whom he saw quitting the 
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House in disgust, to remain behind and vote 2gainst him'. 56 His description 
of himself as 'a liberal, n~:y a Radical minister' 57 was too plausible for the 
comfort of most Whigs. By comparison, Castlereagh had been an easy 
target. 
The debates on Spain in 1823 were the last attempts at a frontal attack 
on government foreign policy until the era of Wellington and Aberdeen. 
Between 1823 and 1827 the Whigs lost their id~?ntity as an oppositi::m .. 
. . 
Hobhouse tells of a meeting of the Whig Spanish Committee in June 1823, at 
which Grey expressed the _opinion that the cause was hopeless and he 
discouraged others from making sacrifices for its sake. He was in despair 
at the polit-ical situation at home and abroad and wished 'he never had to 
put his foot in the House of Lords again'. Hob house aptly comments that 
Grey was '"always desponding unless he thinks he is ridi.ng the winning · 
horse.' 58 There was no hope of his being in that positi.on while Canning 
was alive. As strategic considerations brought British policy more in line 
with liberal sympathies, Canning began to win 11ew friends· on the opposition 
side. His growing determination to prevent French intervention in Portugal 
and the Spanish American colonies, though propounded still within the 
confines of neutrality between 'the contending principles', was expressed in 
such a way as to suggest, but never overemphasise, his own liberal 
sympathies. Lord Holland and Sir James Mackintosh, two of the most 
influential voices on foreign policy, quickly warmed to him as Brougham 
had; Wilson praised Canning for inauguratine a new era. in British foreign 
policy. 59 
There was some attempt to revive the Spanish issue at the beginning of 
the 1824 session in terms of criticism of the government's alleged failure 
to hold sufficiently strong lang11age to the European powers. The debates 
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seemed to lack any urgency. Lord John Bussell brought forward a motion 
on the subject but admitted that the debate could only be of historical 
value as the time for action had long passed. He borrowed a verse from 
Addison to characterise his ideal of British foreign policy: 
"Tis Britain's care to watch o'er Europe'R fate, 
To hold in balance each contending state, 
To threaten bold, presumptuous kings with war, 
And answ.:!r each afflicted natiom~'s prayer." 60 
He ·admitted that the sense was better than the poetry, but the real short-
coming of his conception of Britain's role was that it was too close to 
Canning's own. In 1826 Canning characterised Britain as Aeolus, the 
arbitrating God of Winds described by his beloved Virgil. 61 On this 
occasion he brushed aside Russell's criticism.s with ease, making great 
play with the emptiness of the opposition bench~s, noting that this was 
their normal state when such motions were debated. He reaffi.rmed Britain's 
neutral stance and emphasised the impossibility of an alternative. Certainly 
it was not to be found in the confused anti-government motion of the 
corpulent Lord Nugent, 62 whom Canning described as 'an enormous breach 
of neutrality.' 6 3 Unlike the Whigs, he was not prepared to make threats 
without naval and military backing. He believed that 'a menace not intended 
to be e:{ecuted is an engine that Great Britain could never condescend to 
employ'. 64 He preferred to provide for war before threatening it6 5 aud 
never relied on unsupportable assertions. The Monroe Doctrine was an 
excellent example of the Foxite moral statement, and as such was welcomed 
by the Whigs. 6 6 However, they were to learn i.n office that, in the context 
of European politics, an assertive foreign policy required e>.lJensive naval and 
military support. 
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As Canning moved into the attack, first over the recognition of the 
Latin American colonies and th(m over Portugal, Grey removed himself 
completely from the debate on foreign policy. From May 1823 to April 
1827 he did not speak on the subject, confining his attentions to Ireland on 
the rare occaslons when he visited the Lords. For the most part he remained 
at Hawick, sometimes wintering in Plymouth for the sake of his wife's health, 
all· the time nursing his implacable hatred of Canning. He had inherited 
from Fox the notion that it was more important to maintain the purity of 
party principle than to compete for office. Canning's career seemed to 
Grey to embody the very opposite philosophy, so that he could never 
countenance supporting him as Foreign Secretary and was never fully 'to 
forgive those. of his colleagues who supported Canning's administration of· 
1827. Grey's high principles, which had definite substance in other areas of 
his political life, were in this matter· a cover for a hatred which was largely 
based on social snobbery. As far as the head of the recently ennobled Grey 
family was concerned, the fact that Canning's mother was an actress in 
itself constituted a disqualification from the Premiership. 67 However, 
Canning was becoming difficult to attack. For example, Grey complained 
to Holland that Canning lagged· far behind Monroe in formulating an enlightened 
policy with ·respect to the autonomy of the Spanish American colonies, but he 
was reluctant to attack Canning for fear of encouraging the ·supporters of the 
Holy Alliance. 68 The Whigs drifted leaderless in Parliament, with Grey absent 
and Lansdowne unsure as to his role and authority; 6 9 in· the Commons there 
was no successor to the discredited Tierney. In any case their growing 
accord with the government over domestic as \veil ~s foreign policy 
loosened habitual. party ties. Tierney himseif set the seal on the new 
situation in 1826, when he declared that 'we are certainly to all intents 
and purposes a branc.h of His Majesty's Government.' 70 
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Not the least of the fact0rs in this accord was Canning's preparedness 
to take more resolute action in response to the changing strategic situatimi 
in Spain and Latin America mentiot-;.€d. earlier. He had hoped in 1823 to 
leave the sword in the. sheath, but when the interventionist methods and 
despotic ideas that had trinmphed in Spain threatened to envelop the New 
World as well, it was time for Bl'itain to change, in Canning's words 
'from an umpire intc an adversary;' 71 Thus, in 1825 and after, his 
influence was paramount in effecting the separation of Brazil .from Portugal. 
He encouraged the Portugese people to accept the constitutional charter 
bequeathed by Dom Pedro on his abdication from the throne, thereby hoping 
to forestall foreign intervention. The same motive had led him to extract 
a self-denyf.ng ordinance from France over PortugaL'1'2 When it was clear 
in 1826 that Portugal's peace was threatened by the actions of supporters 
of the usurping Dom Miguel on the Spani.sh border, he responded to the 
calls for assistance on the basis of tr.eaty obligati.ons. It was time to 
Qnsheathe the sword and 'fly to the aid of Portugal.' Canning's speech in 
the Commot1S on 12 December 1826 was arguably his greatest parliamentary 
triumph. He defused the intervention versus non-intervention debate by 
dressing up a decision based on strategic necessity 7~ and moral obligation 
in crusading language which was bound to appeal to the Whigs. He chose 
his ~ords carefully however: he was acting in defence of Portugese 
independence and not as the champion of the new· constitution. Furthermore, 
he had 'called the New World in existence' as a direct diplomatic counter to 
possible French ambitions. The correct interpretation of this speech 74 was 
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to be keenly disputed in the context of Wellington's subsequent Portugese 
policy, but at the time it found approval in all parts of the House. Canning 
noted with satisfaction that the disposition of Parliament was now towards 
'active exertion' in contrast to the 'passive neutrality' of J.823. 75 
Canning's speech won acclaim from the Whigs in Parliament. Holla'nd 
and Lansdowne expressed unqualified support for intervention, while in the 
Commons Brougham talked of 'principles worthy of our best times expounded 
by the Foreign Secretary with unprecedented en~rgy, fervour and effect.' 76 
There were a few dissenting voices: ·Hume, always a stern advocate of 
retrenchment, doubted the existence of a true casus foederis and his 
amendment was supported by Henry Brigr.t and John Wood for the same 
re.ason. 77 F~om a distance, Grey also expressed his misgivings, though for 
less clear-cut reasons. He expressed to Princess Lieven, the wife of the 
Russian Ambassador and his chief source of political intelligence, h:!.s 
·confusion as to the exact function of the troops to be sent to Portugal, 
particularly in the event of the· Constitutionalists being repulsed. He harked 
back to the error of acquiescence in the French invasion of Spain as the root 
cause of Britain's equivocal position on the Therian Peninsula. 78 Here once 
again he was displaying his caution together with a belief in the arbitrating 
force of moral declarations • 
. Little heed was paid to these views. While Grey was content to remain 
sulking in his tent at Howick, his opinions were received with understandable 
irritation by his colleagues in London. 79 The most influential Whigs were to 
join Canning in open or tacit collaboration in 1827 and whole-heartedly 
approved his foreign policy. Shortly after Canning became Prime Minister, 
Grey delivered a bitter attack on him in the Lords. Canning was deeply 
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. wounded ·by it and cunsidered taking a peerage to reply. 00 It was a clever 
but disingenuous speech, repeating previous criticisms of Canning with 
respect to the French invasiot~ of 1823, his delayed recognition of the 
Latin American colonies and his tardiness in giving l:Jortugal effective 
di:plomatic suppor:. 81 He was unable to resist recalling the boast about 
calling the New World into existence and setting it alongside Canning's. 
ea:r:lier statement that he had done nothing to promote Latin American 
independence. This was a quibble: by 'calling into existence', Canning 
had meant the act of diplomatic recognition. 82 Grey clarified his views on 
Portugal in a more penetrating speech a month later, in which he doubted 
· the wisdom· of interference on the prete:;..1: stated, while showing himself 
aware of the· strategic issues involved:. 
interference might be justified on the broader 
grounds of policy which rendered it necessary 
for us to take measures to prevent France from 
obtaining • . • power and preponderance -over the 
Peninsula. 8 3 
He also gave a timely warning, directed more at the radical elements than 
the government, .of the dangers attendi.ng teo ready an assumption about the 
aspirations of the people of Portugal. The French had been similarly 
embarrassed in Spain: 
By some singular fatality it is found necessary 
by the French to continue an army in Spain for 
the support of the absolute monarchy to which 
·[allegedly] the people are so much attached; 
while we are. supposed to maintain an army in 
Portugal under the apprehension that, if it were 
withdrawn, the constitutional government of 
which the people are so fonq would be immediately 
overthrown! 84 
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In this ·speech Grey divested himself sufficiently or his prejudices to give 
·a glimpse of the moderation anq. intelligence with which he was to approach 
foreign affairs. as Pl'ime Minister after 1830. 
For the time being, however, he was isolated from the ·mai.nstream of 
political activity. He described himself in a letter to his son as bei.ng 
'separated from almost all my old friends .•. I stand aloof from all parties, 
acting upon my own principles'·· 85 His correspondence with Holland and 
Lansdowne seems to have stopped completely until 1830 and his friendship 
with them never fully recovered. He was dependent on Princess Lieven* for 
information on foreign affairs. Grey's weakness for female flattery, together 
with Mme. Lieven's reputation as a femme fatale and political intriguer in 
the ~uropean courts, have focussed the attention of amateur and professional 
historians alil;::e on their relationship and its effect on Grey's foreign ·policy 
when Prime Minister. 86 Phrases from his letters to her, such as 'there . 
are objects, particularly one, for \vhich I would risk everything - happiness, 
reputations, even life itself', 8 7 . led one commentator to cast Grey as Antony 
to Princess Lieven's Cleopatra. 88 ·The balance can easily be redressed. by 
an examination of their letters to other correspondents - Grey to his son 
and the Princess to her brother - which show that they both moderated their 
. true political feelings ·to maintain their friendship . 
. At thil-) time the Princess was a source of info-rmation for Grey on the 
developing situation in the Near East. The Whigs had long nurtured a 
sympathy for the cause of Greek independence, together with a corresponding 
ant~pathy to the Turkish 'i .. egime. In 1822 Grey had urged a benevolent 
attitude towi:i.rds Gre:ece as one of the priaciples of British foreign policy. 89 
A year later the Greek Co:::nmittee was formed by Hobhouse, who. ha<.l been 
*Prince Lieven was Russian Ambassador in London from 1812 to 1834. 
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a close friend of Byron's, and- an influential group of radical M.P.'s. By 
the beginning of 1824 it numbered Brougham., Lord John Russell,. Lambton 
and Mackintosh among its 85 members. 90 The Committee attempted to 
support the Greek cause unofficially by sending money and arms rather than 
pressing for direct British intervention. It foundered badly in 1825 aild 1826 
after inept, and possibly corrupt administration of the loan that had been 
raised on behalf of the Greek rebels. This initiative was in essence non-
parliamentary, even non-party: Grey, Holland and Lansdowne were never 
associated with it. Grey preferred to look at Greek Independence in its 
wider European dimension, as a welcome consequence of the e:>..'"Pulsion of 
the Turks from Europe. Like Fox before him, he was prepared to countenance 
Russian expansion as the necessary cost of Turkish collapse. 91 He wrote to 
Holland in 1826: 
'It seems likely that a Turkish war will be 
courted by Russia . . . in that case I shall 
strictly adhere to the lesson learnt from· your 
uncle ••• the expulsion of the Turks from 
Europe, quocunque modo, I shall think a great 
good. I am much less afraid of the extension 
of the Russian Empire on that side than towards 
Germany ..• At all events, the establi~hment 
of an independent Greece may afford us a means 
of pr.oviding a barrier towards the Mediterranean. 92 
Apart from wishing Britain to have a voice in any settlement of Eastern 
Europe consequent upon a Turkish defeat, 9 3 he wanted to see events takine;-
their course in the Near East without British intervention. Like most 
English statesmen of the time, he was to change his attitude towards 
Russia and Turkey, but at this stage his ideas coincided with government 
policy, at least after Canning persuaded the Tsar to look more favourably 
on the Greek cause in 1825. 
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However, when Canning nioved to the offensive against the Turks in 
1826 and 1827, impelled by strategic considerations and a measure of sympathy 
towards the Greeks, Grey objed;ed, 'just as he had done over Portugal. He 
did not accept that a departure from the principle of non-:-intervention was 
justified to enforce the Treaty of London upon the Turks. He disliked this 
Treaty with its apparently unenforceable dematids: . given his dislike to 
open-ended· diplomatic commitments, he would have been shocked by the 
secret articles \vhich, while not leading directly to the Battle of Navarino, 
at least made arbitration by force a p~ssibiiity. 94 Grey was not convinced 
that the cause of Greek independence was best served by Anglo-Russian 
intervention ·against Turkey, not least because he was beginning to grow 
suspicious of Russian ambitions with. respect to Greece. One month before 
Navarino he wrote to Princess Lieven that he was not satisfied as to the 
expediency of a combined naval operation and looked with jealousy upon 
possible Greek dependence on Russia. 95 He was again isolated: most Whigs 
applauded the joint action at Navarino as the triumph of the highest principles 
of British policy, as Holland and Brougham maintained. Admittedly, some 
speakers, notably Lansdowne and Althorp, whose caution over foreign affairs 
rivalled Grey's, were unea~y at the apparently unauthorised action of the 
allied admirals, but they did not equai Grey for sceptism. He endorsed 
Wellington's description of the battle as 'an untoward event' 96 and deplored 
the use of arbitration by force. The Greek cause could be endangered 
through Turkish reprisals. Actually, there was no alternative in practical 
terms but for Britain to join with Russia in the Ne~r East if the Greek 
cause was to prosper and European peace was to be maintained, but Grey 
advocated a high moral ton a in prefe.rence to 'preventive intervention', for 
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fear of Britain being trapped in 'entagling alliances'. 
To his credit, Grey was prepared to countenance decisive action once 
the iatervention had been unde:rtakei1. This was his concern in the case of 
Portugal and pre-eminently in the case of Greece, in connection with which 
he scored an almost accidentai success in 1829. He had found something 
to praise in Wellington's foreign policy, not least the Duke's apparent . 
reversal of Canningite attitudes in bvour of peace and withdrawal. 
Wellington and Aberdeen were Turkish sympathisers and as such were in\!lined 
to dissipate the fruits of Navarino by inaction. This Grey was prepared to 
accept. 97 However, ·they wished to prevent the expansion of Russian 
influence in Greece by limitinb the frontiers of the new state to an extent 
which would make its independence only nominal. Greece was to be confined 
to the Morea and Athens left in Turkish hands. Although he believed the 
main cause of the government's di.fficulties was Canning's undue encouragement 
of the Russian ambiti.ons through the Treaty of London, Grey feared that 
Wellington's wavering \vould prompt the Turks to go back on their undertaking 
to accept the Protccol of March 1829,. whi.ch had granted dependent status 
to Greece. 98 He wrote to Adair in Paris in September 1829 suggesting a 
compromise between the Arta-Volo. boundaries laid down in the Protocol and 
favoured by Austria, France and Russia, and Wellington's Morean boundary. 99 
Adair transmitted this proposal to Pozzo di Borgo, the Russian ambassador 
in Paris, and it later became the basis of modifications agreed to in the 
Protocol of February 1830.mo Grey noted: 
I little thout;ht that living here at the bottom 
<Jf Northumberland I should be marking out the 
frontiers of new kingdoms. 101 
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It was indded surpri.sing, but it revealed, for all his idleness and 
factiousness, a practical concern that was to serve him well as Prime 
Minister. 
It was to need more than the governmentis mismanagement of Greek 
affairs to bring Grey back to full participation in politics. His indecision 
as to whether to oppose the Wellington mini.stry over foreign affairs · 
gene:::-ally had been noted in 182 9, 10 2 and whi.l e he deplored the . conciliatory 
attitude towards Dam Miguel's usurpation in Portugal, 103 he was inclinoo to 
forgive much on account of th.e previous 'rhodomontade' policy of Canning. 
His equivocal attitude was shared by his old associates, particularly as the 
e>..-p('lrience of office and the passage of R~man Catholic Emancipation had 
softened antogonisms. 104 Even Grey was irked by the apologetic tone of 
some of the opposition motions, 105 and Wellinr:,ton's vacillation seemed too 
often to go unchallenged. However, in the face of a growing fear of Russia, 
it was difficult to attack the government's pro-Turkish line. As Grey 
remarked to Holland in 1830: 
To hate Turkish oppression is very well: .but 
to express that feeling in a way to create a 
belief that you are comparatively indifferent 
to the interests of your own· country or the 
security and peace of Europe is anot,her matter. 106 
The most decisive opposition to the Wellington ministry was to be centred in 
its mishandling of Portugese affairs and ·was to come not from the Whigs, 
but the Canningites. Huskisson and Palmerston had argued bitterly in 
Cabinet with Wellington and Aberdeen over policy towards Portugal and the 
Near East, and the continuation of the struggie in Parliament after the split 
of 1828 changed the whole complexion of the opposition to Wellingtoni.an 
foreign policy. 
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Palmerston's speech of 1 June 1829 on British policy towards Portugal 
has been exhaustively described by his biographers, not least because it was 
their. subject's first important pronouncement on foreign affairs after 
twenty years of unremarkable diligence at the War Office. 107 However, 
Palmerston's contribution has been studied at the expense of those of other 
speakers in that debate, which, taken. as a whole, displays an array of 
attitudes from which the foreign policy of the Grey ministry was to emerge. 10 8 
Mackintosh introduced the motion on the government's attitude towards 
Portugal as set down in the king's speech. His was a classic statement qf 
the Whig position in so far as it teetered between non-intervention and 
sympathetic neutrality. His passion for peace inclined him against making 
any territorial guarantees, particularly in connection with the Ottoman 
Empire, but he felt that Britain's alliance with Portugal demanded a more 
resolute stance. ·He denied that neutrality implied an insensitivity to .right 
and wrong and maintained that it was a line rather than a point, allowing 
a· government to take up a variety of positions upon. it while remaining true 
to the pri.nciple. He accused the· government of going too far in acquiescing .. 
tri the 'base, feeble despotism' of Dom Miguel at t~e expense of the 182() 
constitution, of which he wrongly regarded the British as guarantors. Like 
other speakers in this debate, he attacked the government not for failing 
to ~nteryene, but for intervening on the wrong side. 109 Brougham, whose 
attitudes on foreign policy were formed by a combination of his high 
philosophical approach and Quaker pacificism, enlarged on this theme. He 
asserted that non-intervention in the internal affairs of. other states was 
'a sacred and inflexible principle of policy1 from which the government had 
departed in connection with the Miguellite tyranny. He concluded: 
I would counsel strictly and vigorously non-
interference with reference even to Dom Miguel; 
not that I hate his tyranny less but I love peace 
and the principl~s that lead to it more. 110 
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The speeches of Mackintosh and Brougham taken together provide a 
fair summary of Whig attitudes throughout the 1820's. Peel, whose 
performances in the Commons in foreign affairs debates always suffered 
through comparison with Canning's, ·replied solidly. He maintained that 
the principle of non-interference was distinctly recognised in sending a 
force to Portugal" in 1826, an action taken 'not only in conformity wlth the 
spirit of ancient treaties, ·but of wisdom and sound policy.' While deploring 
Don~ Miguel's 'lapses' he denied both th~t Britain was a guarantor of the 
constitution and that there was any ground for adopting a principle of 
interference. He would not allow British ports and arsenals to be used to 
equip the forces supporting Donna Maria, the legitimate Queen, ~::md her 
Regency of Terceira. 111 Such a reply was sufficient to meet Whig 
criticism, but less effective against the attacks of Peel's former colleagues, 
who challenged his interpretation of Canning's Portugese policy. Huskisson's 
speech was characteristically indecisive, but he did say that Dom Miguel's · 
crimes demanded 'the highest disappro"lJatiotl _of the country and the 
government.' It was not necessary for him to say what Miguel deserved,· 
he added - thus leaving the House in the dark as to his real opinion. 112 
Palmerston was by contrast unequivocal, in a speech that was a thinly 
veiled bid for the Foreign Secretaryship ·in any future administration. 
His inspiration was Canning, although as his ideas developed he was to 
diverge from the Canningite tradition in word and deed. 113 Certainly his 
assertions that the moving power of political affairs was public opinion and 
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. that 'those statesmen who know how to avail themselves ·of the passions, 
. of the interests and of the opinions of mankind are. able to gain an 
asceadancy' were the. essence of Catiningism. Palmerston believed that 
in attacking the withdrawal of troops from Portugal and the government's 
·recognition of Dom Miguel', he was reasserting the true Canningite line 
. . 
over Portugal. He may have had in mind Canning's remark in 1825 that 
.'Portugal has been and always mu.r;;f be English so long as Europe and the 
world remain in anytbing iike theh· present state.' 114 However, in a . 
. . 
speech that showed nothing of the conciliatory tone towards the admiilistration 
displayed by some Whigs~ he rode roughshod ov~r .his master's careful. 
formulations of neutrality and non-intervention to establish an attitude 
wholly his own: 
Time was, and that b1.lt l3:tely, when England 
was regarded as the friend of liberty and 
civili~::ation, and therefore of happiness and 
prosperity in every land; because it was thought 
that the selfish interests and political ·influence 
of England were best promoted by the extension 
of liberty and civilisation. 115 
This went far beyond anything Castlereagh, Canning or their opponents had 
professed. In rebuking Peel for his interpretation of· non-intervention with 
respect to Portugal, he f~rmulated a doctrine which assumed crucial 
importance after 1830. After bestowing on the princ-iple of non-intervention 
its conventional adjective 'sacred', he continued: 
If by interference is meant interference by 
force of arms such interference, the govern-
ment i.s right in saying, general principles 
and our own practice forbid U!:: to exert. 
But if by "interference" is meant inter-
meddling, ·and intermeddling in every way 
short of actual military force, then I must 
affirm that there is nothing in such interfarence 
which the law of nations may not i.n certain 
cases permit. 116 
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We only have to recall Canning's rebuke 'Away \\lith the distinction between 
war and armed neutrality!' to see how f~r Palmerston had strayed. 
The baroque vigour of his denunciations of Dom Migu.el attracted more 
attention than his formulations of non-interventionist policy. The speech, 
copie~ of which Palmerston had printed and circulated to M.P's and the 
ne\vspapers, won him favour among radicals but showed him to be out on 
a limb." In his assertions that Britain should not stop at strong remonstrances 
. 
if they were ignored, and that 'selfish interests were best promoted by the 
extension of liberty', he was no Whig. He had gone further than they would 
ever have dared or the government dreamed. The distinction drawn between 
intervention and intermeddling was bo_th novel and crucial. The debates of 
the 1820's had for the most part revolved around the accepted principles 
of neutrality and non-intervention. The most radical of opposition speakers 
in the Commons were content· generally to blur the line of neutrality without 
proposing 'intermeddling' as a principle. Moderate men were firmly opposed 
to it, as Melbourne confirmed in 1830 when he disapproved of the 'species 
of interference which has been manifested by th~ people of this country on 
behalf of the revolutions on the Continent' as being liable to incite civil 
disorder. 117 Palmerston' s idea of promoting British interests together wti:h 
liberty and civilisation through 'intermeddling' was liable to provoke the 
sort of distrust in European courts that all but the most extreme el emei'!ts 
wished to avoid. That Palmerstoa's doGtrir:.cs, when applied in office, 
tended to conflict with the treasured principles of peace and retrenchment is 
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amply demonstrated by the reluctance of his colleagues to see him return 
to the Foreign .Office in Melbourne's 1835 ministry. 118 Brougham wrote 
that he highly disapproved of PalmeJ.:ston' s forei.gr1 meddling. 119 During the 
Grey ministry," Palmerston's conception of Britain's role led him into that 
struggle between the contending principles which Canning had hoped Britain, 
Aeolus-like, would avoid. In so doing, he was at one with Whig sympathies 
but at odds with Whig principles of peace, retrenchment and non-i.ntervention. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE CRISES OF 1830 AND THE NEW ADMINISTRATION 
In retrospect, events on the continent and in Britain in 1830 assume a 
pattern that encourages sweeping explanations. The revolutions in France, 
Belgium and Poland, which ended once and for all attempts to base a 
permanent states system on the Vienna settlement, coincid.e neatly with 
the· collapse of the post-war political system in Britain through which a 
succession of Tory coalitions had neutralised agitation for reform. Yet 
however much events on the continent were interrelated, the emergence Gf . 
a predominantly Whig administration at heme was the culmination of a 
domestic process whereby the obstacles barring the path to office we.re 
finally removed. Far from smoothin~ the way for Grey and his cGlleagues 
in November 1830, the Fren_ch and Belgians together posed the most serious 
threat to European peace since 1815 and presented the Whigs with the 
dilemma· of intervP.ntion or non-intervention in a most dangerous form. 
The union of Belgium with France was traditionally inimical to Britain, yet 
even in this case it will be seen that th~ Whi.gs were reluctant to shed the 
luxury of an impractical attitude. 
It had been clear for some time that the attitude towards Belgium 
expressed by French liberals· could put their British counterparts in a 
quandary. The Whigs were well informed of their views through their 
extensive contacts in Paris. Holland, Brougham and Russell were frequent 
visitors there. while Grey enjoyed extcnsi\'c correspondence with Sir Robert 
Adair and the Comtesse Flahault, the leading hostess in Parisian liberal 
society, who, as Margaret Mercer Elphinstone, had been the confidante of 
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Princess Charlotte. The Whig~ clearly recognised the character of the 
Polignac administration, but they were alarmed by the aggressive tone of 
the opposition. Grey expresfled this concern in a letter to Lord John Russell 
in 1829: 
My wishes must naturally be in favour of liberal 
principles and opinions ••••• [ and I hope ] the 
present struggle will be favourable to the liberty 
of France, and, I must add, the peac~ of the 
world. Here I must cm"J'ess is my great fear. 
There appears to me from all I have read in 
their ••••• pape;rs and all I ·have heard from others 
including Adair, to b(:l RO much violence on the 
part of the liberals and a spirit of such hostility 
·~fp this country that I cannot help· dreading the 
result of their obtaining the power of the govern-. 
ment. 
For Grey, peac:e was stili the most sacred principle of all: 
I r..m a friend, in the words of the old Whig toast, 
"to the cause of libe:;.,·ty all over the world", but 
my first care must be for England, and if the 
accession of the liberals is likely to be attended 
with th~ renewal of au· the evils of war, I must 
wish for Polignac arid even the devil himself in 
preference to them. 1 
He dreaded the prospect of Britain being drawn into war for the saJ.::e of 
Belgium. Russell was also worried about French ambitions. He copied the 
following passage from Thiers' Histoire de la Revolution F·mncaise (1828) 
.. 
into one of his notebooks: 
Les Pays Bas etaient en effet une acquisition 
importante pour notre patrie ••••• La llollande 
tombait sur l'influence imnt'ediat-e de la F'mnce 
des qu 'elle n 'en etait plus separee par les provin-
ces autrichiennes. Alors la ligne F·mncaise 
. 
s'et-endait non jJas seulement jusqu'a Anvers, mais 
jusqu'lJ. Jexel et les rivages de l'Anglet-erre etaient 
envelojJpe pa·r zme ceinture de-. ·rivages ennernis. 2* 
* Italics Russell's. 
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Palmerston, whose ·growfng .reputation. among Whigs at thi.s time is 
clear from his frequent appearances at Holland House, 3 was less \von·ied. 
He visited Paris twice in 1829 and made the acquaintar..ce of the Flahaults 
and the most important opposition fi.gures - Casimir Perler, Sebastiani and 
Guizot - together with Talleyrarid, Pasquier and Benjamin Constant. He 
perceived the weakness of the Polignac government and hinted at the 
possibility of an Orleanist coup 4 , but trusted in the power of the propertied 
classes to ensure that any new r~gime would be rationally liberal. 5 After 
one visit he travelled back to London with Hobhouse, who noted that 'he 
talked liberal just as well and as freely as if he had played the part all his 
life. 16 
French liberals were at pains to allay fears of a rer..2wal of aggression, 
and to judge by Grey's changing attitude in 1830, they had some success. 
Grey confided to Princess Lieven i.n March that he had changed his mind 
about the international repercussions of a liberal upsurge: 
My fears of a revolution are not very great, 
but if the war openly declared ag~inst the 
chambers should lead to that calamity I do 
not see why the other pow·ers should suffer 
by it ••• 7 . 
In Ju~1e Comtesse Flahault wrote to reassure Grey of the good intentions of 
the French liberals, particularly if the English government was to be 
sympathetic: 
If you were to be at the head of a new 
administration to-morrow, you would 
immediately reap the fruits of your long-
established reputation for liberal principles 
and turn the scale in favour cf England, 
before you had even time by your acts to 
manifest the conciliatory spirit which wc.uld 
govern your commands. 
She attempted to put Grey's mind at rest over the threat of reunion with 
Belgium: 
The English alarmists have made a great bug bear 
of the Netherlands which they imagine is the ... 
object of France ~o regain - so it might be if there 
was a declaration of hostilities because it is w~ll 
known that the whole country would rise . . .. it j s 
equally true that every Belgian wishes to be restored 
to France and that every Dutchman to get rid of his 
anti-nationalist neighbours ... but be aEsured ... 
that nobody here thinks of war or wishes to make 
new conquests. 8 
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When the July Revolution did break out, there was no thought of the 
threat to the Netherlands to lessen the enthusiasm which seenis to hn.ve 
been very widely expressed in England. The parallels with the events of 
1688 were obvious·, while the absence of the excesses whlch h!ld shocked 
many into condemnation of the previous French revolution grea.tly impressed 
observers. 9 Grey recognised that violent resistance had been justified: 
I lament every act of violence attended with loss 
of life. But the unjustifiable and atrocious attempt 
of Charles X and his ministers to extinguish ... 
the liberty of France • . . could only be resisted 
by force and I must rejoice that the resistance has 
so far been successful. 10 
.Wellington, the days of whose administration could, according to 
Palmerston, be measured 'by algebra if not by arithmetic', 11 acted with 
·commendable restraint in the face of this direct violation of the Treaties of 
Paris of 1814 and !"815. At the very least, the events in France justified 
an international congTess under the terms of the .Quadruple Alli.ance of 
20 November J.R15. 12 However, the speed of events in Fr&.nce did not 
allow fot· protracted discussions on the issue of intervention such as had 
been a feature of the immediate post war period. ·In addition, Wellington 
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probably had no liking for congresses after his experience at Verona in 
1822 13 and still less enthusiasm for a war in which he might have had 
to take a leading part. 14 For~unatel)r for him, the idea of the Concert of 
Europe was no longer an effect•.ve rallying call for the Four Powers. 
Wellington's supposed patrona~e of Polignac as Prime Minister led the 
opposition to undere:stimate his rple in preventing a conflict by his quick 
recognition of the Orleanist rt!gime. He thereby cut the ground· from under 
the feet of the autocratic powers, among. whom Russia in p~rticular was 
tempted to mobilise. in the face of expected border disturbances. in Spain . 
and the Netherlands.* In the event the· three powers quickly agreed to refrain 
from intervention although their diplomatic recognition of France followed 
only slowly. Wellington could argue that Charles X's violation of his 
coronation oaths and his desertion of the throne absolved the Allies from 
their obligation to consult formally. 15. 
Wellington and his foreign counterparts were in all probability prepared 
to see the situation in France stabilised, even at the cost of legitimacy, in 
order to concentrate the more fully on the revolution in Belgium, whi9h 
was a graver threat to the European balance. In the Treaty of Paris of 
May 30 1814, the Allies made no secret of the fact that they sanctioned 
the institution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in the interests of the 
Balance of Power. 16 Thus as the disturbances in Brussels at the end of 
August ripened gradually into the formation of a Belgian provisional 
government at the beginning of October, the Allies deplored not so much 
_ the violation of legitimacy but the threat to European peace. In contrast 
to the July ·Revolution, the Belgian cause struck few chords of sympathy 
*Grey later paid tribute to Wellington's role in preventing war: Hansard, 
3rd series, ).1, 311 (16 March ~832). 
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in England. Hobhouse arranged for a loan of 100 guineas to be sent_ to 
the insurgents 17 and Cobbett offered som'3 encouragement to the Belgians 
amidst his praise for the French and denunciation of the English borough-
mongers, 18 but in general, support for the radical cause in France did 
not extend to Belgium. The Belgians had no strong national tradition of 
the sort that had attracted English radicals to support the cause of Greece, 
Polarid or the Italian States. Furthermore, had not Napoleon, incongruously 
the most effective patron of Belgian nationalism, talked of Antwerp as 'a 
pistol aimed at the heart of England' ? Where the Tories and the 
beneficiaries of the Anglo-Dutch trading relationship were furious ·with the 
Belgians, the Whigs at very least were embarrassed. Holland's attitude 
was representative: 
Joy in France I accept - but -1 see nothing to 
rejoice at or approve of in Belgium and I think 
nothing could have occurred more calculated to 
embarrass the well-meaning either in or out of 
France or to furnish the i.ll disposed with 
plausible reasons for engaging _in negotiations 
of remonstrances that may lead to war. I 
believe France does everything in her power 
to prevent such a result and to prove her 
sincerity in abstaining from interference. 19 
Holland, whose energetic and often indiscreet Francophilia was often 
to be a cause of irritation to Grey and Palmerston, was concerned about 
a possible revival of the 'spirit of 1792' in the face of unrest and radical 
agitation at home: 
Meetings and public speeches are hazardous 
- and uncontrollable and they may very unreasonably, 
but not on that account less mischievously, raise 
an alarm that would furnish the ill-disposed with a 
handle to involve us in war and ·arbitrary measures. 20 
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The prospect of intervention and war was a major worry for both 
government and opposition. Grey, · stm at this stage complaining that 
he had· no· political correspondents· eave Holland, 21 was anxious to discover 
whether Britain had any obligation, as opposed to. a right, to inten·ene. 22 
On receiving the relevant documents he was re~ieved to discover that there 
was none. 2 3 Both he and Holland were heartened l.Jy the King of the 
Netherlands' promise to the rebels to consider the case for administrative 
separation, and they expected the Prince of Orange to become Viceroy in 
Brussels, thus preventing the threatened intervention by the· Tsar on behalf 
of the King his son-in-law. 24 But no one had much time for the Belgian 
revolution:-~.ries, certainly not Lord John Russell in Paris: 
It is a curious fact that the present [Francophile] 
party in Belgium would have been ready to 
proclaim Charles X and only object to join France 
o·11 account of her Charters. 25 
Holland called the Belgian insurrection 'foolish and unreasonable. •26 
. Such comments were rapidly being overtaken by events. King William 
·of the Netherlands called for the assistance of the Allied Powers on 
5 October, not because he was incapable of crushing the revolt, but 
through the need to preserve a united front against France if force was 
used. The request for help was parrioo by the Powers. Talleyrand, 
newly installed as Ambassador in London, encouraged Wellington to set _up 
a conference in· London to forestall any .unilateral action. The Five Powers 
agreed to meet at the beginning of November. Grey had already been 
considering the problems of intervention in the light of a permanent 
estrangement of Belgium and Holland, and it led him to some heretical 
statements in view of Whig principles and the traditions of British foreign 
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policy~ Remembering what he had been told by Comtesse Flahault in 
June, he was anxious that the 'spirit of suspicion· and jealousy in France' 
should not be aroused: 
We should not be diverted from this even if a 
civil war [in England] should break out as long 
as we could hope to keep France quiet. 2 7 
HE:l returned to the charge in a letter to Holland three weeks later.: 
To speak plainly (but this to you only), bei.ng 
convinced that Belgiuiil: will ultimately belong 
to France, my· policy would be to prevent the · 
aggravation of that misfortune if it be one by 
the expensive losses of a war undertaken to 
prevent it. 2 ~ 
His remarks were not 'to you only': he repeated his thoughts in a long 
letter to Adair the next day. After reaffirming his belief that there was 
no obligation for Britain to intervene even if Prussia o:r Russia should 
advance, 2 9 he went on to discuss the possibility of ·French intervention in 
Belgium. A wanton invasion would justify British intervention according to 
the Vienna agreements, but if the Belgians pressed for union, this was 
another matter: 
The reestablishment of the sovereignty of the King 
of the Netherlands appears to me to be impossible. 
I therefore would be willing to accede to any 
arrangement which would not ghre this country to 
France. To the objection that it could not exist in 
a state of nominal independence without being virtually 
subject to the influence of France ••• my answer 
is, better this than worse. Such an arrangement 
would at least give us time \V.ith all its chances; if 
\\·e might acquiesce in it without dishonour the 
consequence we apprehend 1~ight not foll.ow and if it 
did it would be less dangerous than if we had exhausted 
ourselves in a vain effort to prevent it. 
*Italics mine, 
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In conclusion, he placed the blame for the situa~ion on Pitt's declaration 
of war after the French invasion of the Scheidt in 1792, which he and Fox 
had denied to be ?. t~ue casus belli,30 and 'what was called the settlement 
of Europe by Metternich, Castlereagh, Wellington and Co.' 31 
This letter has been quoted at 1 ength to point the contrast between 
Grey's cavalier attitude whilst in opposition and his practical concern for 
maintenance of the Balance of Power when Prime Minister.· Fox's 
observa~ion that Grey was 'artless, hasty and imprudent in a private room 
but discretion personified in public debate' 32 is borne out by his private 
letters· at this time. Here he puts his concern for peace above Whi.g 
respect for national self-<letermination and concern for the maintenance 
of the independence of the Low Countries,. a principle unchallenged from 
Marlborough's time. At least he was consistent in his disregard of the 
importance of establishing Belgian independence as a first priority -
during his first months of office he was prepared· to support the Prince of 
Orange as sovereign of the new state 3 3 .- but ·he was to bring his policy 
towards French domination of the Low Countr~.es r.10re into line with 
. . 
tradition in backing Palmerston's uncompromising attitude towards the 
possible election .of the Due de Nemours to the Belgian throne. 
Grey's days of idleness and political self-indulgence were numbered, 
as opposition began to solidify against the Duke and .the reform issue 
ripened. Aithough he had described himself six months earlier as 
'altogether unequal to the discharge of the duties of any laborious office', 34 
and regarded his attendance at the beginning of the Session in April as an 
unprofitable necessity, the death of the Ktng had altered the situation 
radically. Grey no longer had to contend with George IV's implacable· 
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opposition to his taking office 35 and enjoyed the attentions of William IV, 
whose accession marked, accordfng to Princess Lieven, 'a new dynasty'. 36 
Soon afterwards he declared against the Duke, ending two years of 
speculation as to whether he would join the government. 3 7 H~ thereby 
. . . 
found himself at the head of an informally linked opposition group 38 which 
included the leading Canningites - Huskisson, Melbourne, Palmerston and 
the Grants - as well as the Foxite 'old opposition'. 39 Wellington repeatedly 
sounded out the Canningites during the summer on the possibility of their 
joining the administration but they always insisted that Grey be brought in 
also, presumably in order to neutralise the 'ultra' element in the government. 
It was at this point that the Ge·neraJ. Election and the French 
revolution had impinged upon the political situation. It is now generally 
agreed that the election was not directly influenced by events on the 
continent. 40 Most of the contests were decided before news of the French 
outbreak reached England, and extensive study of public attitudes in the 
constituencies which polled subsequently suggests that the debate about 
reform was couched in domestic terms. As for events in France, · the 
prevalent attitude was e>..'Pressed by the Leeds Mercury: 'why, we had our 
Glorious Revolution a hundred and forty years ago'. 41 However, some 
members of the opposition sought to make capital out of the July revolution 
by attempting to establish that Wellington 'vas the power. behind the 
promotion of Polignac the previous year.· It was alleged that he was kept 
informed of all the plans of the French government through unofficial 
correspondence with Lord Stuart de Rothesay, the Ambassador in Paris, 
who had pronounced 'ultra' 1 eanings. Sir James Graham, who was quirJkly 
acquiring a reputation as a radical following his break with Canningism, was 
anxious that Brougham should go to· Paris and make use of his political 
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contacts to discover the truth.42 Some of Graham's remarks - such as 
'your presence in Paris would be most useful to us' - almost persuade us 
to believe that he wished merely to remove the volatile Brougham from the 
political scene at a delicate time. Certainly, since his triumph in the 
Yorkshire election, Brougham had displayed an uncompromising and · 
proprietorial attitude towards the Reform issue that boded ill for any Whig-
Canningit_e coalition. However, as Graham was genuinely critical of the 
government's handling of the French and Belgian crises we must presume that 
his desire to incriminate Wellington was real. -He feared that the Belgian 
crisis would precipitate a war if Aberdeen remained at the Foreign Office, 
whilst rejoicing at the prospect of revolutions in half the courts of Europe, 
sufficient 'to make the hand of our chronicler dizzy'. 4 3 
Graham's colleagues "tended not to express such enthusiasm, preferrtng 
to press the Duke on domestic issues· rather than inflaming feeling ab!'oad. 
Grey's political position had been strengthened unwittingly by the death of 
Huskisson, for whom he had never much cared. 44 · The tragedy at Parkside 
Station had, in Professor Aspinall ,·s words, 'lowered the value of Canningite 
stock' 45 and Palmerston and Melbourne began to respond to offers of a more 
formal junction with the Whigs as they moved towards an appreciation of 
the need for parliamentary reform as well as retrenchment. 4 6 By the end 
of October, agreement was reached on a reform· motion, and although 
Brougham spoilt the initiative by arrogating to himself the responsibility 
of presenting it, his mistake was dwarfed by Wellington's declaration 
against reform in the Lords on 2 November. 47 . 
"For our purposes however, the Duke's observations on the perfe~tion 
of the British Constitution take second place to the discussion of the Belgian 
situation. In the King'.s Speech the Belgians were described as 'revolted 
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subjects•· and His Majesty's Government promis~d that Allies would make 
every effort to restore them to the Dutch crown. 4 8 · In his reply ·Grey 
displayed the extent to which he moderated his views for public consumption. 
As we have already seen, he depre~ated the revolt but opposed any attempt. 
to reunite the two countries by farce. He placed emphasis on his hopes for 
Belgian independence rather than on his willingness to see Belgium reunited 
with France for the sake of peace. He warned the Government that Britain 
would find herself in an awkward, indeed potentially a dangerous position vis 
" a. vis France and a newly independent Belgium in view of the king's promise 
to restore 'such tranquility as may be compatible with the welfare and gcod 
government of the Netherlands'. He enlarged on the problem of relations with 
France and the issue of intervention with one eye on the London Conference 
that was to meet for the first time two days later: 
I believe that if the Duke applies to France for 
her co-operation in interference on the principles 
implied in _that part of the address, he will find 
France soon falling off from negotiation and the 
,~easure leading to the result which it is his wish 
to avoid. 49 
Needless to say he pressed for a declaration of non-intervention and Hume was 
anxious that Britain's treaty obligations be laid on the table as a proof that 
intervention was unjustified. 50 A week later Lansdowne urged Aberdeen to 
state categorically that Britain would not intervene; sensibly enough, the 
Foreign Secretary's reply was non-committal, but he .promised that any 
intervention would be 'amicable'. 51 This was the only plausible attitude 
the government could take, as the reunion of Belgium with France, either 
voluntarily or by force, would almost certainly provoke a warlike response 
from the Eastern Powers. It:.-. his last week of opposition Grey must have 
realised this, as well as the fact that the Conference was a diplomatic 
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necessity rather than an attempt to revive the Holy Alliance, which was 
irrelE:vantly attacl{ed by almost every Whig speaker in parliament at this 
tim€. The Conference had rnt::t on only two occasions when the Wellington 
government was brought down, appropriately enough, on a vote to refer 
Civil List expenditure to a select committee. 52 The Duke resigned on 
16 November and Grey became Prime Ministe1· at the. age of sixty-six. 
The situation he faced in foreign 2ffairs was especially difficult for a man 
of high Whig principles in that he often had to justify the role of the 
Conference, whose status and terms of reference were far from clear, in 
dictating to the Belgians the form of their independence. The terms of 
·reference for the intervention. versus· non-intervention debate had to change 
now that the Vienn~ settlement had been torn apart and the Whigs were in 
office. 
In many respects Grey, an ageing, arrogant and embittered man, was 
ill-suited to the highest office at a time of profound unrest at home and 
crisis abroad. Above all, he lacked the will to govern resolutely. The 
most cursory examination of his papers reveals his diffidence: 
I am quite determined never again to attempt 
anything like a lead in politics. The motives 
which have induced me to form this resolution 
are chiefly personal but they have been confirmed 
by my reflections of the political situation. 
Thfs passage dates not from the 1820's but from 1802 and is addressed 
to none other than Charles James Fox. 53 By this time he had overcome 
his initial dismay at the prospect of living in Northumberland 54 and was 
increasingly loath to forsake the delights of family life in the country so 
sympathetically described by Trevelyan. 55 The remoteness of Howick and 
Grey's reluctance to leave it were a chronic irritation to those who looked 
to him- for a lead. Tierney wrote to him in October 1809: 
Which of your ancestors it was who purchased 
or seized an estate in Northamberland I do not 
know, but I wish with all my heart he had been 
knocked on the head for choosing such an out of 
the way spot for the. residence of his descendants. 
There are a thousand things which it would be 
most desirable to talk over. No good can be done 
unless you come to town. 56 
Grey's fund of excuses was inexhaustible, ranging from conventional 
political explanations to domestic ones - such as his need to supervise 
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a new governess. 57 Though as Prime Minister he was necessarily bound 
to London for most of the year, he generally managed to escape to Howick 
during the long recess, where·, to Palmerston's irritation, he was 
effectively inaccesible in the event of a sudden diplomatic crisis. 
Grey was the obvious choice as Prime Minister in 1830 b:?.cause of 
the respect that his long attachment to the cause of reform had won him 
amongst Whigs and the confidence that his aristocratic and conservative 
mien engendered amongst the Canningites and the Ultra Tories who would 
form an essential part of his government. However, he was ill-suited to 
the role of leader. Sidney Smith had remarkerl on his 'lack of executive 
coarseness15 8 and this trait is revealed in his failure to assert himself 
sufficiently over his colleagues. He had little stomach for a fight ancl 
threatened resignation so often that Winthrop Mackworth Praed, the Tory 
versifier, wrote a poem entitled 'Turn ~gain Lord Grey'. 59 Brougham 
talked of his 'low fit • . • once a month he was for resigning'. 6 0 Grey 
tended to rely on others to supply drive ar~.d ambition, and his c_hoicc of 
men leads us to one of the most enduring criticisms of hir..:1 - his nepotism. 
Trevelyan characteri.ses it as an endemic weakness of Whig governments, 61 
but it is significant that Grey came in for criticism from his colleagues 
as well as from his Opponents. 62 ·Brougham was irritated by Grey's 
habit of considering 
anything of no value that happens never to have 
occurred to l:irn.self, to Lamhton, or to some 
one of his O\va family or of the parish of 
Howicl~. 63 
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Perhaps the real reason for criticism of Grey among Whigs was the fact · 
that the disloyal behaviour of Lambton* his son in law, and Howick, his 
son, in Cabinet _contrived to give Whig nepotism a bad name. Even Grey's 
brother, who was t:L~anslated to .the Bishopric of Hereford with help from 
the Premier, made no secret of his distaste for the Irish Church Bill in 
the Lords in 1833.64 Such reversals pained Grey and helped to give the 
impre~sion that he would not brook criticism, so se~sitive did he become. 65 
The Duchesse de Dino, Talleyrand's constant companion and an acute observer 
of the political scene, noted: 
It is really curwus that a man in Lord Grey's 
.exalted position and of such noble nature a.s he 
should be so sensitive to small matters and have 
nerves so childishly susceptible. 6 6 
Hobhouse complained that Grey was 'always thinking of himself and his 
failures in life.' 6 7 
To set against his failings, Grey brought to the conduct of British 
affairs and foreign policy in particular a wealth of patience and practical 
concern, together with a moral integrity that was genuine, however 
arrogantly displayed. Brougham and Holland praised him for his practical 
sense and tolerance in the face of extreme ·opinion in his Cabinet. 68 
*Afterwards 1st Earl of Durham. 
King Leopold of the Belgians paid tribute to 'something so noble and 
generous' in his char~cter, 6 9 while P almerston, writing at the time of 
Grey's resignation in 1834, described him 2.s the possessor of 
one of the most statesmanUke minds and one 
of the noblest natures that have ever appeared 
in any scene of public affairs. 7 0 
He had an experience of office which so many of his colleagues lacked, 
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and indeed was Foreign Secretary from September 1806 to March 1807, thus 
subsequently gaining respect for his v~ews on foreign policy. In truth his· 
record at the Foreign Office was undistinguished, but he worked within 
narrow limits in prosecuting the war. ·-The Ministry's cautious and half-
hearted attitude accounted for his parsimonious support for the Prussian 
and Russian campaigns in Europe and he was not encouraged by the King's 
preparedness to let Europe burn pro\iided Hanover's safety was guaranteed. 
His experience of foreign affairs, however dated, undcubtedly seems to 
have assisted Palmerston as a newcomer to the conduct of foreign policy. 
Palmerston was grateful to Grey as 'a guide whose direction was invaluable 
and whose kindness was unlimited'. 71 Certainly Grey gave Palmerston solid 
support at ti.mes of crisis and in relation to the issues of intervention that 
particularly concern us, always took Palmerston's part. However, he was 
very unwilling to overrule the opposition of his colleagues . - as we shall 
see in the episodes involving Portugal and the Near East. His Foreign 
Secretary was unfettered by a Whig conscience in urging intervention even 
to the detriment of the Naval Estimates. 
Palmerstcn's tendency to upset the high priests of the Whi.g party as 
well as his opposite numbers abroad72 goes far to explain why he was never 
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· fully accepted among Whigs. Significantly he.-was not Grey's first choice · 
for an office of such prestige: Holland and Lansdowne, the two most 
respected Whig p·eers _after Grey, were approached first. Hol!and declined, 
much to. his wife's satisfaction, on the grounds that he was physically and 
temperamentally ill-equipped to meet- the demands· of office. 7 3 Lansdowne 
· refu~;~ed for similar reasons and it was he who mentioned Palmerston in 
connection with the post. 74Grey adopted the .proposal as soo~ ·as he was sure 
that Lansdowne could not be persuaded. Princess Lieven made extravagant 
claims to the effect that she had persuaded Grey to appoint Palmerston 
. . 
. . . 
rather than Lansdowne to the Foreign Office, 7 5 but although her intimacy 
with both raen would have made her intervention possible, Palmerston's 
appointment can be exphiined in more mundane terms. Grey had been 
impressed with him for some· time and- described him as the pick of the 
opposition side in March 1830. 76 As· early as 1827 Palmerston li.kened 
himself to 'Caspar in the Freischiltz story • . • quite af~aid that Lord Gr~y 
should come with his long arm and claim me as his· own.' 7 7 Palmerston 
was right in stating that Grey sent for him as soon as he was commissioned 
by th~ King, 7 8 but he was clearly not offered the Foreign Office first· as 
he implies. 7 9 
The preoccupations of Grey's ministry, first with Parliamentary Reform, 
and subsequently with Ireland, tended to make foreign .policy an object of 
sporadic Cabinet discussion rather than constant attention~ Initially the 
Belgian Conference took up all Palmerston's time and its complexity was 
such that Grey, for all his interest in foreign affairs, was unable to offer 
much beyond general advice or suggestions &.s to the: wording of despatches • 
. Too much has been made of Lord John Russell's exaggerated claim that 
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Grey revised every despatch that Palmerston wrote: 80 Bell claims that 
Palmerston was 'the pupil of the circumspect Earl Grey'. 81 . Foreign 
diplomats soon discovered that Palmerston was the authority as far as 
foreign policy was concerned: Grey tended to reveal shallowness of 
knowledge in conversation and appears to have been glad to see a heavy 
burden borne successfully by his colleague. 82 Though. inexperienced, 
Palmerston had been preparing for the post since 1828, and had already 
established his reputation as a hard worker and merciless taskmaster at 
the War Office. 83 His regime at the Foreign Office was harsher still. 
His clerks had their working hours lengthe~ed and their salaries cut and 
were criticised for bad grammar and poor hand\vTiting. 84 
.Palme~ston was happy with his relationship with Grey - 'no t\vo men 
ever went on better together in office and very few half as well' he 
claimed 85 - but he faced ·considerable opposition and hostility in Cabinet. 
ins lack of Whig pedigree and his lukewarm attachment to the cause of 
parliam,entary reform went down badly both with his colleagues in the 
Cabinet and government supporters in the House. 86 In the diplomatic sphere 
his determination to uphold British interests against all comers by 
'intermeddling' and threats of intervention by force· if necessary contrasted 
sharply with Whig· notions of a pacific foreign policy, sympathetic to the 
constitutional powers, conducted in a restrained manner. Even Holland, who 
was alone amonst the leading members oi the Cabinet in supporting 
Palmerston's return to the Foreign Office in 1835, admitted that 
his determined stand againet French aggrandisement 
in Belgium coup] ed with his stand on th~ reform 
issue gave rise to suspicions of his lukewarmness 
in the cause of the party and the ministry to which 
he belongs. 87 
In Webster's view, Palmerston had to suffer more criticism than· any 
other nineteenth century Foreign Secretary with the possible exception 
of Canning. 88 Given the traditional absence amongst Whigs of 'habits of 
business as ministers of first class', in B~ougham's phrase, 80 . the 
criticisms from his colleagues were often unfair. They tend E.-d. to 
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underestimate the day...:to-day pressur~ under which Palmerston worked and 
implied that .British ii1terests could be left to assert themselves without 
the advocacy provided by a strong fleet or ~n intermeddling minister . 
. Palmerston' s co~leagues ·could not complain that he kept them in the ·dark 
over policy. He never failoo to ·refer important matters to the Cabinet,. 
and was praised for the toleration and good humour he displayed while his 
. . 
proposals were subjected to rambling and ill-informed discussion. 90 The 
Cabinet often met at the Forei~n Office and frequently supplemented their 
· daytime meetings with sessions over dinner at Lord Holland's or Lansdowne 
House. A full attendance was very rare, and the absence of the Prime 
. . 
Minister or important members of the Cabinet at vital meetings contrasts 
strongly with modern practice. Any minister could summon a meeting and 
there seems to have been no recognised system for informing ministe1·s 
of the summons or its pretext.H 1 One of Lord Holland's many apologies 
for absence hig~lights the slackness of Cabinet arrangements: 
My lady says there is a Cabinet. to-day but as I 
have no summons I will spare myself this ,bad day. 
Lansdowne replied to one of Palmerston's summons in equally cavalier 
fashion: 
Were it not for qur public ·county dinner 
I should be much tempted to run up again. 92 
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The coJleagues with whom Palmerston had to work espoused between 
. . 
them every shade of political opinion, from the Ultra Toryism of the Duke 
of Richmond through Canningism and Whiggism to the ·radicalism of Durham 
and Lord John Russell. Their common bond existed in a belief in the rule 
.-·of the i"anded and aristocratic interests which .they themselves embraced. 
The great weakness of Grey's Cabinet was its lack of executive rigour. 9 3 
This showed itself in the discussion of foreign policy, where members often 
seemed to display either diffidence or an impracticable rigidity of approach. 
The latter failing impressed Talleyrand, who complained that they were 
a~ways comparing the present with the past and citing what ~tlr. Fox said 
on such and such an occasion. · He went on to make a more generally 
applicable criticism: 'Ils ont .1 'air de ne pas savoir que la vie d'un ho:::mne 
d'etat est une transaction perpetuelle'. 94 Home affairs dominated cabinet 
discussions and ministers had little time and still less inclination to consider 
individual aspects of Britain's international relations deeply. From the 
evidence that remains 95 it appears that Palmerston usually managed to 
obtain agreement on a general policy, . although he often had to modify his 
own position to take account of tl;te Cabinet's dislike for positive action. 
As will be shown, the compromises which he had to make are reflected in 
the equivocal British attitude toward.s successive problems of intervention and 
non-intervention. Cabinet diffidence often hampered Palmerston during 
periods of parliamentary recess when he required prompt decisions. The 
reluctance of ministers to remain in town prompted Granville, the Ambassador 
at Paris, to complain: 
I am surprised how, at a moment's notice, when 
questions of vital importance may require immediate 
solution, questions of war arising out of Portugese . 
affairs, or Dutch or Belgian, the major~ty of 
the Cabinet. can retire for months· together into 
the country at a great distance from London. 96 
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· Palmerston made genuine attempts to keep ministers abreast of developments 
during recess by circulating digests of despatches, 9 '1 but acc~unts of ·cabinet 
meetings do not suggest they were much studied. In ·spite of Palmerstou's · 
efforts. the traditional criticisms were made of the scarcity of relevant 
,·.; 
· information. 9 8 .. 
Cabinet attitudes towards successive issues involving possible British 
intervention abroad will become clear as this study proceeds, but the 
. . . 
tendency of members to assume fixed positions, whether out of diffidence 
or prejudice, allows us .to make some. useful generalisations. Lord Althorp 
was pre-eminent among those who wished to avoid the expense and 
complication of intervention. As Chancellor of the Exchequer and Leader 
of the House of Commons, he was an indifferent politici.an but. a II"..an whose 
integrity made him a popular and important figure in the Grey administration. 99 
His naivete :i.n foreig~ affairs was extraordinary. In wishing to cut out 
all expenditure which he considered superfluous, he suggested ·to Palmerston 
in 1831 that Britain's good relations with France rendered a fleet and an 
army unnecessary. 100 In the same year. he expressed his willingness to 
allow France to anne..x Belgium if the evils of war could thereby be avoided. 101 
His passive view often found support, ·though for differing reasons. · Richmond's 
. views on foreign policy owed more to Wellington than anyone and he deprecated 
any forcible attempt to assist constitutional movements or to frustrate the 
designs of the autocratic powers. 1 02 Brougham had more flympathy for the 
Liberal Movement, particularly in ~oland, but his Quaker pacifism and his 
belief in the need for retrenchment were stronger still. The learned 
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articles on foreign policy that appear in his Collected Works stress the 
. . 
importance of non-intervention as a basic principh~. 10 3 ·His detestation 
of war was shared by Lord Melbourne. Although Melbourne was largely 
ignorant of foreign affairs, and close to Palmerston104 personally, he was 
consistently critical of the Foreign Secretary. Like Stanley, the other 
leading Canningite in the Cabinet, he was strongly opposed to intermeddling 
to further the interests of would-be constitutional states. 105 However, the 
Canningites and even Richmond seem to have been more s~nsi.ble of 
strategic issues than their. Whig colleagues and supported Palmcrston's 
firm line against French pretensions in Belgium in 1831. Melbourne seems 
to have enjoyed considerable prestige it'l the Cabinet: during the Cabinet 
crisis over intervention in Portugal in 1834, Althorp described hi.s judgment 
as 'better than all the rest of us put together'. 106 Admittediy, Althorp 
wrote knO\ving. that Melbourne would follow his non-interventionist line, but 
the commentJ coming from a Whig, is significant. The other Canningites 
made less impression on their Whig colleagues. Grant at the Board of 
Trade made little impact in cabinet; Goderich at the Colonial Office 
applauded the resolute stand against France but his praise of .Palmerston 
.was not reflected in any vocal support for his foreign policy. 10 7 
Grey and Lansdowne occupied the middle ground on the issues 
involving intervention. Both men dreaded the prospect of war, and the 
memory of what they considered as Britain's precipitant entry into war in 
1792 was in the forefront of their minds. Such considerations, together 
with their consciousness of the government's parliamentary weakness, 
reinforced theiJ.· natural caution. However, as the two most experienced 
observers of foreign affairs, they appreciated the need for a resolute 
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assertion of British interests even against France, as well as in_ favour 
of the constitutional movements in Europe. We shall see Grey's 
recognition of this need most clearly in his insistence on intervention in 
Portugal, on pain of his resignation, in 183-1. 108 Previously he had shown 
support for Palmerston's assertiveness but no desire to force his colleagues 
to acce.pt such a line. Lansdowne's personal view is· more difficult to 
discern: indeed it is remarkable what little impact. ~1e made in Cabinet. 
He was undoubtedly· the most respected Whig peer after Grey and played 
a substantial role, together with Holland, in advising the Prime Mit1ister 
on Ministerial appointments. 109 Grey clearly tried very hard to persuade 
him to become Foreign Secretary. We m:ty assume that he offered the post 
to Hollr..nd first out of deference to their long friendship, knowing that he 
.would refuse; it was generally expected, that Lansdowne would tak<~ the post. 
When Holland heard of his refusal he predi~ted that 'it will, if versisted in, 
annoy very many of our friends' •110 · Even as Lord. President La!!sd~wne 
was e>..1Jectro ·to make a substantial contribution to foreign policy. Lord 
John Russell anticipated that 'in foreign affairs a few very good things 
ought to be hit out by Lord Holland and Lords Grey and Lansdowne', 111 
but the promise was not fulfilled. Although, Uke Holland, he received all 
important despatches before their circulation to the rest of the Cabinet 112 
and had a good grasp of French domestic polities, his voice was not heard 
often. After one cabinet meeting Holland commented: 'his opinions on foreign 
affairs were, as usual, right but faint'. 1-13 Clearly Lansdowne lacked the 
ability to project his character and opini.ons. His caution was such that he 
was described as havingbccn'born in 1780 at the .age of thirty'. 114 Twenty 
five years ago Sir Charles Webster described him as 'a somewhat enigmatic 
figure' 115 and he is likely to remain so while his papers are closed to 
historians. 
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Lord Holland's character was anything but .enigmatic. He shared the 
Foxit£ background of his colleagues, but his identification with liberal causes 
in Portugal and elsE:-.vhere led him to adopt a more trenchant attitude towards 
the Eastern Powers and to display a greater preparedness to intervene. As 
he commented to Brough::tm: 
I may ba a little less Quakerish and non-interfering 
than you, from a persuasion that sE:asonable 
interference and even the attitude of war is 
sometimes the best means of preventing it. I 
do not believE:· that the expression of Quakerism · 
in the Enelish Cabinet just now is half so likely 
to avert • • • war as a persuasion ~hat England 
• • • is determined to side with France ·and 
J ... iberalism 116 
Such sentiments were not far removed from Palmerston's, but his views 
were not consistent. He bombarded Grey and Palmerston with memoranda 
advocating armed intervention against. Dom Miguel's Portuguese r~gime but 
showed little understanding of the need for Britain to assert her- strategic 
interests· in ·Belgium or the ~ear East. His indiscreet promotion of French 
interests made him a difficult colleague. Palmerston commands admiration 
for restr~ining himself until 1840 before remarking: 
Individual members ought not, as Lord Holland 
does every day of the week, to speak openly to 
all who come near them about the policy and 
measures which the Cabinet .•• is embarked 
in, just as a member of the Opposition would 
speak of the policy of an administration which 
he was labouring to turn out. 117 
Holland's saving graces were his good humour and a willingness to defer 
to the superior judgment of Grey and Palmerston on crucial issues of 
policy. However, he gave Palmerston some difficult moments, not least 
because of the prestige that his garrulous wife enjored in Whig society. 118 
The radical element in the Cabinet might have been mqJected to 
welcome Palmerston 's vigorous support ~f the Liberal Mov-ement after 
1832. However, his pragmatic approach and his intermeddling methods, 
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not to ·mention his wavering attitude towards Reform, had lost him radical 
support. His firm stand against France and his initial refusal to confront 
the Eastern Powers over the suppression of the Polish revoit branJed him 
as a reactionary in radical eyes. Russell supported Palmerston over 
intervention in Portugal throughout 1833*, but personal factors prevented 
Palmerston from commanding full- hearted support from radical opinion in 
the crusade against the Eastern Powers. He was viewed with suspicion in 
that he had served his apprenticeship i!l the Liverpool administration and 
his attitude towards foreign affairs owed nothing to the mo!·al and almost 
philosophical approach favoured by the Whigs in the].r years of opposition. 
There was jealousy too: both Durhaw· and Hussell Heem to have nursed 
ambitions of occupying the Foreign Q_ffice. 119 
Palmerston's strongest source of support for intervention came from 
Graham at the Admiralty. This was particularly noticeable after 1832, 
·when the partial settlement of the Belgian questior.. freed the Royal Navy 
for duties in Portugal and the Near East. He ilu.cceeded brilliantly in 
reducing Naval expenditure while placing at Palmerston's disposal the 
strong fleet that was the essential adjt~nct to an assertive foreign policy. 120 
He shared with Palmerston an executive flair not possessed by their 
colleagues, together with a firm grasp of the strategic considerations that 
lay at the heart of Palmerston' s foreign policy. He was a great admirer 
of Palmersion and a constant source of moral support. in the Cabinet. 1z 1 
Among those outside the government, Palmerston found strong 
*Durham had resigned from the Cabinet in March 1833. 
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support for intervention from Sir George Shee, his private secretary and 
a contemporary at Cambridge. 122 Although the Foreign Office was not 
yet structured to allow the t\vo u.nd~r-secretaries any voice in policy 
making, 123 Shee's personal· friendship with Palmerston and his special 
role oi intermediary between the Foreigii Office and the Press 124 made 
him m~re prominent than Backhouse, his superior. Shee seems to have 
been an enthusiastic interventionist. In August 1831, he urged Palmerston 
not to be swayed from holding str.:mg language towards France by Grey's 
misgivings, 12 5 while ov.er the Portuguese question he was reported by. 
Brougham to be competing with Holland in the vehemence with which he 
advocated intervention. 126 The same could not be said of the King, wh0se 
acquiescence in the Reform Act should not blind us to hi.s essential 
conservatism. He entertained a deep su·spicion of the French, which was 
strengthened by the events of 18:U and led him to support Palmerston's 
firm line and to award him the Order of the Bath in June 1832. However, 
as the gap between Britain and France and the Eastern Powers became 
· apparent, William was most reluctant to endorse joint action in support of 
dubious constitutional ·causes. He had been prepared to see his beloved 
Royal Navy used to threaten France, but disliked its being brought in to 
assist France in coercing Holland or advancing the legitimist causes in 
Portugal and Spain. 
Similarly, Palmerston did not enjoy consistent support in Paliament. 
His dry oratorical style and his High Tory pedigree did not appeal to the 
Radical element which mi.ght have been expected .to approve of intermeddling. 
During his first eighteen months in the Foreign Office, Palmerston's 
coldness towards neform seemed to complement his toughness towards 
France, his reliance upon a resurrection of the Concert of Europe (though 
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it had been initiated under Aberdeen) and, pre-eminently, his neglect of ·the 
Pc_>les. In spite of Palmerston's identification with the Liberal Movement 
in ;Europe after 1832, his defence of the Tsar against personal attacks 
a~d his failure to forestall Russian lntervention in Poland and Turkey 
outweighed his encouragement of constitutionalism in Germu.ny and Portugal. 
The Radicals were no clearer than their counterparts of the 1820's about 
the alternative to. non-intervention in such cases; WHlia'm. Iy justl:;• remarked 
that those who were making the· loudest outcry about Polar1d would have 
refused to grant the suppli.es necessary ·to support. their causc. 127 However 
it was the manner, rather than the policy adopted towar:ds powers such 
as Russia, which was important to the ·Radicals, and Palmerston seemed to 
let them. down. The pressure of work at the Foreign Office prevented him 
from attending Commons debates regularly. Government policy sometimes 
had to be expounded by Althorp, the Leader of the House. We have already 
seen the extent to which his naivete over foreign affairs contrasted with 
:Palmerston's shrewd approach, and his statements on matters of policy 
were generally brief and rarely informative. Unsympathetic critics 
attributed Pa.lmerston's frequent absences to his social activities, 128 unaware 
of the crushing burdens he carried as Chairman of the London Conference 
and the conscientious head of an overworked and ill-organised department. 
Admittedly, Palmerston '.s dismissive attitude towards the House did not 
help. He wrote in 1833 that the House of Commons did not 'care a straw 
for foreign affairs' and that the Government could do as it liked. 129 Such 
a statement was not wholly justified, for although within the cvntext of 
intervention or non-intervention parliamenta:l.'y debates were often ill-informed 
and retrospective, the strength of feeling that was occasionally displayed -
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for instance over th-3 Government's failure to restraht Russia· in Poland -
brought home to ministers the fact that the views of members could not 
be. ignored, however belatedly they were e~-pressed. 130 Palmerstor1 could 
expect even less co-operation from the Lords, where the Tory majority 
was a constant threat to the Government. Grey· and his colleagues were 
perpetually on the defensive against charges of intervention· or a breach of 
neutrality with regard to Belgium and Holland or Portugal. · Aberdeen and 
the Marquis of Londonderry were the most insistent critics, but the 
trump card for the opposition whenever French aggrandisement, whether 
in Belgium or Portugal, was debated was the presence of the Duke ·of 
Wellington, that bulwark against the ambitions of the French in the Low 
Countries and on the Peninsula. Fortunately for the Government, debates 
on foreign policy were _poorly attended, as they were in the Commons, and 
divisions were rare. However Wellington did score a major personal 
triumph in June 1833 by carrying against the Government a motion alleging 
a departure from the principle of neutrality in t_he contest for the Portuguese 
throne. 131 
Thus Palmerston could never count on widespread support for his 
personal view of foreign affairs. He was not primarily a man of principle 
and system as Castlereagh and even Canning had been! 32 His opportunism 
and intermeddling were at variance with the rigid traditions of the Whigs. 
Viscount Hawick, briefly a member of his father's Cabinet and one of 
Palmerston's severest critics, wrote in 1865: 
Palmcrston was never an advocate of non-intervention 
in the sense now put upon the words . . • I do not 
blame "him for this .•. But Pahnerston was not 
satisfied with exercising the power of this country in 
supporting right and .justice . • • but was an 
incorrigible meddler . and his meddling would 
not have been confined to words if he had had his 
own way. He all but broke up my father's govern-
ment by insisting on sending a force to Portugal 133 
Hawick's view, full of factual errors, reflects his very strong prejudices 
he regarded Palmerston as hi:lving been 'little more than Head Clerk to 
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my father' on the Belgian Question ~ but it was widely supported. Grey's 
brother-in-law, 'Bear' Ellice, sometime Secretary at War, led the 
unsuccessful campaign against Palmerston's re-appointment in 1835. Their 
quarrel was with his methods rather than his achievements, but style was 
as important as content for the Whigs. Despite the crisis situation in 
November 1830, members of the Cabinet were not pr~pared fo'r Palmerston's 
personal brand of what we might now call 'brinkmanship'. -The tentative 
attitudes of his colleagues which had already been displayed in opposition 
were amplified in government owing to their domestic preoccupations and 
an over-awareness of parliamentary weakness. Prince Czartoryski, the 
Polish statesman and President of the Provisional Government of 1830-1831, 
commented on how the ministry did not- seem 'to feel strong or to be 
conscious that it stand~ at the head of a great nation capable of exercising 
a powerful i.nfl.uence- on the destinies of Europe'. 134 If Palmerston' s attitude 
was active, theirs was passive, particularly in regard to the promotion of 
Britain's strategic interests. The Belgian Question threatened to entail 
British intervention both on strategic and ideological grounds. On their 
past record, the Whigs did not ·seem likely to afford unequivocal support 
on either count. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
PROBLEMS OF INTERVENTION: THE INDEPENDENCE OF BELGilJM 1830-1832 1 
Successive attempts to dominate the European continent, from the 
tim as of Louis XIV to the Kaiser, have proved that there has been no more 
enduring British diplomatic principle than the maintenance of the independence 
of the Low Countries. In his authoritative State Paper, Castlereagh had 
restated t~at principle within the framework of his non-interventionist foreign 
·policy: 
The importance of preventing the Low Countries, 
the military barrier of Europe, from being melted 
down into the general mass of French power . . • 
might enable the British Government to act more 
promptiy upon this than perhaps any other case of 
an internal character. 2 
It is particularly appropriate to invoke CastJ.ereagh 's opinion as a 
preface to a discussion of Palmerston's policy over Belgium in the crisis 
years of 1830 and 1831. Though the most promi::lent Canningite in Grey's 
·Cabinet, his insistence on the primacy of strategic interests over the 
conciliation of the French, and his belief in a resurrected five power 
. cor:tcert as a means to maintain the Balance . of Power, are in the best 
traditions of Castlereagh's diplomacy. Thus Palmerston would never 
countenance the payment of 'Danegeld' to France: 
There is no security for Europe but by standing 
upon a strict observance of treaties m~d a strict 
abnegation of all inlc~·cslcd z:ic~us of aggrandisement. 
The moment we give France a cabbage garden or 
a vineyard we lose all our vantage ground of principle. 3* 
* Italics Palmerston's. 
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As indicated above, his position entailed explicit approval of the 1814-15 
settlement. He wrote to Holland in April 1831 that the Treaty of Vienna, 
Ho\vever objectionable in some of the details of 
its- arrangements is yet with its accessories of 
Paris and Aix-la-·Chapelle the best security of 
Europe against the inveterately enervating spirit 
of France.4 
Such a philosophy accorded ill with the Whig tradition~ of Francophilia 
and indifference to\vards strategic considerations. G:i.·ey's irresponsible 
attitude towards the Belgian crisis while in opposition has already been 
described, and while he moderated his views in office in supporting 
Palmerston, his colleagues showed themselves to be less flexible. I.ord 
Holland in particular urged that a more sympathetic attitude be shown 
towards French aspi.rations. Holland was foremost among those who seemed 
prepared to let nature run its course. with regard to Belgium de::;pite the 
concomitant defeat for British principles and the cause of self-determination: 
Those damned Belgians are the origin of all 
mischief. I honestly wish . th~y had been well 
dismembered and partitioned between France, 
Holland, Prussia and England sb .. 'teen years 
ago - and when the time comes, as it inevitably 
·will, if I am alive I shall rejoice at it. 5 
Thus it can be- appreciated that radical differences of approach and belief 
lay behind the apparent unity of the Cabinet in resisting successive French-
inspired threats to the peace - the election of the Due de Nemours, Louis 
Philippe's son, to the Belgian throne, the slow French withdrawal from 
Belgium in August 1831, and the question of the Belgian barrier fortresses. 
Various factors conspired to ensu:&.·e titat the crises of 1830-31 did not 
constitute a manifestation of the Nethe.rlands problem in the classic form, 
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such as was precipitated. by Napoleon or envisaged by Castlereagh in his 
State Paper, though it has often been thus described. The question arose 
in peacetime and the balance of power \vas upset not by war, but by 
revolution. The Powers were faced with the necessity of reintegraUng 
the Netherlands into the States system, both on a strategic and a political 
' . 
level. Thus there was the possibility of intervention on two planes -
dip!.omatic intervention to settle the arrangements for the new Belgian 
State, and intervention by force to prevent its being absorbed into France. 
Palmerston had to endure criticism in both areas. The ill-defined role of 
the London Conference - not 'intervenante, mediatrice ou arbitre' as 
Metternich appreciated 6 - brought forth charges of intervention in the 
internal affairs of other states. 7 On the strategic level, the principle of 
intervening to prevent the French acquiring Belgium was weakened by the 
possibility of an unforced union of the two countries taking place at the 
insistence of the Belgians.. Given their support for French liberalism as 
opposed to Belgian nationalism, Palmerston's Whig colleagues needed much 
persuading that it was worth threatening France with an ruqJensive and 
debilitating war to prevent such a union. Palrr..ei'ston was therefore 
especially concerned to prevent a direct confrontation with France, and 
he sought to achieve this by outmanoeuvring her diplomatically, both at the 
Conference and in Brussels. Thus for example he was prepared to sanction 
'intermeddling' in the election of a sovereign in an attempt to prevent the 
Due de Nemours assuming the throne and thereby precipitating war. 
Such complexities were not anticipated when the Whigs came into 
office. Mole, briefly the French Foreign Minister in 1830, made an appeai 
to the Powers to. maintain a strict recognition of the principle of non-
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intervention in Belgium, which Talleyrand reiterated in his first interview 
with William IV. 8 In truth this appeal, which the French claimed was 
based .on the principles of Castle:ceagh and Canning, was a calculated att-
empt to forestall_ any unilateral aCtion by the Eastern Powers and to allow 
the pro-French element in Belgium full rein. However, Mole's appeal was 
echoed by Whig speakers in Parl-iament 9 arid probably encouraged the 
incoming ministers t'J believe that the Belgian question could be resolved 
if Britain and France we:::-e to act together to prevent intervention. 
Palmerston first chaired the London Conference on 30 November 
1830 and he was quickly to discover that the issues of intervention and 
non-intervention could not be so sha::.-ply defined as the Whigs l~ad hoped. 
Although the very existence of the Conference was a guarantee against 
unilateral action, the means of ensuring that the Netherlands could continue 
. to perform their traditional barrier function remained to be found. This 
was a matter in which strategic considerations loomed larger than questions 
of national self-determination, to the extent that any new political arrange-
ments would have to be approved, if not actually prescribed by the Pov.·ers. 
Palmerston made it clear that recognition of the independence of Belgium, 
which was agreed by the plenipotentiaries on 20 December, was directed 
solely towards the restoration of tranquillity in the Netherlands and of the 
balance of power in Europe as a whole. 10· His colleagues in the Cabinet 
appreciated that it was necessary for the Powers to mediate between the 
two parties in the dispute and they shared Palmerston's estimate of the insig-
nificance of Belgian independen~e pe'r se. However, there was some disag-
reement among cabinet members as to whether it would be legitimate to 
take this form of diplomatic intervention further in choosing a sovereign for 
the new Belgian state. The dilemma over intervention or non-intervention, 
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which was continually to face the Grey ministry, overhung. Cabinet discussions 
at least until the beginning of Februal"y, when the crisis over the possible 
election of the Due de Nemours was resolved. 
Palmerston and Grey had been anxious from the outset that the 
choice of a Belgian sovereign should not reflect any na.tior1al bias. It had been 
assumed that the Prince of Orange would become King or Viceroy of Delgil,l!n, 
. as this seemed the best way of preserving peace ~nd avoiding military inter-
vention: Lord John Russell expressed just such hopes to Lady Holland on his 
first day in office. 11 -However, the Belgian Provisional Gover~m.ent defied 
the Conference by passing a vote excluding the House of Orange-Nassau from 
power in perpetuity. Fortunately for the Belgians, the response which might 
have been expected from Tsar Nicholas to this insult to hil:l brother-in-law 
the King of the Netherlands was muted· by the outbreak of the Polish revolt 
at the end of November. Even so, it 'was clear that the Powers would not 
allow the Provisional Government to choose a sovereign freely. 
Palmerston and Grey cast around widely. for suitable candidates 
should an Orange restoration prove . impossible. Their first suggestion was 
Archduke Charles of Austria, but Talleyrand thought that such a choice 
smacked too much of a royalist restoration and in any case Metternich mado 
it clear that he would not support the candidacy • .1 2 Then they approached 
Leopold of Saxe-Coburg •. an obvious candidate from the British point of 
,,view and always regarded as a British nominee, although Talleyrand claimed 
to have adopted him first. 13 On the same day that the Conference agreed 
on the independent status of Belgium, Grey told Palmerston in _confidence 
that Leopold was prepared to accept the Belgian throne, following the visit 
of the two to Claremont the previous week. 14 However, Leopold's candidacy 
was not seriously considered at this stHgP-, particularly as the Orange party 
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in Belgi_um was beginning to appear strong. The reports of Ponsonby, one 
of the Conference Commissioners in Brussels and Grey's brother-in-law, 
appeared to reopen ihe possibility of placing the Prince of Orange on the 
throne notwithstanding the exclusion vote. Grey was not convinced: in 
the letter telling of Leopold's willingnes~ to accept the crown, he told 
Palmerston of his belief that 
any attempt to replace the Prince of Orange [at the 
head of the Belgian people] would produce a civil war 
and farewell to all hope that the French Government 
would be able to restrain the party, which is even 
now almost too strong for them, urging measures that 
would lead to the annexation of Belgium to France. 
Grey's change of tone towards France is apparent here and was noted soon 
afterwards by Princess Lieven, who was pleased to see that he viewed the 
July Revolution in a different light. 15 Palmerston shared his scepticism 
about the Orange candidacy, particularly in view of the Prince's unpopularity 
in Brussels after his abortive attempt to occupy the city in September. 16 
However, by allowing the Prince's claims consideration, Palmerston cquld 
be assured of the goodwill of Russia ii1 the continuing deliberations about 
arrangements for an armistice and the proper political and territorial 
complexion of Belgium. 17 Furthermore, Ponsonby was convi.nced that the 
tenuous basis of Orange support would be strengthened by the possibility 
that the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, the possession of the King of Holland 
. 
occupied illegally by the Belgians, might be included in the new Kingdom of 
Belgium in the event of the Prince becoming King. 18 By the first week in 
January, Grey and Palmerston seem to have been satisfied that the Orange 
cause was worth encouragement. Characteristically, Grey set himself against 
any direct interference, though not ruling out undercover support on 
Palmerston's s~g&'estion. ig He wrote to Palmerston ·on 10 January: 
I think the reasons against the open interference 
of Ponsonby and Bresson [the French Conference 
·commissioner in Brussels] obvious. But I wish 
it could have managed to ·have a sort of invitation 
sent from his partisans to ·the Prince of Orange. 
A communication made by him, if not very 
carefully. looked after, may spoil everything. 2 0 
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In the event the Conference plenipotentiaries drafted a letter on the .Prince's 
behalf, soliciting support in Belgium, which Grey revised personally. 21 At 
. . 
this stage Palmerston shared the conviction of the Plenipotentiaries of the 
Eastern .Powers, that peace could be assured only ·by the election of the 
Prince. 22 
The complexities surrounding the choice of a monarch and the definition 
of the Belgian state were little realised and still ~ess understood by the 
rest of the Cabinet. On the question ·of the choice of sovereign, Whig 
opinions. as expressed by Holland, Grant and Russell reveal a concern to 
be done with the Belgian problem with a minimum of interference or offence 
to France. Suggestions as to suitable candidates were thrown around with 
abandon. Holland's comments to Grey at the beginning of January give· a 
good indication as to the tone of the debate: 
My general view is to attach little importance 
either to the Prince or to the form of the new 
Belgian state • • • as either from inclination 
or weakness it must be virtuaily French • • • 2 3 
· In his new role of statesman, Grey could not agree: 
There seems no· case but for strong; language 
[towards France] • • • I wished and hoped for 
better things but whether from insecurity or 
weakness, things are taking a. course in which 
we cannot acquiesce. 24 
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However, there was support for Holland's approach from an unexpected 
source. As· President of th2 Board of Control, Charles Grant had no 
great insight into foreign affairs and the paper on Belgium which he 
submitted to Grey on 20 January 1831 * admitted as much. However, his 
highly individual approach towards the problem of choosing a sovereign is 
a valuable guide to a strain of lay. opinion in the government. He shared 
with Holland an impatience for a quick conclusion to the negotiation8, which 
.. 
arose from an imperfect grasp of their complexities. There was more to 
'· 
the work of the Conference than the calling of an armistice, the proclani.ation 
. . 
of Belgian independence, a·nd the exclusion of obviously unsuitable candidates 
for the Be1.gian throne. The election could not be too soon for Grant, who 
rather unfairly blamed the Belgians for the delay. The most fascinating 
aspect of the paper - and one which may have prompted a. rueful smHe 
from Grey - is Grant's opinion as to· a suitable monarch. His personal 
preference for a Bourbon hardly merits serious consideration, but he was not 
alone in acquiescing in the possible choice of Otto of Bavaria. Otto was 
unacceptable to Grey and Palmerston in that he was Louis Philippe's 
nephew and under the tutelage of the Comte de Merode, the figurehead of 
the cause of Franco-Belgian union. Grant brushes aside objections to his 
election, even under Merode's regency, in terms reminiscent of Holland by 
maintaining that voluntary union would not justify British interference. 
Unlike Holland, who always feared the strength of reactionary Francophobe 
opinion, he did not believe that support for a war over Belgium would be 
forthcoming in such a situation. His assertion that whoever was chosen 
could be relied upon to put Belgian inte:::-ests first can l:ave dona little to 
*For a full transcript see Appendix I. 
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allay the fears of French· aggrandisement which Palmerston constantly 
expressed and Grey increasingly cam1.3 to share. 
Grani:' s opinions are indicative of the state of ignorance among 
members of the government as the Belgian election approached, the first 
of the crises· involving possible British intervention abroad. Palmerston 
was normally at pains to keep his Cabinet informed., but at this time the 
. . 
pressure of work relating to the Conference seems to have allowed little 
time for exposition. The crucial protocol of 20 January 1831, guarantee~ng 
Belgian neutrality, 2 5 took even Grey by surprise. 2 ~ The Prime Minister 
and his cabin~t were predictably enthusiastic about the protocol, particularly. 
. the pledge ·of non-interference containe~ in Article VI. In view of the 
Cabinet's lack of prior knowledge, the evidence of Lord John Russell's 
contribution to the idea of Belgian neutrality, contained in his Ea?'ly 
Corresj>ondence 27 and apparently overlooked by historians, is of especial 
interest. . In an undated letter Holland refers to 'the protocol • • • you 
begot in a corner'; 2 8 tl~at th~ proto"col of 20 January is referred to here 
is confirmed by another letter from Holland of 27 January, urging Russell 
to use his influence with Grey to moderate the British attitude towards 
France: 
You begot the neutrality of Belgium. beget the 
peace of the world. 2 9 
Thus it seems very likely that Russell was consulted even though 
Pahnerston, normally cited with Bulow, the Austrian plenipotentiary, as 
the chief architect or" Belgian independence, 30 ~v~s not cl0se to Russell. 
Certainly Russell's correspondence with Holland during the month of 
January demonstrates his concern that Belgium should enjoy adequate 
70 
protection from. -attack. 31 . Furthetmore, Holland would hardly have written 
in terms of 'begetting protocols' had the similarity between the views of 
Russell and Palmerston been coincidental and only retrospectively apparent. 
For all his presumed prior knowledge of the neutrality proposal. to 
the Conference, Russell was as slow as the members of the Cabinet* to 
appreciate the gravity of the situation as two of the unacceptable ·candidates, 
the Due de Nemours and the. Bonapartist Due de Leuchtenberg, came to 
the fore. The French seemed to be i.ricreasingly uncooperative. Talleyrand 
had already dropped dark hints about the possibility of France acquiring 
Luxemburg and of the Belgians electing Otto of Bavaria. 32 In the Conference 
he· had 'fought "like a lion' to have Luxemburg, properly a part of the German 
Confederation, made neutral, undoubtedly so as to facilitate a possible 
French annexation of Belgium. 3 3 Palmerston' s success at the Conference had 
been neutralised by events in Belgium. -By the last week in January it became 
clear that the Prince of Orange's candidacy was doomed, as, quite apart 
from France's equivocatio_n, 34 Ponsonby had misled Grey and Palmsrston 
about· the size of the Orange party in Belgium. As a commissioner of 
the Conference he had compromised his country by his overt championship 
of the_ Orange cause. 35 However, Ponsonby \vas justifiably incensed at 
.French criticism of his Orangism, 36 as his colleague Bresson was busy 
canvassing support for the Due de Nemours (on the orders ·of Sebastani, 
the French foreign minister) to prevent the election of the Bonapartist 
Due de Leuchtenberg. Grey quickly concluded that there was no virtue 
in supporting the Prince further, 37 although Palmerston, while agreeing 
*Russell di.d not join the Cabinet until June 1831. 
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that there· should be no intervention in the election, stood by the Orange 
cause throughout- so a·s not ·to offend the Eastern Powers. 38 Palm~rbton 
. . 
may als~ have had in mind the necessity of ret&.i~ing the confidence of the 
King at a time of domestic and international crisis. William IV's suspicion 
of French motives had led him to doubt the effectiveness of the neutrality 
protocol as ~ safeguard against aggression. 39 Palmerston adopted this 
position partly for ~he sake of form: he real~sed better than anybody that 
British action, in -the shape of intervention or non-intervention, was wholly 
to be determined by the French Government's attitude towards the election of 
Nemours or Leuchtenberg. 40 . 
Naturally tlH~ Francophiles in the Cabinet, of whom Grant and Holland 
·seem to have been most prominent at this time, put the preservation of 
· peace above the maintenance of the Low Countries barrier. Unfortunately 
·for them, Talleyrand re-opened the question of territorial 'rectifications' 
and the possibility of making Antwerp either a free or a Hanseatic-type 
port. 41 Such a proposal was obviously unacceptable to Britain if the Low 
Countries were to remain a strategic barrier.42 Palmerston managed to 
obtain the Cabinet's agreement to a firm line towards France on this and 
the Nemours issue on January 25, but· there was much uneasiness. In 
reply to Holland's report of the Cabinet decision·, Russell wished for a 
-
·more conciliatory approach towards France: 
The French proposals are ill-timed and unreasonable 
but can't we leave the protest to Austria and Prussia 
• • • unless we do something to please them [the 
-French] they will do as the Polea do _in their marriages, 
make a flaw in tho contract so that they can afterwards 
break it. 4 3 
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Though Grey was looking to any som·ce to prevent intervention and war, 
he was not so favourably inclined to France. 'Their conduct in bringing 
forward this claim for the restoration of the old frontier is very suspicious' 
he wrote to Palmerston on the 26th. 44 With the Prince of Orange out of 
the running -in the election, Grey showed a willingness to consider 
Leuchtenberg's candidacy, which he had earlier ~ismissed in favour of the 
Prince of Orange and out of deference to France. 45 Holland was horrified 
at the thought. He wrote to Russell: 
There seems a malicious sort of pleasure in the 
prospect of Leuchtenberg' s election to the crown 
of Belgium because it would offend and disappoint 
the French government ! As if it would not be ·a 
triumph for the warlike party in France and lead 
to changes in ministry and dynasty that would 
indulge them in war. 
He urged Russell to use his influence with Grey: 
Your word would I know have weight - and I am 
sure you agree with me in thinking that • • • 
nothing but direct aggression or positive insult 
from France should justify us brea~dng with her. 4 6 
Russell did write to Grey in these terms, 47 b~t his view was soon overtaken 
by events. The French signature of the 12th P~otocol, which set out the 
financial arrangements to be made b~tween the Low Countries, 48 had been 
well received in Cabinet as an indication of French goodwill, 49 but Talley1·and's 
independent action in this matter did not reflect the attitude of his government. 
Palmerston learned from Granville's despatch of 31 January that the French 
had disavowed the 12th Protocol and the Bases de SepamUon that \~·ere 
annexed to it, on the grounds that the matters involved were outside 
Conference jurisdiction. 50 The previous day Talleyrand bad asked 
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Palmerston about the possibility ·of Nemours becoming King of Belgiu.m. 51 
Palmerston made his famous reply that Britain would never agree to this 
union of Belgium and France and tb!i.t he expected a generai war to ensue 
in that event. He summoned an emergency Cabinet meeting for 2 February. 
The Conference put out a protocol at Palmerston's instigation renouncing 
any offer of the Belgian crown to princes of their respective counLTies. 52 
Naturally Talleyrand refused to sign such an overt anti-French st~.tsment. 
Unfortunately we have no record of the crucial Cabinet meeting of 
2 February, beyond Palmerston's report to Granville of the decision to 
require French fulfilment of the undertaking to refuse the offer of the crown 
to Nemours. 53 It is clear that Holland· and the others· deferred to Grey's 
and Palmerston's superior knowledge of the .situation in agreeing to confirm 
that Belgium should be really and not tl.ominally independent. Very probably 
Palmerston had the support of the Catmingites - lVIelbourn0 nnd Graham -
in this ·strong line, together with Stanley and Bichmond. If Lansdowne showed 
his hand, it is no longer visible to us. The statement in Palmerston's 
letter that 'we are reluctant even to think of war' provides the best clue 
as to why Francophile opinion in the Cabinet was overruled on this occasion. 
Fortunately for the waverers, on this occasion, as during all the interna.tional 
crises since 1815, they were never driven to declare themselves either 
way. ·Palmerston's mention of the possibility of Prince Charles of Naples' 
election - the first time he had seriously considered it - suggests that the 
. Cabinet was prepared to go to great lengths to avoid having to threaten 
France with wa.r. 
With the election due on 3 Febru~ry, such suggestions v•ere too late, 
The previous week had seen frantic activity in Brussels, with Ponsonby 
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continuing his efforts to foil the pro-French element, justifying his conduct 
in hastily composed fetters to Grey and Palmerston, aptly compared in a 
subsequent parliamentary debat.e t~ a boarding school girl's letters home? 4 
Ponsonby was accused of canvassing for Leuchtenberg so as to foil Nemours, 
and was also implicated hi the Orange plot to obtain· the crown by a ·coup 
d'etat, whose failure greatly embarrassed Grey. In a letter to Princess 
Lieven who, unlike Ponsonby, was directly involved in the plot, 55 Grey 
regretted ever having espoused the O~ange cause. 56 Meanwhile Bresson, 
whose partisan behaviour eventually convinced even Sebastiani of the n~ed 
to recall him, had been joined in Brussels by Colonel Lawoestine, a 
soldier from the Napoleonic .era, who 'burned to enter Belgium at the head 
·of his regiment'. 57 Their enthusiastic reports together with pressure 
exerted in Paris by De Celles, the Belgian envoy, and Sebastiaui, help to 
explain Lou~.s Philippe's equivccai answers to Briti.sh requests to renounce 
the throne on Nemours' behalf~ In the event Nemours was elected with 
an overall majority of one vote.· His cause had triumphed because of 
Sebastiani's instructions to Bresson n~t to communicate the neutrality 
protocol to the Belg·i.an Congress. France's adherence to the decision to 
leave Luxemburg in Dutch hands, if known, would have lost Nemours the 
20 votes of the Luxemburg contingent, 
Ponsonby's reaction to the vote was predictable: 'The bubble has burst' 
he told Grey; 'France is mistress of Belgium for as long as her arms are 
able to keep it'. 58 Palmerston reflected ruefully on differing French and 
British constructions of non-intervention, in the light of Sebastiani's 
various proclamations to the Belgian cong:t:'ess: 
It is rather too good for the French government 
to be objecting to our protocols on intervention. 
when they officially dictate to the Congress as to 
the choice of a soverei.gn. and declare that in a 
given contingency they will march in to unking 
the new monarch. 59 
75 
Although Sebastiani made an official statement on 5 February that France 
would not support Nemours, the promise was not immediately fulfilled and 
the delay aggravated the situation. In truth the French government was in 
a parlous condition. .Talleyrand, increasingly conscious of the danger of 
war,. was acting indepe~dently of Sebastiani's instructions. The French 
government was under severe pressure from extremists not to ~esert the 
Belgians, who in the interim had appointed Surlet Chokier as regent. 
He looked to France to support them in their rejection of the Bases de 
Separation. While the Cabinet waited anxiously for confirmation of the 
French attitude, Palmerston became convinoed that it was 'blowing up for 
war'. 60 At the same time Grey wrote to Flahault urging the French to 
act honestly towards the Conference, and expressing a willingness to 
consider any suggestion as to an alternative rnonarch - even the Neapolitan 
prince. 61 HowP.ver, subsequent events showed that Grey and . the Cabinet 
were less prepared to bind France to· definite undertakings once the refusal 
of the Crown for Nemours h~ been confirmed on 17 February. 62 The 
19th Protocol of 19 February, 63 of which Palmerston and the disobedient 
Talleyrand64 were the principal authors, in essence reasserted the demand 
of the Conference that both Belgium and France accept the Bases de 
Separation. This· remarkable document, which appears in full in Bulwer 
and. Ashley's official life of Palmerston, 65 contains a lengthy preamble 
about the sanctity of ·the treaties concluded in 1814 and 1815 with respect to 
Belgium, before going on to reassert- the inviolability of the Bases de 
Separation against all protests from the Belgian Congress and,- by implic-
ation, the French government. Parts of the preamble were controversial in 
view of traditional Whig attitudes towards the Vienna settlement: 
D'apres ce prinCipe d'un ordre superieur (le grand 
principe du droit public) les Traites ne perdent pas 
leur puissance, quels que soient les changements 
qui interviennent dans l'organisation interieure _des 
Peuples. Pour juger 1 'applic?-tion que les 5 Cours 
ont faite de ca meme principe, pour apprecier les 
d~terminations qu'elles ont prise_s relativement a 
la Belgique, il suffit de se reporter a l'epoque de 
l'Annee 1814. 66 
Such. sentiments did not accord with Grey's opinion of the treaty arrange-
ments, as expressed three months previously: 
[The Powers] •••• havir.g suqceeded in destroying 
that mighty power by the energies of the people 
••••• they set about a new division of Europe in 
which the weak were unceremoniously sacrificed 
to the strong •••• and engaged to uphold the new 
order of things thus established by a forci.ble supp-
'ression of ·an public opinion.. 6 7 
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Grey made strenu~us efforts to secure a revision of the protocol,' but 
he found himself at odds With Palmerston for the first time on a major issue. 
He confessed to Holland: 
1 really do not know what I can do more ••••• the 
conference adheres to the original form of the Proto-
col after submission of my corrections* ,gone over 
with Palmerston. I cannot agree with it in this for·m 
as Palmerston well knows - what more can I do? 
It \\111 be a good thing to bind France if we can, but 
consider, what would be the effect if the War Party 
came in after we had signed a ·protocol they might 
object to on popu1ar grounds? 6.8 
* Not found among ·either Grey's or Palmerston's papers. 
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Holland shared Grey's anxiety although, significantly, he accepted the main 
body of the· document: 
. Perhaps Palnierston could be persuaded by 
Talleyrand: you or me to cut out the first ••••• 
part of the preamble, to curtail the commendations 
of the 1814-15 treaties with which you and I cannot 
agree. Th2n I would press for a speedy signature. 
Let Palmer-stan know what you think, for he is, 
poor fellow, in a great stew. 69 
Palmerston responded to Grey's entreaties. but was unable to persuade his 
.fellow plenipotentiaries to adopt the Prime Minister's revisi.ons. 70 There 
had be.en deadlock on the 22 February but the ·signatures of all five 
plenipotentiaries were obtained the next day to the Protocol in its original 
form. " 1 Grey must have been anxious as to the French government's 
response and wJ.th good reason. On March 3, Louis Philippe rescinded 
his previous acceptance of the 19th P·rotoccl, having already protested 
once again a~out the protocol of 20 January. Shortly afterwards however, 
the King seems to have had a change of heart, for he took a firm stand 
· against the violent element in France by making the judicious Casimir 
Perier Prime Mi.nister on {4 March. At the same time Le Beau, a 
sensible and moderate man, became Foreign Minister in a reformed 
Belgian government. In retrospect these appointments mark a clear end 
to the first phase of the Belgian negotiations. The February crisis had 
passed with the British government apparently behaving in traditional style 
with regara to Belgium, 72 though, as w~ have seen, prominent. niembers of 
the Cabinet held heretical views on the sub~ect. The question posed by 
the Annual Register over Whig policy towards the French invasion of Spain 
in 1823 immediately jumps to mind would the \Vhigs have gone to war? 
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It is unfortunate that so little information on Ca}?inet views of the crisis 
· can be gleaned from private papers. However, the attitude of Grey towards 
the 19th protocol, which serves as a pendant to the Nemours episode, shows 
a reluctance even on his part to. face. directly the issues raised by the 
breach of the Vienna Settlement and possible French domination of Belgium. 
The equivocations of the Whigs in opposition over intervention, whether 
s.trategic or ideological in motive, and over the status of the post-war 
settlement were beginning to be apparent in office. 
The crisis arising from the Dutch and French invasions of Belgium in 
August 183.1, to which we must turn next, produced a similarly equivocal 
response from the Cabinet which, happily, is better documented. It centred 
around the t~rdiness of the French army in withdrawing from Belgian 
territory after the retreat of the Dutch, and appeared to call for an even 
stronger threat of British interventi01i than had been required in February. 
However, Franco-British relations had markedly improved in the interim. 
Furthermore, a con.frontation \vith France would be prejudicial to the Belgian 
cause· in that the success of the Eighteen Articles, 7 3 a revision of the 
Bases de Separation in favour of Belgium, depended upon close Franco-
British co-operation in breaking down the obstructive tactics of the Dutch. 
Palmerston and Talleyrand had worked closely together in securing the 
election of Leopold of Saxe--Coburg on terms acceptable to the Conference, 
·the .Belgian Congress and the Prince him:::;elf. 74 The question of the 
barrier fortresses was the only major source of friction between the 
governments, as the August crisis was to show, although French notions 
about the advantages of a partition of Belgium occasionally came to the 
surface. 75 
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In public the government was keen to present a common front over 
Belgium with France .and the Eastern Powers. Grey replied to Aberdeen's 
criticisms of British policy, as expressed in the debate on the King's 
Speech of June 1831, by emphasising the concerted nature of Conference 
decisions. 7 6 Aberdeen had attached the governmetit for depa.,:'ting from the 
principle of non-interfe-rence that the King's Speech acknowledged. 7 7 He 
cited the exclusion of certain candidates from the Belgian throne as instances. 
T~is action, 
U it was not in fact intervention, it was what our 
neighbours the Fr~nch, who were very fond of new 
words, might very fairly call 'quasi-intervention'. 78 
R-adicals criticised the g-overnment in similar terms, 7 9 but their motive was 
ideological; the Tories aimed to strengthen the Dutch government, with whom 
- they were in close touc~ through Falc~, the popular Dutch Ambassad~r. 
There was , always the possibility that the R-eform offensive would fail and 
bring.Aberdeen back to the Foreign Office. Aberdeen criticised the arbitrary 
manner in which the 'inviolable' Bases had been guperseded by the Eighteen 
Articles and said a few uncomplimentary words about the choice of Leopold 
as Belgian King. In his reply, Grey denied that the principle of non-
intervention had been breached, as certain candidates for the Belgian 
throne were generally agreed to be unsuitable. He put forward the choice 
of Leopold as an example of the corporate nature of Conference decisions. 80 
Unfortunately, Leopold was not popular in France, where he was seen as 
a British agent. At the end of July Louis Philippe made an inflammatory 
speech announcing that the barrier fortresses would be destroyed, and that 
Belgium would not be a member of the German Confederation if she were 
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to acquire LuXemburg. 81 The speech, which greatly embarrassed the British 
government in that it· dealt with matters in which France was not to be 
consulted, drew angry protests i~ the Lords from Wellington, who throughout 
the Belgian crisis regarded the barrier fortresses almost as his personal 
property. 82 Grey'~ reply was halting· and non-committal~ 3 
Any difference between the French and British governments on these 
issues was dwarfed by. the action of the King of the Netherlands. On 2 August, 
without prior warning, Dutch troops invaded Belgium. - the final answer to 
repeated Conference requests to adhere to the Eighteen Articles. At mid-day 
on 3 August 84 Palmerston, as Chairman of the Conference, received a letter 
from the Dutch government replying. to the request of 25 July to send 
·plenipotentiaries to negotiate a final settlement with Belgium. 85 The letter, 
~hich Palm.erston opened at the ~onference session ne}\.1: day, contained a hint, 
but not a definite statement, about the imminent resumption of hostilities. 
It reminded the Conference of its undertaking to implement the Bases and 
went on: 
••• si cette supposition etait dementie par 
l'even~m.ent, il ne resterait au Roi d'autre 
alternative, que celle de recourir a ses 
. propres rnoyens et de mettre un terme a des 
condescences • • • La demarche meme ci-
dessus mentionee .des Repn}santes des 5 Cours 
· a la Haye prouve evidemment combien a cette 
epoque la Conference de Londres etait convain~uc 
des Droits du Roi de recommencer les hostilites. 86 
This passage is particularly important in view· of subsequent Opposition 
claims in Parliament that the Dutch. had given warning of the resumption of 
hostilities. In fact the Dutch army was already on the move when the letter 
was sent, and the British government learned of it independently on the 
afternoon of 3 August. 8 7 
.·-~ 
81 
This first phase of the crisis was characterised by an unus"ually 
rapid and unanimous response from the Cabinet. Palmerston was determined 
to p:cotect Belgium and her new King, even if no other Power would 
intervene, 8 8 and he received strong support. Grey was abJ e to tell him 
that those members of the c~.binet who \vere present at the accusto!n.ed 
weekly meeting over dinner at Lansdowne House on 3 August were unanimously 
agreed that Codrington's squadron should be dispatched to the Downs. 89 
Graham was to send appropriate instructions immediately, although 
Codrington (pace Navarino ?) was not to be told of their object. It could 
be argued that the Apeed of the Whig response in this instance was due to 
the consideration that the d~spatch of the squadron was a precautionary 
measure rather than an act of intervention - and also that the mere 
movement of ships did .not affect the Naval Estimates. However, there 
, 
must have been othar thoughts in the minds of the mini.sters to account 
for their resolve. There was the threat to 'the cause of liberty all over 
the world' posed by the Dutch invasion: also, in view of the rapidity with 
which parliamentary questions were tabled, there was the threat of a 
Tory attempt to stop the Reform Bill by compromising the government 
over Holland. 90 
Almost immediately the Cabinet was presented with the yet more 
challenging situation arising from the French advanc~ into Belgium. The 
first hours of the campaign had displayed the superiority of the Dutch 
·:army, commanded by the· Prince o.f Orange, over the Belgians and their 
plight was desperate. Leopold had written to both the French and British 
governments 91 requesting armed assistance and the French replied 
immediately, mobilising with ominous haste in the view of those who 
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believed that they wished· for partition. 92 The next week saw the most 
frenzied activity on both the diplomatic and political fronts. Uniquely 
during the term of Grey's ministry, the Opposition were able to bring 
pressure on the government during a diplomatic crisis rather than offering 
retrospective criticisms. The movements of the opposing armies could 
not be concealed a8 could di.sagremnents in conference. The question of 
possible intervention in Belgium had re-emerged with a vengeance, and 
Tories were quick to point the parallel with Napoleon's entry .into Belgium 
in 1815 •. In response, the Cabinet had to adopt a positive attitude to 
coincide with that of the Conference while not jeopardising the ripening 
relationship with France. The auguries were not promising. Brougham: 
writing before news of the French advance had reached London, was in a 
non-interventionist mood and seemed to fear the French more than the 
Dutch: 
I cannot help feeling most anxious about France and 
a little about Prussia. One thing is clear - if we 
move one inch we give both a preta-...::t to enter 
Belgium or Holland • • . Surely we could put it to 
Prussia that her best policy is to be firm and make 
France abstain from entering Belgium - for if once 
on any pretext she gets possession no French 
government is strong enough to withdraw. 
But as to France - I must say I feel most strongly 
the necessity of sending a most powerful and 
important special ambassador to let the King 2.nd 
ministers know our feeling and that of the country 
against war - you [Grey] would do it with most 
effect but I fear you could not be spared. Then 
Lansdowne seems the next best • • • 9 3 
Brougham's l~tter has been quoted at length to bring out its full Foxite 
flavour - s3asoned as i.t 5.s with his Quaker pacifism. However, events 
had already overtaken it when it reached Grey who learned (from the 
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newspapers !) on 6 August of the French advance. 94 The Conference and 
the British Cabinet were embarrassed both by the French action and the 
secrecy which had surrounded it. Pahnerston was clearly angry: 
The French having taken a wrong step by moving 
their troops without our concurrence we might 
remonstrate and pick a quarrel with them about 
it, but ••• the wiser course is to try to obtain 
a hold over the future proceedings of the French 
troops and this I think the proposed protocol 
effects. 95 
The protocol in question, 96 which accepted the French fait acc01njJli while 
bindi.ng the army to the decisions of the Conference, had been pushed through 
with difficulty in face of the pro-Dutch sympathies of the Eastern Powers. 97 
Palmerston dutifully witheld his signature to allow the Cabinet, which he 
had summoned to an emergency session on Satnrday, 6 August, to voice its 
opinion. The Cabinet agreed that the· French army should be asked to 
withdraw as soon as the armistice was re-established. However, the meeting 
was unsatisfactory, and as such throws light on the nature of decision making 
in Grey's Cabinet. In the first place, Grey, together with Melbourne and 
Russell, was not there as he had left London on the Friday for a weekend 
audience with the King at Bdghton. Durham gave him a report of the 
meeting: 
I am very sorry you did not come up - for we 
have lost 2 good hours ••. Misfortune was that 
being there, every member of the Cabinet, old 
and young, able and decrepit, thought himself 
at liberty to discuss the whole state of Europe 
• • • They all particularly request tha,t you excuse 
yourself from the King to attend C2.binet to-morrow -
truly nothing could be more necessary. 9 8 
This letter speaks volumes for Palmerston's patience, which Graham and 
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Brougham were to admire, 99 in allowing rambling and ill-informed 
discussions of foreign affah·s to go on in Cabinet. There 'is also the strong 
impression that ministers, including 'Palmerston on cccasions, looked to 
Grey for a lead on foreign policy. In his journal Lord Holland gives a 
more detailed account of the confusion that irritated Durham. 100 Most of 
the discussion centred around .the good faith of the French action. The Tory 
element in the Cabinet, notably Goderich and Richmond, believed, as did 
Bagot, the British ambassador at the Hague, that the French had jumped the 
gun in inter'\rening as the result . of a deal with Leopold over the barrier 
fortresses and Luxemburg. Richmond suggested that the Conference should 
be dissolved and the Dutch and Belgi.ans. left to confront each other - not a 
practical suggestion but one which was later to occur even to Grey as the 
negotiations grew yet more tire~ome. 10 1. Palmerston was able to reassure 
his colleagues that Biilow and Wessenberg, the Austrian and Prussian 
plenipotentiaries, had confirmed that it was essential to reach amicable 
agreement with France over the movements of her troops if peace was to 
be maintained. This news was apparently a great relief to Holland, 
Lansdowne and Brougham. Consequently, agreem~nt was reached on the 
attitude towards· France, though out of dererence to Grey and the other 
ai?sentees, final judgement was deferred. There was some debate as to 
whether the English fleet should be placed at the dis·posal of the Conference 
as the Protocol stated. However, as Durham· pointed out in his letter to 
Grey, the French army was on a similar footing, having been reprimanded 
for acting independently. 
Grey's reaction to the events of the \'!eekend was surprising. He 
showed a.n une""1Jectedly tough attitude towards France and wished to reserve 
the right for Britain to act independently. He was dissatlsfied with the 
protocol of 6 August: 
If· we concede this [the subordination of the Royal 
Navy to the Conference] as an equivalent to a 
similar engagement on the part of the French army; 
it must be remembered that it is only an engagement 
on the part of Talleyrand and may be disavowed-in 
that case we would be very inconveniently bound to 
the Conference, on the majority of which we cannot 
depend. 102 
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Grey's amendment was a.dopted in ·~he final text, but Palmerston was still 
successful in his attempt to 'let off the French government as easily and 
as handsomely as we could'. The protocol in .its final form was a master-
piece of ingenuity in view of the French breach of accepted diplomatic 
practice. However, it was a short term expedient. Questions were being 
asked in Parliament about the exact status of the French troops, which the 
government could not ignore. Palmerston was questioned closely in the· 
Commons about the P.xtent of British foreknowledge of the French advance 
and the apparent violation of the engagements of 1814-1815. His answers, 
based on the premise that 'there could be no previous agreement for an 
event which was not foreseen', failed to satisfy his critics, like his subsequent 
attempts to explain why the Dutch letter of 1 August remained unopened in 
his pocket for so long. 10 3 Londonderry and Aberdeen led the assult in the 
Lords, supporting King William of the Netherlands against any a~legations 
.of bad faith and cr.iticising the gov~rnment's acqui.es~ence in French excesses. 104 
Alarmed by the s~rength of feeling and by Sebastiani 1 s hint that the French might 
remain in Belgium until the fortress question was settled· to their satisfaction, 
Palmerston told Granville: 
I have been assailed with questions and notices 
of motions on the subject, all of which have for 
their object to express th~ strong e"--pectation felt 
that now that the Dutch troops are retiring from 
Belgium that French troops will also return to · 
their own territory. This was the assurance 
given ve-rbally by the French rninisters to the 
Plenipotentia-ries of the four Powers; and it was 
on the faith of this assurance that the Conference 
adopted the march of ihe French as a ·measure 
of the alliance. 105* 
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Worse was to follow, for on the next day. Talleyrand suggested privately to 
BUlow that perhaps .a partition of Belgium might be the: ·best solution to the 
problem. 106 Palmerston insisted to Granville that the French army had to 
leave Belgium - in view of ·Talleyrand's attitudes this had become 'a question 
of war or peace'. 107 As Palmerston said, Grey was 'peremptory on this 
point' in his own letter to Granville: 
The French must not remain in Belgium on any 
pretext whatever • • • Public opinion in England 
is already excited and any appeara~ce of bad 
faith on the part of France would kindle a flame 
which would make war inevitable. 10 8 
Grey was particularly annoyed at the equivocal attitude of the French towards 
withdrawal. The Cabinet, meeting the previous day, had gratefully sanctioned 
Codrington's return to Portsmouth following the official order to the Prince of 
Orange to call off the advance to Brussels and retire behind the Dutch 
frontier. ·109 There was another meeting on the 13th and ministers approved 
the language Palmerston had used in his despatch to Granville. According 
to Holland, llO Palmerston's opinion that partition was a very real th~eat 
carried much weight with his colleagues. Goderich, for example, was keen 
that· Britain should show over Belgium the same firmness displayed by 
Stanley towards Ireland. Holland was more concerned about the Prince of 
Orange's delay both in executing his withdrawal orders and apologising for 
*Italics Palmerston's. 
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the insults which Adai.r and Lord William Russell; the British medi.ators 
in the field, had suffered at his hands. However, he, together with 
Althorp, Brougham and Russell was persuaded to ·agree to Britain's 
stance. Judging from Althorp's subsequent attitude, the decision was not 
understood as a commitment to war· without further warning. . 
. The unsatisfactory French response to the British representations of 
which Palmerston learned on 16 August brought a commitment to war nearer • 
. On that day he wrote to Granville using the oft quoted wm·ds: 
One thing is certain ,.. the French must go· 
out of Belgium or we /lave a general war, 
and war in a given number· of days. 111* 
· Palmerston spoke without Cabinet backing - a meeting was to be delayed to 
await official French replies to the representations in the ietters to Granville 
of the 13th. It is unlikely that a Cabinet response would have been pitched 
so highly as this, Palmerston's most unequivocal threat to the French of · 
British intervention over Belgium. The non-interventionist element in the 
Cabinet was strong, among whom Althorp was the most outspoken. He wrote 
to Brougham expressing even more heretical views on Belgium than those 
of Grey a year earlier: 
Grey talks of a Cabinet on Belgium and of holding 
strong language about the French army there. 
The case I admit to be very difficult but war can 
do no good, and must be rui!-1-ous • • . I had 
rather they kept Belgium permanently than that 
we should go to war. I am sure it would be the 
least of two evils for this country. The middle 
course would be best. The French wish to stay 
until something is settled: the Conference might 
insist with France on preliminary negotiations 
[between Holland and Belgium] • • • You m(lst be 
at Cabinet whenever it is summoned. 112 
*Italics Palmerston's~ 
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The Cabinet met on 18 August prior to a session of the Conference and 
it is not difficult to deduce from Palmerston's report to Granville 11 ~ that 
his colleagues persuaded him to tone down his language. Certainly the 
protocol of that day was conciliatory in that it set no time limit on the 
required Frent::h evacuation. The prete>.."t was that official news of the 
Dutch withdrawal had not been communicated to. the Conference. 114 Judging 
by Holland's· description of the Cabinet meeting, Grey's anger had cooled 
too, though almost certainly not for the reasons for former gives: 
He is so reasonable in council and so unaffectedly 
desirous of peace • • . that I am half inclined to 
suspect that when he assumes so high a tone, as 
he does occasionally with France, that his vicinity 
to Richmond gives his first suppositions a tincture 
of Princess Lieven's politics. 115 
AJ.though both Grey and Palmerston were still determined that the decision 
as to the demoliti.on of certain barrier fortresses was to be left to the 
Four Powers, they stepped back from the brink further as news came in 
of the delay of the Dutch retreat and the deliberate inundation of Belgian 
land through dyke breaking. 116 By 26 August Palmerston seems to have 
been satisfied by French promises to withdraw. 117 However, he was still 
. concerned at the possibility of a Franco-Belgiall: deal involving the 
demolition of c~rtain fortresses in return for a portion of the French 
troops remaining behind to stiffen the Belgian Army. The French govern-
· ment had sent La Tour Marbourg to Belgium with a list of fortresses to 
be demolished. Palmerston sympathised with Leopold's plight, but could 
not allow a subst:l.nHal French presence in Belgium. The Protocol of 
15 September officially closed the August episode -· the Dutch already 
having agreed to a six week's armistice - by announcing the complete 
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voluntary withdrawal of those French troops remaining at the e>..-press 
wish. of Leopold. 11 ~ 
The length of time which elapsed between Palmerston' s 'war in a 
number of days' outburst and the protocol about Fren11h withdrawal testifies 
to the way French diplomacy steadied and particularly to the moderating 
non-interventionist tone of the Cabinet. We have already seen how Grey 
softened towards France, and to judge by Holland's remark about 'Lansdowne's 
opinions on foreign affairs [being] 'as usual right but rather faint', 119 we 
can assume that the Foxites won the day. _ Holland had suggested privately 
to Grey that the request to withdraw be delayed to make it look less 
peremptory. 120 Palmerston took the opposite view: 
I hardly know upon what grounds we could justify, 
when the papers come before Parliament, having 
abstainoo from telling France that, the objects for 
which she entered Belgiuni being fully accomplished, 
it is time that her troops should retire. 121 
He wrote in similar terms to Granville, 122 but received on the same day a 
long and important letter from Grey, reflecting Holland's view: 
That we have a :Light to insist on the immediate 
evacuation of Belgium by the French is undeniable. 
The quest~on is whether it is advisa~le to rest 
immediately upon the right, or to wait, without 
showing timidity or altering our tone • . . to see 
what France will do upon the very clear and 
distinct intimation which has been given to her 
••• I must add that I have a great distrust of 
the ministers of the three Powers. Some of them 
would not be sorry to see a war break out . • • 
and more than one of them I suspect is in 
communication with the Duke of Wellington and 
Aberdeen. I hope you will take care to let them 
know that if a war takes place, they must be 
prepared to carry it on with their own resources, 
that we can act only by sea -and that they must 
eA'Pect neither subsidies nor pecuniary assistance 
of any kind from this country. 12 3 
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In Cabinet the next clay Grey's view was accepted - not surprisin-gly, given 
its appeal to the 'peace and retrenchment' lobby. Furthermore, Russian · 
military ·strength could soon be brought to bear on Belgium in view of the 
imminent surrender of the Poles at Warsaw. The fear that the Tsar, 
'flushe-d a...fter i":.is frightful success over the Poles', might offer military 
help to his brother-in-law was uppermost in the rninds of ministers. 124 
Palmerston had the unenviable task of conveying the Cabinet decision to 
his . Conference colleagues and wrote somewhat ·irritably to Grey of his 
rough reception: 
I had g-reat difficulty in persuading the three Allies 
to do what you wished. Prus5ia was the most 
unmanageable and would hear of nothing but a 
summary protocol this day; Austria had instructions 
to do whatever Prussia did: Russia was the most 
anxious to acquiesce in our wishes. 
After much battling I prevailed upon them to give up 
their protocol, though they all said they did it with 
regret. 125 
With the irr..mediate crisis past, the issues of· a final settlement 
between Belgium and Holland and the fate of the barrier fortresses remained. 
It was clear that the Dutch would not accept the Eighteen Articles a.nrl that 
Belgium could not defend herself unaided. Negotiations were resumoo, 
resulting in the Twenty-four Articles of 14 October and the definitive 
Treaty of ·15 November. 126 From the P?int of view of possible British 
intervention the fortresses were of great hnportance, and the discussion 
about their possible demolition . acts as a pendant to Cabinet debate .on the 
proper response t~ the milita.:·y events of August. The barrier fortresses 
had been refurbished after 1815, at Allied e"'-rpense and under Wellington's 
supervision, to forestall a renewed French advance into Belgium. These 
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thorns in the French side had always. been of dubious value, and the close 
ties between France and Belgium t~at were apparent after their respective 
revolutions seemed to render t_hem unnecessary. At least, so the French 
thought: Talleyrand was irked to be excluded officially from the Conference's 
of 17 April, although he appears to have helped iri drafting it. 128 It was 
agreed that in view of the general strategic situation and Belgium's reduced 
means, some of the fortresses would be demolished after further discussions 
. . -
between the Four Powers. 129 During th.e summer of 1831, Britain and 
France were preoccupied with the negotiation of the. Eighteen Articles and 
the terms for Leopold's acceptance of the Belgian Crown, but Louis 
Philippe's pronouncement on 23 July that all the barrier fortresses were 
. . 
to be destroyed 130 brought the problem to the fore once again. The Dutch 
invasion was most unfortunately timed in this respect, for the French 
presence in Belgium was an excellent bargaining counter in discussi.o!ls over 
the fortresses with the Powers and with Leopold in particular. We have 
. . 
already seen the vehemence of the opposition's reaction to Louis Philippe's . 
speech, and during August Wellington made strong representations to Grey, 
in conversations and lengthy memoranda, about the military necessity of 
retaining at least half of the fortresses. 131 . Palmerston was able to 
command support in Cabinet for the principle of rejecting any bargain 
between Leopold and the French. He told Granville that 'I have seldom 
seen a stronger feeling than that of the Cabinet about this question of the 
fortresses.' 132 However, he promised to treat the question of demolition 
realistically (as Wellington had not) in· the light of Belgium's military 
weakness. Palrnerston may have exaggerated the strength of feeling. 
Holland reports that Grey seemed reluctant to force the issue, as the 
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fortresses were to be demolished anyway. 133 Russell hoped to see 
.French wishes accommodated, although he recognised Britain's right of 
property. 134 However, the Cabinet agreed that the Four Powers alone 
should decide the question, 135 and the French eventually showed their 
acquiescence by formally renouncing L'eopold' s unofficial offer to demolish 
all the fortresses if France guaranteed the Eighteen Articles. 136 
· Thus far, Palmerston and the Cabinet had seen eye to eye on the 
fortresses issue. However, during the final phase, after the publication 
of the protocol respecting demolition, the spectre of intervention and war 
reappeared, bringing out the customary differences of opinion. Negotiations 
on the fortresses had been continued alongside those on new terms for 
Holland and ~elgium, with the difference that France was excluded. The 
fortresses were not in themselves important but Palmerston regarded theri1, 
in Webster's words, as 'the symbol of the resolution of the Powers to 
preserve the independence of Belgium from attack by France'. Leopold 
sent General Goblet to London early in October to negotiate a treaty 137 
and a list of fortresses to be demolished was agreed in a secret protocol 
on 15 November. 138 The list differed from that which La 'four Marbourg 
had put before Leopold in August 139 in that Charleroi and Tournai, on the 
western border with France, were to be maintained on Wellington's advice. 
Philippeville and Marienburg, the two fortresses nearest the French border, 
were to be demolished. 140 The protocol· secretly communicated to Leopold 
was the basis of the secret convention which the Four .Powers signed with 
Belgium on December 14. 141 
The Cabinet approved the convention on the same day and Palmerstot~., 
to his subsequent chagrin, forgot to emphasise the need for complete 
secrecy. 142 In the event Holiand' s indiscretion precipitated a major crisi::::. 
Talleyrand clearly had wind of the Convention - ·Holland later told 
Palm~rston that he only heard that ·Tourn~i was a point at ·issue through 
Talleyrand. 143 Talleyrand pr8ssed Holland about the status of Tournai. 
H;olland wrote ·to Grey: 
What a· taking rsic J Tallnyrand is in about Tournai: 
it would be provoking that Casimir Peri.er' s ministry 
should be endangered or any coolness between us 
·arise from a matter which in reality does not signify 
3 brass farthings ••• 144 
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It is not clear whether Holland had revealed all at ·the time he wrote this 
letter; however let us enjoy the account of the whole incident which he 
entered with engaging naivete into his _journal: 
Fortress protocol signed - Mons, Ath, Menin, 
Philippeville and Marienburg are to be demolished. 
I told Talleyrand of it and he wants to know if 
Tournai i.s on the list. I sent to Palmerston to -
ask. His reply made me conscious of my own 
indiscretion in telling Talleyrand anything about 
it, but it was too late to recaU. 145 · 
Palmerston was justifiably angry with Holland. Ha had hoped to receive the 
Belgium ratification before presenting the Convention to France as a fait 
accompli. The French reaction to news of the Convention was extreme. 
They had e}.1)ected Tournai to be demolished in accordance with a pledge 
. given by Leopold on 8 September, 146 and retaliated by threatening to 
withdraw their sanction from the Treaty of 15 November. That Philippeville 
and Marienburg,. two fortresses ceded by France in 1815, were to be 
demolished,· was an additional insult. 147 Leopold· was placed in an awkward 
position with regard both to France and the other Powers, and urged 
Palmerston to agree to a suspension of their demolition. 148 Durham added 
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his weight to Leopold's entreaties. 149 He was a close friend of the King 
and had recently returned from a special mission to Brussels, undertaken 
principally to distl·act his mind from a succession of family bereavements 
and some bitter disputes with Grey about his status in the Cabinet. 15 0 
Holland also struck a conciliatory note in his letter of apology to Palmerston,. 
though he agreed that the complaint about the Jemol ition of Philippeville and 
Marienburg was s~spicious. Their demolitio~ was only injurious to France 
if sh~ had designs of recovering them. But he warned· Palmerston: 
You miscalculate if you imagine that we, that 
our friends, or what is more material, the 
House of Commons or the Country are prepared 
to go to war or to spend· one sixpence for the 
demolition or preservation of any or all of the 
fortresses in Belgium - still less for preserving 
• • • the right • • • of dictating what places 
shall remain fortified in a· neutral territory. 
However, With customary modesty, Holland emphasised that this was 
his view alone and that he would not press it i.n . Cabinet the next day if 
Grey and Palmerston thought differently. 151 
in fact the meeting of the next day showed a marked difference of 
opinion between. Grey and Palmerston. 152 Grey regretted that the choice 
of fortresses had ·offended France although Palmerston maintained with 
some truth that the opposition to th.e demolition of two of them was 
suspicious. The French Cabinet was understandably worried about the · 
?~reaction at home if France was seen to acquiesce in the Convention. Holland 
countered striktngly in his journal: 
••• A similar dread .of Wellington is in truth 
our motive for making the selection we have 
made - for the point in di~pute is three blue 
beans in one blue bladder - of no intrinsic value 
but suita9le to make a clatter and call attention.15 3 
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Palinerston's stubborn attitude towards France together with his !wavering' 
attitude towards the :R.eform Bill 154 gave rise, according to Holland, to 
'suspicions of lukew3.rmness in the cause of the party and ministry to 
which he belongs.' Grey continued to urge Palmerston to consider the· 
position of Philippeville and M.arienburg, but. the Foreign Secretary's 
resolve was strengthened by the receipt of despatches from Paris, which 
showed that Sebastiani was spoiling for a fight. He had shifted the grounds 
of French protest in objecting to the manner in which the Convention had 
been negotiated, comr)aring it with the behaviour of the Quadruple Alliance. 155 
Grey was thereby forced to reconsider his own position and emphasise that the 
fortresses were a matter between the Four P9wers and Belgium. However, 
he insisted to Palmerston that Cabinet sanction was necess~ry before "the 
Conventiqn could be signed, no doubt exp_ecting support for his moderate. 
stance from some ministers. 156 Palmerston's reply of 2:4 December was 
uncompromising - he could not believe any Cabinet minister would propose 
a delay in ratification and expected many of his colleagues to oppose such 
a suggestion. 157 He was aware of the negotiatlons going on in Brussels 
between Leopold and Sebastiani' s brother, 15 8 and was concerned lest further 
·delay should give more time for French intrigues to bear· fruit. Goblet 
had already announced that Belgian ratification had been delayed. Clearly 
. relations between Palmerston and· his more moderat~ colleagues were 
becoming strained. Holland claimed that Palmerston had written to Grey 
expressing a 'tartly hinted' determination on the· part of himself and some 
of his colleagues to reject anything that could be construed as 'toadying' to 
Franct:, and warned Grey of the consequences to his ministry of such an 
approach. 159 It is not clear whether Holla.nd is merely exaggerating the 
96 
contents of the letter of 24 December or referring to a pungent document 
since lost or destroyed. However, the language is plausible and Palmerstonian, 
and Melbourne, Stan~ey, Richmond and Goderich would be among those he 
had in mind as resolute opponents to concessions. 
Over the· Christmas period the crisis reached its peak as the possibility 
of war seemed to present itself. On 25 December Grey reasserted his view 
that the difficulty over the fortresses was 'ridiculous' but agreed,. subject 
to Cabinet approval, that Britain could not retract. As to war, he thought 
that the people would not support it, adding~ with perhaps feigned 
disappointment, 'I cannot conceal it from my~ elf'. 16 0 In Cabinet the next 
day Palmerston repeated his strictures on Holland for his indiscretion, 
and his attacks on France's hostile attitude. It seems however that no firm 
decisions on ratification were taken, for that day Grey wrote to Palmerston: 
I am even more anxious that the matter which 
has never been d-istinctly brought before the 
Cabinet should now be submitted to their con-
sideration. 16 1 
In the meantime Holland was rallying the moderate element. Durham had 
already expressed a hope that all the fortresses would be destroyed. 162 
Brougham was ill and unable to attend Cabinet meetings at this time, but 
Holland kept him ir...formed, playing on his Quaker pacificism: 
Would it not be madness to quarrel" and is it 
not dangerous to get out of humour about the 
fortresses in the weak and neutral country of 
Belgium? • . . The notion of a treaty conducted 
in secret with four of the Powers to keep them 
up as a security against French perfidy and 
aggression is in my judgement preposterous in 
the extreme . • • Palmerston says that if we 
hold tough language, the French will yield, for 
their present anger- is all bluster • • • but at 
the ·same time I must ~ay our high language as 
far as I am a party to it, . would be bluster too 
• • • I wish yo_u were here . • • 'yhen you come, 
be peaceable and let them . feel how utterly 
untenable a warlike system would be. 16 3 
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We must presume .that Holland deferred to his superiors in the Cabinet of 
27 December which approved an immedi~lte ratification of the Fortre8s·es 
Convention. However, Holland's report to Brougham sugests that the 
extent and degree. of 'bluster' to be held towards France was in dispute: 
I hardly think our Cabinet • • • would spend one 
sh,illing to keep the fortresses • • • a war, a war ! 
for such an object would be scouted at from Johnny 
Grott's House to Land's Enct. 164 
T4e invalid Brougham had no need of Holland's ·cautionary doses on this 
subject, as his reply shows: 
• I agree with you more. than entirely - that 
is I doubt whether you don't go too far with the 
,warriors, stout as your joining them is. But" 
that we must speak daggers . and use none I hold 
to be qu_ite clear • • • my creed, as you know, 
is yours - and even more bigoted and intolerant. 
I am 'o.ne of the people called Qual~ers' and 
therefore I do affirm that I cannot belong to . a 
government making war. 
Brougham qualified this statement in memorable· terms: 
Of course I speak of offensive war - that is in 
our portion - inte?ference war. If we did not go 
to war for Portuga1 and Poland we never can for 
any other thing that does not bear immediately 
or directly on our own self defence - ·Fortresses 
in Belgium indeed ! ! Pooooooooohhh ! l6 5 
Holland's reply shows how Grey and Palmerston had influenced him over 
the advantages of bluster: 
I may be a. little less Quakerish and non-
interfering than you, from a persuasion that 
seasonable interference and even the attitude of 
war· is sometimes the best means of preventing 
it. 166 
Thus by the New Year, British Policy had been· clarified, and further 
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French and Belgian attempts to obtain a revision of the Convention terms 
failed. 167 Against a background of continuous French protests, the matter 
was closed by the face-saving declaration of the Powers, framed by the 
Belgian plenipotenti~ry Van de Weyer ,168 that the fortress arrangements 
• 
were consistent with the existing guarantees to Bel~um, and that the ·· 
Five Powers all stood on an ·equal footing with her. 16 9 , 
The settlement of the fortress question r.uarked a new phase in Franco-
British relations. The increasingly un~ooperative att~tude of the Eastern 
Powers, as shown by the Tsar's refm~al to ratify the Treaty of 15 November, 170 
induced Palmerston to look more towards the French for support in ' 
·implementing the Treaty arrangements~ rather than adopting the Concert 
approach that he had maintained throughout 1831 at the expense of relations 
with France. In the three crises of that year his differences with the 
·cabinet centred on the strength of protest to be made to France in each 
case. Palmerston was apparently prepared to go to war on all three . 
occasions, though recognising that the fortress issue was hardly worthy 
of it. 171 Almqst certainly the Cabinet would not have been with him. We 
have seen the attitudes of Althorp .and Brougham towards the French invasion 
and the fortresses and their opinions undoubtedly carried weight. Althorp's 
universally recognised integrity and Brougham's trenchant radicalism. were 
essential piliars of the ministry in the two Houses. On the other hand there 
was the possibility that a conciliatory attitude towards France would e~ose 
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the government to the charge that European security was being threatened 
.. thereby. Holland summed up the dHemma neatly: 
• I do not think Palmerston differs very 
essentially from us in the persuasion that a 
strict union with France ••• even with the 
risk of some little separation from the other 
three powers • • • is i"tJ.clispensable ••• he 
is perhaps a little too ready to listen to 
iinsinuation~ • • • about French intrigue and 
perhaps yet more apprehensive of incurring 
the reproach· of entirely subverting the con-
federacy for the protection of Europe which 
Wellington and his party would say was the 
point of our victoi"ies • • • 17 2 
I~ events had resolved themselves into a question of war or peace - which 
Palmerston's skill and bluster had prevented in 1831 - it is probable that 
Britain's strategic interests would have lain less heavily in the scales than 
the Cabinet's predilections towards peace,_ retrenchment a:nd the survival of 
the Orleans Monarchy. 
The year 1832 saw a basic change in formation as Britain and France 
united to secure a settlement for Belgium in the face of the obstruction of 
Holland and the Eastern Powers. Thus, when the time came, intervention 
in the Netherlands was contemplated with a view to foiling Holland rather 
than obstructing the ambitions of France. As Palmerston wrote to Granville 
on 19 February: 
We [the Cabinet] wish to stave off for the present 
every question upon which Great Britain and France 
may have divergent interests. 17 3 
It is not necessary here to follow the interminable neg-oti::ttious over the 
problems of the Navigation of the Scheidt and the division of the Netherlands 
National Debt which continued throughout this year, and resultoo in a 
' I 
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preliminary convention in ·May 1833. 174 However, it is pertinent to note 
in this context Palmerston's increasing interest in the constitutional 
movements in Germany and Portugal during 1_832, as compared with his 
pragmatic attitude towards the aspirations of the Poles and the Italians 
in the previous year. His gr~.dual recognition of the need to. enforce the 
Treaty rights of Belgium was paralleled by his outspoken support for the 
liberal movement in Europe in his Parliamentary speeches during the summer. 
of 1832. 
Grey and Palmerston both seem to have become conscious of the 
possible need for joint coercion of the Dutch during the summer of 1832. 
Although the Eastern Powers had ratified the Treaty in April and May, their 
acceptance was hedged about with reservations, particularly with regard to. 
the navigation of the Scheidt and the division of the National Debt between 
the two countries. 17 5 The confe:..·ence called upon Holland and Belgium to 
open negotiations for a Definitive Treaty, but neither side would consent 
until Antwerp and Luxemburg were evacuated by the Dutch and the Belg_ians 
respectively. On 1 June, by which time the triumph of the cause of 
Parliamentary R.efo:::-m ·was apparent and the Eastern Powers could therefore 
be confronted more comfortably, Grey suggested to Palmerston that a 
squadron be sent to cruise off the Downs. 176 The government had acted. 
along similar, though· more modest lines the previou~ October, when three 
ships and some smaller craft had been sent to convince the Dutch that a 
renewal of hostilities would prompt an immediate British reaction. 17 7 
Leopold encouraged Grey to adopt a resolute attitude. In a typically 
emphatic letter he gave his opinion: 
I feel convincedthat as long as you do not 
force the King of Holland to evacuate Antwerp, 
he will not negotiate on fair te·rms. 17 8 
Leopold, like Queen Victoria, seenlGd to think and write in italics for 
much of the time. In this maite1· at least, his agitation was justified. 
· The citadel at Antwerp had b0en occupied by the Dutch since the revolt, 
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and wl_lile initially the British had been happy to see it. in their hands and 
not controllro by France, 179 it had become by 1832 a symbol of Dutch 
intransigence. Palmerston was beginning to think in terms of direct 
intervention, particularly after the Dutch rejected the unanimous offer of 
the Five Powers of concessions on the distribution of the Debt in return for 
the ~vacuation of the citadel and a commitment to begin serious negotiations. 180 · 
Grey in his turn was aware that 'we may at last come to m,esures d'e.~.:ecution 
in Holland', although he was concerned about the possible effects on Anglo-
Dutch trade. 181 
Palmerston had written to Granville on june 22, before the Dutch 
had finally refused to negotiate, asking him to sound out the French on 
the possibility of a joint naval blockad,e of the Dutch coast. 182 The French 
reply was hesitant, not least because there was a continuine; political 
interregnum in France following the death of Casimir Perier in May. 
However, the French joined with Britain in a counter statement to the 
Dutch refusal, informing the other powers that the two countries would 
proceed to implement the Treaty if no progress was made by 30 August. 18 3 
Palmerston prepared for such an eventuality by obtaining reports on the 
condition of the Dutch and Russian navies from his ambassadors at The 
Hague :1nd St. Petersburg. 184 The inng was consulted abc>ut the best means 
of implementing the Treaty, but he was resolutely opposed to a joir..t 
project for. feai~ of antagcmising the Eastern .Powers. 185 Grey was also 
apprehensive, though for different reasons: 
The whole procedu:J;"e is very risky, for the French 
government is very weak and I fear that the Eastern 
Powers may interve:1e. 18 6 
He added that full consultation with the Cabinet was essential. 
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Palmerston had not rejected a negotiated settlement completely, for 
he ''ias worldng on a project, 1ater to be known as his Theme, whiqh 
displayed a genuine desire to come to· grips with the complexities of the 
problems of the Sche1dt and the Debt. 187 . However, Leopold was insisting, 
wl.th some justification, on the need· for the British and French govcrnm.ents 
to make practical efforts to implement the Treaty and thereby stabiliRe 
the do:J?estic situation in Belgium.· He called for a joint operation involving 
the Royal Navy and the French Army~ 188 Grey was clearly imp1·es~ed by 
these arguments in view of the continuing deadlock in the Conference: 
•• for God's sake let us escape from the 
ridicule of these continued conferences and 
come to a conclusion one '~ay .or the other. 18 9 
At this point Grey took himself .off to Howick for the first time for two 
years. 190 He left Palmerston to face the reaction of his colleagues to the 
prospect of renewed military activity over Belgium, .now increasingly 
likely in view of the Dutch rejection of his modifications to ·the NovembP.r 
Treaty with respect to the Navigation of the Scheidt. Althorp and his 
friends were anxious to restrain Palmerston: 
Richmond and Graham are here .and alarmed 
at the prospect of troops in. Belgiu~. Th~s would 
mean war. A squadron in the Downs is the 
furthest we should go. 
If you can get France to be quiet, it would 
be the best thing to let Leopold try his strength 
.... But for God's sake do not let us enter into 
war.l91 
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Althorp stressed that the letter expressed a joint opinion, in which ·case 
Graham's concurrence is surprising. However, Graham showed willingness 
to support a purely naval action three days later: 
I can promise a formidable number of ships ready 
for any service, but do not too hastily take up 
Transports_· or move troops - this is war. 
A naval: demonstration is harmless: a .military 
movement is a step of more fearful ·consequences. 
Leopold must try to hold his own in the first 
instance: and if he fails France, always too willing 
to move, will be ready at hand to assist. 192 
Palmerston was in a position to appreciate that the moderation practised 
by his colleagues and in particular by the King did not take sufficient 
account of the stubbornness he was encounte-ring from all sides in the 
Conference. His Theme had been officially r~jected on 16 September and 
Grey was quick to realise that joint action was now inevitable. Still at 
.Howick, Grey wrote to Palmerston of his attempts to persuade his week-
end visitors, Brougham and Althorp, of the moral necessity of fulfilling 
treaty obligations in spite of the risk of war. The Cahinet was divided on 
the subject of coercion. Brougham_ and Althorp seemed dispose<;l to let France 
act alone, a view which neatly incorporated Francophilia and non-intervention. 
Grey rejected both these attitudes, which displayed irresponsibility and a weak 
strategic grasp. On this occasion Grey belied his· Foxite pedigree, for in the 
same letter to Palmerston he advocated for the first time complementary 
naval and military operations with France. He hesitated slightly in coming 
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to this conclusion, but because of the instability of the Franch government 
rather than through a .reluctance to embrace joint intervention. 19 3 
Some ministers had been worried that Palmerston would act without 
Cabinet consultation, 194 but in iact .no move was made until 1 October. 
On that day the final Conference protocol was issued, making the split 
between the Eastern and Western Powers manifest. Wessenberg and BUlow 
had misled Palmerston about their readiness to join in putting pressure on the 
·King of Holland. The British and French plenipotentiaries alone endorsed the 
final demand that Holland should come to a settlement on pain of 'voies 
coercives'. 195 Palmerston was determined to press on alone~ He wrote to 
O:ranville next day: 
We will act alone. It is much better that it 
should be so than that we and France ·should 
continue to be clogged and hampered by the 
three heavy sailors of the convoy. 196 
It still remained to convince King and Cabinet of the wisdom of coercive 
measures. One of the problems which Palmerston foresaw when he first 
suggested a joint ope.ration was the possibility of having to recall a· hostile 
parliament. 197 Both Althorp and Holland were concerned about this:. Alth01~1l 
feared that the government might be forced· out of office, although he accepted 
that firm action against the Dutch was essential. 198 The King had come 
round to the point of view after the Eastern Powers had dashed his hc:;>es 
of a concerted approach. 199 Lansdowne seemed in favour of coercive 
measures without the recall of parliament. He argued that a new post-
Reform Act Parliament 'would be a suitable tri.bunal to try us on the 
charge of not having called the old one'. 200 . Palmerston had already made 
up his mind.. He wrote to Hn.lland that if the Dutch .continued to be 
obstructive: 
the Combined Squadrons should blockade their 
ports and the French troops advance to besiege 
and take the citadel [Antwerp]. 2 0 1 
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Grey returned to London on 8 October, three days before the crucial 
Cabinet on the coercion issue was due to take place. He was probably not 
finally con:vinced of the necessity of force, but Durham's decided stance on 
the· issue may have swayed both him and the doubters in the Cabinet. Durham 
had just returned from his mission to Russia by way of Brussels, and 
presented a well-argued memorandum202· recommending joint Anglo-French 
action by sea and land. As we have seen from the correspondence of Grey 
and Palmerston, Durham was not the first to advocate this course, as his. 
biographers would have us believe, 20 3 but his arguments may have been 
decisive in obtaining Cabinet support. Any discussion of this point must be 
hedged about with qualifications as Durham's memorandum is not dated. It 
may not have been presented at the meeting on 11 October at all, but 
prepared subsequently as an answer to the King's grave misgivings about 
any Anglo-French military agreement. 2 0 4 However, such a resolute stand 
on interference is remarkable coming from any member of the Cabinet except 
Palmerston, and we can well understand ·that the idea startled some of 
Durham's colleagues. 205 
The Cabinet reached final agreement on 16 October and its unanimity 
was sufficient to persuade the King to withdraw his opposition to a Convention. 
With the French government stabilised by the appointment of the Due de Bruglie 
as Prime Minister, the terms of the Anglo-French Convent~on were agreed 
upon· within a week. 2 0 6 Although the joint intervention was decisive, the 
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British share in the operation reflects the -caution of the Cabinet. A naval 
blockade would not of itself achieve anything immediate beyond antago"nising 
the commercial lobby at home, 2 0 7 but the Cabinet would not coiltemplate a 
British land operation. We· have already seen that Althorp and Brougham 
w~uld have preferred to leave the coercion entirely to the Freuch. Althorp's 
.opinion seems to have carried increasing weight as the Grey ministry began 
to fragment, and on this occasion he was prepared to sanction a British 
blockade because it would add nothing to the naval estimates. . He also 
conceded that decisive action at this time gave the best hop_e of peace in 
the future. 2 0 8 
Thus, after nearly two years of negotiation over Belgium, the Cabinet 
was at last prepared to sanction an unequivocal tJ:...reat of intervention. The 
threat became a reality in November, when the French advanced towards 
Antwerp while the Royal Navy blockaded the Dutch· ports. After a protracted 
struggle~ hampered by Franco-Belgian disagreements over troop movements 
in Antwerp, the citadel was taken on 24 December. For the Cabinet, . though. 
certainly not for Palmer~ton~ the Belgian affair was closed. 
Although Palmerston 's contribution to the peaceful creation of an 
independent Belgium has -been recognised and admired, the strength of the 
opposition which he faced in the Cabinet has not been fully appreciated. His 
Whig colleagues did not easily shed opinions formed during a lifetime of 
opposition, even when the most ruthless pragmatism was required. Grey 
set a good example in this respect, but Palmerston found it difficult to break 
down the prejudices of his Foxite colleagues. Throughout 1831 Cabinet 
sympathy for Frunce and a concurrent dislik~ of intervention in any form 
had militated against Palmerston's attempts to keep the peace. The years 
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of opposition seem to have bred in several m~mbers of the Grey ministry . 
. an infinite capacity for self-deception. The opinions· of Althorp, Grant and 
Holland offer striki.ng examples of thi.s:. their various prejudices agai.nst 
strategic intervention over Belgium, or any action that smacked of a 
renewal of the Quadruple Allianc~ against France, could have crippled 
British policy. In October 1831 Holland congr9.tulated himselr' and his colleagues 
achievement over Belgium: 'none but a reforming ministry could have kept 
the peace' he boasted to· Brougham. He talked of 'the good faith of France 
and especially the manly and straightforward conduct of Talleyrand' as being 
instrumental in the result. 2 0 9 
One can imagine Palmerston's reaction to I>raise of French good fa:i.th or 
the wisdom of the Cabinet. He had spent most of his political life in office, 
and drew his inspiration from the practi?al example of Castlereagh and 
Canning, rather than the obsolete traditions either of the belief in a proper 
moral tone in foreign policy, or the need for a reduction in government 
· expenditure that were handed down by Fox. Palnierston employed Castlereagh's 
Concert framework together with Canning's methods of 'intervening to prevent 
intervention' to gain hi~ ends in the Netherlands~ 210 . The history of the 
negotiations shows th:tt the Whig traditions of non-intervention were no more 
relevant in the days of the Liberal Movement than they had been in the 
days of the Holy Alliance. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
NON-INTERVENTION AND RUSSIAN AGGRANDISEMENT, 1830~~8.33 
The Belgian question dominated international relations for two yea!'s. 
The emphasis placed on a collecti\"e approach to the matter, as the only 
mean·s ·of preserving European peace, coloured British reaction to events 
·elsewhere. Although Palmerstun made up for his initial silence with his 
champlonship of- constitutional movernents in Europe after 1832, some of 
the damage had already been done. The cost of ~btaining Russia's grudging 
co-operation in the Belgian negotiations was discernible both in ideological 
and ·strategic terms. Russia was allowed to violate the Vienna agreements 
over Polish institutions lest British intervention should endanger the Five 
Power. Concert. Turkey's request fo:r British naval help against Mehemet 
Ali. was parried by the Cabinet, who were unwilling to add to the Royal 
Navy's commitments while the Dutch coast was under blockade. As a result, 
the Polish revolt was crushed, while Turkey temporarily became a virtual 
Russian protectorate. 
The outbreak of the Polish revolt on 29 November 1830 made little 
impact in Britain. The Cabinet discussed it briefly and dismissively in 
late December, and the plight of the Poles was not raised in Parliament 
until August "1831. 1 In thls instance, Whigs and Radicals were slow to 
support a cause with which they had been traditionally sympathetic. A 
Polish mission, led by Count Biernacki and Prince Czartoryski, had found 
considerable support for the cause of Poli.sh independence in 1814.·2 B1·ougham 
. wrote an enthusiastic article on the subject in the Edinburgh Review, 3 
while Grey and Mackintosh brought the aspirations of the Poles to the 
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notice of parliament in their critiques of foreign policy. 4 The architects 
of the Vienna settlement paid little heed to the representations of the Poles. 
Metternich and Castlereagh were anx.ious that Polanc.l should be partitioned 
so as to make Prussia a stronger bulwark against France. 
The Poles had Tsar Alexander to thank for any separate status ~t all. 5 
At his insistencP. a Ki.ngdom of Poland was set up, united to the Russian 
Empire by its constitution. In territorial terms the Kingdom was a shadow 
of its historical self, . although the Poles were granted their own Diet. 6 
Admittedly, there had been no concerted Whig campaign for Polish independence 
between 1813 and 1815, 7 but the silence of 1830 and 1831 is surprising. 
Neither Grey or Brougham were inclined to give the Poles unconditional and 
open support ~n their revolt against the Tsar. Grey was conscious of his 
change of attitude, partiqularly after the Morning Chronicle printed a letter 
of his dating from 1814, in which he had strongly advocated the creation of 
an independent Polish kingdom. Times had changed since then, he argued: 
it is one thing to state certain political 
opinions with a view to arrangements which 
are not completed and a~other to urge the same 
views in order to set aside these arrangements 
after they have been sanctioned by treaties. · 
The opinions I then entertained I see .no reason 
to retract; and if the independence of Poland 
had been established on those principles which 
might best have secured the permanent settle- · 
ment of Europe n.t the general peace, moEt of 
the difficulties and dangers which have since 
occurred and which still embarrass us might 
have been prevented. 8 
Brougham must have reasoned· along similar lines, for although he subsequently 
remarked that 'if we did not go to war for . • • Poland, we never can for 
any other thing', 9 he made no attempt to galvanise opinion in Parliament, 
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as he had done in 1814. 10 
In so far as they considered the Polish question at all, ministers 
regarded it as a loca.l difficulty for the Tsar. It should be stressed that 
un,til he· moved to destroy the Diet, the Tsar was acting within his 
treaty rights in the suppression of the revolt. On 18- Deceiil.ber, Carlisle 
judged that the revolt '.must occupy the partitioning powers very seri.ously' 11 
without caring to pass a British opinion. His more liberal colleagues were 
hardly more inclined to do so, for the French suggestion, first broached 
by Talleyrand on 26 December, 12 that Britain and 'France should mediate 
jointly between Russia and Poland, was _coolly received. Grey had no ·wish 
to intervene and was at pains to establish that Belgium constituted a special 
case, in that a threat to European peace was involved and 1the amicable 
interference of mediators' was justified. 13 Palmerston echoed thi.s view, 
with Cabinet sanction, in a private letter to Heytesbury, the British 
Ambassador at St. Petersburg 
• • • France has proposed to offer mediation between 
the Emperor and the Poles. We have, of course, 
declined such a step upon the serious grounds that 
to offer such interposition between a sovereign and 
·· his revolted subjects in the outset of the quarrel and 
before anyone can tell what may be its issue would 
give just offence and set an inconvenient example. 
Should the contest go on and assume the· character of 
the Gr~ek or Belgian affair so that there should appear 
little prospect that the sovereign could reconquer his 
·former subjects the case might be different; but the 
matter is not ripe for such a course at present. 14 
This is hardly the ·voice of the Foreign Secretary of a reforming ministry 
and yet even Lord Holland deplored attempts by the French to stir up 
*Italics mine. 
liberal opinion in Europe: 
•. • ~ I wish Poland could be pacified and arr~nged 
without great military mo\'ements, ?J.though I do 
wish Lafayette had refrained from talking about it, 
\Vhich can do no good. 15 
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The Cabinet determined to meet wlth silence the representations of 
the Polish mission i.n January 1831. Palmerston wrote to Granville about 
a private and unofficial meeting he had had with the Polish deputy 
Wielopolski: 
He told me their case, but asked for the good 
offices of England: I said that my ears were 
open but my mouth was shut .•. that I was 
glad to hear any authentic accounts of transac-
tions of so much interest but. that I received 
him in my private character and in my official 
character could say nothing to him whatever. 16 
This is not to say that some members of the Cabinet were not sympathetic 
to the PolisP, cause, 17 but the Belgian Conference, and even the revived 
Concert of Europe, in so far as it helped to ~reserve peace, overshadowed 
all other considerations. It was not as if the French had proposed anything 
approaching direct intervention, or even independent mediation, 18 but the 
Cabinet were disinclined to invite even the suspicion of intermeddling at 
this st::..ge. Grey recognised that Britain's hands were not completely clean: 
Can we take the insurgents und.er our protection, 
for such would be the fact, without incurring the 
imputation of holding out encouragements to revolt, 
wherever it might take place, setting a precedent 
of interference between the sovereign and the 
'subject which might not improbably (the case of Ireland 
for instance) become inconvenient tCl ourselves? 19 
His apprehension was justified, for eveti over the Belgian question, Irish 
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radicals were quick- to contrast Britain's proprietorial attitude towards 
Ireland with the collective approach towards the organisation. of the Belgian . 
state. 20 · It was best. to leav.:: Poland and Russia to fight it out at Grochow, 
outside Warsaw, particularly as the Poles had wilfully deposed the Tsar on 
25 January and elected Czartoryski President of the Provisional Government.~ 1 
Furthermore, &s Palmerston pointed out to Holland in March 1831, there 
were other priorities: 
If we did not want the Russians to keep Soult 
[the French minister of war] in order, we 
should wish the Poles hearty success. 22 
Incidentally, the same doctrine held good in Italy, where Palmerston witheld 
support from, the rebels in Piedmont and the Papal States, ·for fear of 
encouraging French ambitions in the Mediterranean at the expense of 
Austria.23 
·The news which Heytesbury communicated to Palmerston in his 
despatch of 25 February called for a fundamental change in the government's 
attitude. The Tsar had announced the appointment of Marshall Diebitsch 
as military governor of Poland and Engel as head of the provisional 
civil government which was to be established at Warsaw after the entry 
of the Russian army. Heytesbury commented that the appointments 
'announce a material change of system with respect to the future government 
of Poland'.24 Palmerston, who received· the despatch in mid-March, did not 
need reminding of the implications of the appointm~nts. They constituted 
a direct breach of the Treaty of Vienna, which prescribed a distinct 
administration for the Kingdom of Poland· witb.in the Russian Empire. 2 5 
In strategic terms the Russian decision was equally momentous, as the 
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prospect of permanent military occupation of Poland could disturb the 
balance of power in the West. After consultation with the King and the 
Cabinet, Palmerston replioo promptly to Heytesbury deploring the apparent 
breach and adding that the signatories of the Vienna Treaty had a special · 
interest in Poland: 
• • . In an ordinary case of civil war between a 
sovereign and his subjects, foreign states can 
. have no grounds for intervention, even of advice 
or remonstrance. But there are circumstances 
peculiar to the Kingdom of Holland which make 
it in this respect an exception. The treaty • • . 
to which most of the States of Europe were parties 
[provided that Poland] ••. should be attached to 
Russia by its constitution and should enjoy a 
·distinct administration 
The Government did not believe that the revolt gave the Russian govern.ment 
·any grounds for departing from the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna. 2 6 
Despite the theoretical justification, the Cabinet shiro away from a direct 
pr~test to Russia or any encouragement of the Poles. Palmerston -askoo 
Heytesbury to collect the opinions of his fellow-ambassadors in St. ·Petersburg 
on the prospect of permanent military occupation of Poland, in an attempt 
to produce a consensus among the Four Powers. 2 7 There was no thought 
of unilateral mediation or intervention. Palmerston's c()m.ment to Granville 
could have been written by Castlereagh: 
We must stand upon our treaties ••• We should 
remonstrate if Russia departs from the Treaty of 
Vienna, on the other hand we could not do so 
ourselves by trying to make Pola.nd entirely 
independent. 2 8 
Grey echoed this view: 
Whatever we may feel, I do not see in· 
whatever way, or on what ground we could 
interfere, except by an early intimation that 
has been giveu that we shall expect Russia 
to adhere to the Treaty cf Vietma ~rrangements. 29 
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Palmerston's initiative failed: Heytesbury had to inform him at the end of 
April that his observations were not received 'with any great corcf.ial!ty' 
by his fellow ambassado~s. 30 Indeed, Metternich favoured Prussian 
intervention to save· Russia from possible defeat. Defeat was unlikely, 
but the Poles remained in control of Warsaw in spite of their reversal 
at Gruchow. Palmerston \varned Metternich through Cowley, his ambassador 
in Vienna, that Britain would· remain neutral should France counter a 
Pruss ian offensive by invading the Rhenish provinces. 31 However, he 
took note of the rebuff he had received from the Eastern Powers, and. was 
not prepared to sacrifice the concert . over Belgium for the sake of the· 
Poles. A private letter: to Heytesbury at the beginning of lVIay reveals the 
relative importance of the Belgian negotiations, and the incessant French 
pressure for joint mediation over Poland: 
'l'he course of the Belgian discussions ... ·has 
indeed been calculated necessarily to throw England 
into intimate union with Russia, Austria and 
Prussia and io place these four powers in a state 
of separation from France •.• Pray therefore assure 
Count Nesselrode that we know and undsrstand the 
honesty and good faith of the Russian Cabinet and 
that we do not set less value upon those qualities 
after our own experience of some months of the 
kinds of qualities unfortunate~y displayed by the 
government of France • • . 32 
He stressed the theme in a private letter to Granville ten days later: 
But we are still desirous of keeping fair with 
Russia and we are not less likely to have influence 
over her by letting her. have no reason to 
suppose that we are making common cause 
with France against her. 33 
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In view of the pro-French sympathies of some members of the Cabinet 
and the frequent representations made by Talleyrand on -behalf of the Poles, 
the Government's attitude towards the revolt might have been expected to 
be more sympathetic. ·-Britain's reluctance to act cannot be explained wholly in 
terms of traditional Whig failings or the importance of preserving peace 
in the Low Countries. In the Spring and Summer of 1831, the Reform issue 
overshadowed everything else. Talleyrand had noted in March· that ministers 
could not concentrate on other matters. He admitted to Sebastiani: 
Je me Viens a regret oblige de retarder les 
communications que les depeches me mettront 
dans le cas de faire au· ministere anglais. La 
discussion de la .reforme parliamentaire, qui 
se prolonge a la Charubre ·des Communes, absorbe 
tenement lcs ministres, la nuit et la jour, qu'il 
est impossible de les entretenir d'autres affaires 
•, set•ieuses en ce moment. 34 ' 
However, the excuse of domestic pressures was insufficient. As Talleyrand 
remarked to Seb:;~.stiani two months later, any initiative in favour of the 
Poles would have to come from the force of public opinion: 
Les affairE;!s de Pologne sont pour moi un objet 
constant· d'attention et de combinaisons: j~ ne · 
doute. pas que le Gouvernement anglais n 'y porte 
aussi beaucoup d'interet et n~ait, sur ce point, 
des· dispositions analogues aux nOtres; mais pour 
que le Cabinet de Londres intervlnt en faveur des 
Polonais, il faudrait que l'opinion publique lui 
en fit, pour. ainsi dire une obligation; et ce 
n'est qu'un evenement marquant qui peut produire 
cet effet. Je pcnse au surplus que, dans ce 
moment ou il y a de la l~ngeur dans les affaires 
de Pologne, le · Gouvernement du Rol. murait moins 
d'avantage a s'occnper de cette question et que 
des delais attenderaient beaucoup d'effet de ses 
demarches; mais si un succes important venait a 
avoir lieu, ce serait alors ••• que nous pourr-ions 
agir immooiatement . . • 35 
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Thus ~he Poles could expect little active encouragement from Britain as 
they prepared to move against Diebitsch's forces at Ostroleka. 
The King's speech of June 1831 reflected the Government's lack of 
urgency. In it, hopes were expressed that the 'contest in Poland' could 
peaceably be reso~ved. 36 -Here, for the only time throughout Grey's 
ministry, Princess Lieven's influence is undeniably apparent. She had 
written to Grey asking him to substitute 'contest' for 'war' in the original 
draft of the speech, as the latter term implied equal status between the 
two belligerents. 37 The King also took exception to the term 'war' but did not 
not suggest an alternative expression. 38 The Princess clearly had her 
wily but this seems to have been a unique episode. Grey was prepared to 
quarrel with Princess Lieven over other matters; so we must assume that 
he did not consider the phrase used to describe the· Polish ·revolt important. 39 
The Grey-Lieven correspondence is much less full during Grey's years of 
office. When we read in Czartorysk~'s Memoirs that 'every morning before 
he got out of bed he used to write· her a nc.~e on paper scented with musl~:!, 40 
it must J:>e remembered that the cold reception accorded to Polish 
. representations in London would colour the Prince's attitude. The mention 
of Poland in the King's Speech passed almost without comment in both 
Houses. 'Orator' Hunt alone made reference to Poland, deploring reports 
that arms exported from Birmingham were being used by the Russian army 
in the struggle, but making no mention of the sufferings of the· rebels. 41 
The French meanwhile continued to press for a joint diplomatic initiative, 
particularly during July as news of the collapse of the Poles' eastern 
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rising at Ostl~oleka reached Paris and inflamed. opinion there. For 
the sake of the stability of his government Casimir Perier urged 
Talleyrand to make .l"enewed repres1.1ntations to the Cabinet in view of -
the feelings expressed by the press and public opinion in Frarice; 42 
Talleyrand found the British attitude unchanged. Palmerston reacted 
sharply to suggestions ·of Franco-British arbitration or of sending a naval 
detachment to th,e Baltic or the Black Sea. He wrote privately to Granville: 
There is no pretext for interfering in any 
way than by a si~ple offer of mediation because 
it is a clear case of civil war between subjects 
and sovereign ••. in which the usual observances 
of modern' times would forbid at least friendly 
powers from intermeddling by force • • • 
Talleyrand's proposal to send a fleet to the Baltic 
and Black Sea could not, at present at least, be 
- thought of • 4 3 
. 
Palmerston's draft reply to Talleyrand 1s suggestion was discusse4· and 
endorsed by the peers of the Cabinet on 20 July. There were few 
outspoken supporters of the Polish cause in the Cabinet at this time. 
According to Pri.ncess Lieven, Durham, for one, was 'a Pole enrage.' 
who ·had on thrc:.e occasions· in Cabinet pressed the cause of recognition 
for Poland. 44 Less dramatically, llolland had already expressed support 
for a joint mediation if it was practicable and safe. 45 However, as. he 
hin;tself noted in his Journal, there was little support: 'Goderich, Richmond 
and above all the Chancellor were vehement in urging objections to our 
concurrence in any such offer.' Brougham's attitude was particularly 
surprising, as Holland did not fail to point out: 
It was passing strange that Lord Brougham should 
take this line.- and not the less so that the Poles 
(esp.ecially Count Walecki), ·who have had intercourse 
. with us, are loud in their c'omplaints of the coldness 
of our Cabinet, with the exception of Lord Brougham, 
from whon1 alone .they profess to have receivE--d warm 
and. cordial assurances of zeal and good offices in 
th . "' 46 e1r cau ... e ••• 
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Grey, Lansdowne and Melbourne 'urged the same objections as B~ougham, 
but with less passion'. Holland and Carlisle were alone in favouring the 
French proposal." Holland does not elaborate on their arguments that 
Brougham and others used. · However 1 a full meeting of the Cabinet the 
neXt day produ~ed a similar conclusion, and presumably the arguments 
·used at this meeting w~re those of the previous day. 'Informed opinion' 
·in Holland's phrase, held that the French government was too .~nstable tc 
be trusted. With the Chambers due to meet on 23 July, the Cabinet 
rightly susp~ted that Casimir Perier wished to entice Britain into an 
agreement beyond mere mediation to satisfy the DeputiE)S. Grant and 
Carlise agreed with Holland that the French Government shouid not be· 
rebuffed while Althorp and Russell 'nearly' agrt:ed. However 1 t~e Cabinet 
was not prepared to commit itself even to friendly mediation. 47 It is 
instructive that the division in the Cabinet involved its attitude towards 
the French rather than· its attitude towards the Poles. The French 
government attempted to mask the failure of its joint mediation it?-itiati\•e 
through the aggression· of the Speech from the Throne on 23 July 1 whose 
bearing on the Belgian issue has already been noted. The French Deputie~ 
were indignant at the lack of response shown to the plight of the Poles 
following their defeat at Ostroleka and the Russian advance across the 
Vistula ·towards Warsaw. Casimir Perier was ready to resign in the 
absence oi an undertaking to assist the Poles. The issue was immediately 
overshadowed by the Dutch invasion of Belgium, but had it not been for. 
D.9 
the Dutch action, the French Governmet:tt would' have· collapsed as Holland, 
Grant and ·Carlisle had . .fea1~ed. 
It was d\Iring August, when events in Belgiul!'l: P.nsured ~ht'!.t Britain 
would not wilfully break up the European Concert for the sake of Poland, 
that the plight of the Poles was first raised seriously in .Parliament. 
Palmerston had refused to accept a petition from the Westminster Political 
Union on behalf of the Poles, which prompted Henry Hunt to call for his 
dismissal.48 .There were several other petitions presentEd at thia .time, 
from groups including the 'Friends of Humanity· and Justice', the National 
Reform Association and. one 'on behalf of British Youth'. All called for 
mediation to protect the Poles; some advoc.ated fleet action. At a time 
when the movement of French troops was causing grave concern, there 
was little response eith~r from Parliament or the Governmellt. At the end 
of August th~ Cabinet dealt the Poles a further blow by refusing to forward 
to the King a request froni Czartoryski to receive an official delegation.· 
It was a trifling matter in itself, but the decision was . important in that it 
~ressed the Cabinet's ·official attitude towards the Provisional Government 
in Poland. Fortunately, the minute which· the Kiug received expressing 
the personal views of Cabinet members has survived, and this ·unhappily 
unique document affords an insight into the debate on. British policy, 50 
Grey and Palmerston had already agreed that the King could not receive 
a letter from the head of an unrecognised government, and their opinion 
was shared by Graham, Goderich, Melbourne, Stanley and Russell. 
Thl.·oughout the period the government could always excuse its inaction 
in the fac.e of Russian violation of the Tre2.ty of Vi.enna by pointing to the 
-illegality of the Czartoryski regime. At this juncture ministers thought it 
unwise to antagonise Russia by making rash promises to the Poles. Russell 
,_ 
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was anxious to· reassure C~artoryski of British sympathy for the Polish 
.cause, but by informal nieans. ·Lansdowne, Grant, Ca.rlisle and Holland 
dissented from: the majority view. Both Lansdowne and Grant doubted 
whether any harm would be done if the King were to accept the letter. 
Carlisle, who emerges from the shadows on this· occasion alone to state 
his personal view, agreed with them. He· also believed that the refusal 
. carried. British neutrality too far, in view of the Russian advance towards 
Warsaw and the possible destruction of the Polish army. It would be 
'treading in the steps of· the King of Prussia' to snub Czartoryski. 
Holland replied to Palmerston's request for an opinion in trenchant style. 
He accepted that the King could not- receive the letter while Poland was 
unrecognised, but urged the C~binet to consider the possibility of recognising 
the Provisional Government. Holland's ideas were not followed up and 
Palmerston continued his atte1:1pts to· influence Russia through a concerted 
approach. After the fall of Warsaw he expected Austria and Prussia to 
remonstrate with Russia, for the military occupation which followed showed 
·blatant disrespect for the settlement of 1815. Once the revolt was crushed, 
Palmerston did not regard the Russians as empowered to destroy Polish 
institutions. He ~ote to Heytesbury: 
The time is riow come when the· Powers who were 
parties to the Treaty of Vienna may interfe:re in 
Polish affairs • • . I think Prussia and Austria will 
also demand adherence to the Treaty of Vienna 51 
Palmerston was to be. proved wrong. In April Metternich had already 
shown where his sympathies lay by impounding the arms of a Polish corps 
which had accidentally retreated into AuEtr_ian territory. 52 Heytesbury 
summed up the situation astutely in October: 
. "'' 
.I have· some reason to suspect that a perfect 
.understandiug exists between tho courts ·of 
St. Petersburg, Vienna and Berlin with respect 
to the modifications about to be introduced into 
the ·Polish Constitution • • • This would be a 
notable change in the political condition of 
Poland, but it would still leave a Constitution 
and a Representation according to the letter of 
the Treaty of Vienna • • • 53 
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By the beginning of November Palmerston seems to have decided to harden 
hi~ heart against Russia and. to deliv~r a formal protest without consulting 
the. other Powers. Grey was slow to approve Palmerston's change of 
course. He was uneasy about a forthright statement to Russia, particularly 
as the Polish cause was now hopeless: 
• • • after having suffered the Poles to be subdued 
without any interference, we should not carry public 
opinion with us if we were to get into a quarrel about 
the intended modification of the constitution. Experience 
has shown that the constitution has not been much 
respected, not is it probable that it would be more so, 
even .if we could get it formally re-acknowledged and 
establishoo 54 
These opinions prove that the assertion that Grey was more sympathetic 
to the Poles than Palmerston55 is bas~ on Grey's impotent protestations 
well after' the damage had been done. Ever. after Grey re.ceivoo confirmatio.:. 
from Lieven of Russia's implacable attitude, he would not commit himself 
· ·,.. to being 'unenforcibly in the right' without Cabinet c·o~sultation. 54 However, 
the Cabinet, even. in the absence of Durham and Grant, agreed that the 
Provincial Assemblies proposed by the Tsar were no subsUtute for the 
National Diet sanctioned by the Treaty of Vienna.. 57 The arrival of some 
harrowing despatches from Chad at Berlin may have influenced the decision. 58 
As a _result, Palmerston sent Heytesbury instructions to convey to the Russian 
government an official protest at their '.7iolation of the Treaty of Vienna in 
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abr~gating the constitutio~ of the Duchy of Warsaw. 59 This laborious 
decision did little to affect Russian policy and still less to alleviate the 
sufferings .of the Pohs •. If it was intended as a new departure, its 
impetus was exhausted by the neeessity of obtaining Five Power agreement 
over a ·~elgian Treaty. Thus while the Government made great efforts to 
induce the Tsar to ratify the Treaty of 15 November, no serim-1-s attempt 
was made to follow up the protest about Poland. Palmerston reaffirmed 
the British position in March 1832, 60 but by then the matter was 
'· 
diplomatically supine. During the crucial summer months of 1831, the 
Government had been unwilling to consider An~lo-French mediation, let 
alone int~rvention,· and it was "ironic that the eventual protest was based 
on the hated Treaty of Vienna rather than support for the 'cause of 
liberty. all over the world I. Admittedly it was difficult to conceive how 
Britain could have inte.rvened directly' and effectively, but Cz~rtoryski and 
his colleagues were justified in feeling neglected. 
Czartoryski himself arrived in London in December and succeeded at 
least in awakening the conscience of ministers. Grey confided to 
Brougham: 
It is really heartbreaking_ to. see him [Czartoryski] 
and now these d- ...: d Russians are doing all they 
can to throw the Belgian affair into confusion. It 
is to be regretted that we had no power of sending· 
a fleet into the Baltic last summer to settle the 
matter of Poland. 61 
However, Grey would not alter his official attitude. He seemed to 
Czartoryski to be excessively concerned that he should not speak out 
of turn, 'as if he feared to say anything t~at might not be in accordance 
with Palmerston's views'. 62 Czartoryski found Palmerston himself cold 
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and dogmatic in his quibbling about the exact meaning of the Vienna 
term3 in relation to Poland. In the Prince's account he appeared 
embarrassed over his governrr..ent's policy, retreating rather ingenuously into 
declarations of non-int~rvention ln the internal affairs of other states •. 6 3 
·Brougham also had some awkward shuffl.i~g to do: he explained to 
Czartoryski that no joint representation was made because: 
Such a step would have been of doubtful efficacy 
The fate of Poland will always interest us; but 
unfortunately the Polish cause is opposed to the 
wishes of all the other powers. They all want 
peace, while to take up the cause of Poland means 
war. 64 
Czartoryski shrewdly characterises British attitudes with his comment: 
The ministry does not seem to feel strong or to 
be conscious that it stands at the head of a great 
nation capable of exercising ·a powerful influence 
on the destinies of Europe. All this leaves a 
free field to our enemies in the North. 6 5 
If Cabinet sympathy was belatedly e>..-pressed. parliamentary support 
for the Poles was equally mistimed. It was only when Russ"ian intransigence 
·in other areas was apparent that the. Polish cause became, in Mr. Taylor's 
expression, 'the symbol of Radical foreign policy'. 66 The Radicals were 
little troubled by the war during 1831 and The Times' call for British 
intervention in July of that year had not been taken up. 67 However, the 
members of the reformed parliament were more prepared to speak out 
against Russia than thei.r predecessors had been. There were debates 
in the Commons in April ar..d Jnnc 1832 and in July 1833. Although the 
Tsar came in for bitter and colourful criticism, equivocal radical attitudes 
towards intervention recalleP. the debates on foreign policy of the previous 
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decade. As William IV commented, those who made the loudest outcry 
· about Poland would have refused to grant the supplies ·necessary to support 
. their cause·. 68 The debates of 1832 and 1833 were fic:ry but rarely 
constructive. Thomas Attwood was among the iew wbl') were prepared to 
go beyond mere abnse of Russia. He offered his fom~ sons, and forty 
million pounds of public money, in the cause of war to liberate Poland 
(to Palmerston's great amusement) but he waited until July 1833. 69 By 
that time his radical colleagues were more concerned with assisting Polish 
refugees through the Polish Societies which had formed in London and the 
• 70 provmces. 
For. the government, the matter was closed. One last attempt to move 
the Russians. over Poland had been made in the Summer of 1832 when Du.rham 
.was sent on· a mission to St. Petersburg. Grey had suggested that Durham 
be sent on a trip abroad to help him overcome his depression and nervous 
instability. Durham was given· rio specific ·brief to plead the Polish cause 
but it. was hoped that he would be able to mention at least the plight of 
Polish refugees. 71 The Russian Government was initially alarmed at the· 
prospect of a 'Pole enrage' coming to St. Petersburg, arriving as he did 
when news came through. of the Commons debate in June during which the 
Tsar had been roundly abused. 72 Palmerston's. eloquent silence ·during the 
debate was and has been much discussed 7 3 in terms of his increasing 
support for .the Liberal Movement in Europe, but it is significant that he 
gave the Poles no encouragement at this time, and subsequently defended 
the Tsar against similar personal attacks. If the Russians had little to 
fear from Palmerston, they were soon to discover that Durham was e·:en 
less trouble during his stay. One of Durham's weaknesses was his 
inordinate vanity and love of honours. Lord Tankerville had said of him 
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'Gad sir, he calls on you and thinks it gives him a right to quarter your 
arms'. 7 4 The Russians indulged hi.m to the full and were able to blind 
him to the ineffectiveness of l•is nii.s~ion. He could not bring himself to 
mention the Polish question to the Tsar himself. Brougham told Czartoryski 
that Durham did not wish thereby to jeopardise his chances of gaining the 
Ribbon of St. Andrew. 75 Durham mentioned the matter to Nesselrode, the 
Russian Foreign Minister, at the very end of his mission and was fobbed 
off with a promise that the Tsar would issue a merciful ukase to the Poles. 7 6 
Holland later commented that Durham's judgment had been warped by 
'Russian cajolery': 
[Who] if he can say 'boo to_ a goose' has not the 
presence of mind to say 'phoo to a bear' but allows 
himself to be hugged by him. 77 
Durham was encouraged by the intrigues of Nesselrode and Princess Lieven 
. 
to think of himself as a possible successor to Palmerston. 7 8 Thus the 
fruits of his mission were wholly unconnected with the fate of the Poles. 
The government had allowed Russia to crush the Polish revolt without 
effective protest. Palmerston gave a higher priority to the necessity of the 
concerted approach towards the Belgian problem while his colleagues, as 
Brougham admitted to Czartoryski, gave their concern for peace at all 
costs an equal emphasis. They shared the general concern for the fate 
of Polish refugees, 7 9 but their earlier failure to act in diplomatic 
recognition of the sufferings- of the Poles and the true intentions of 
Russia was quickly shown up by events. The Russians did not co-operate 
in ratifying or helping implemei.Jt the 15 November Treaty; indeed they 
were the strongest source of support for the Dutch in their intransigence. 
As a result the Poles suffered even more than the Belgians. Palmerston 
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was never able to live down his application· of double standards to the 
aspirations of the Belgians and the Poles after Russian duplicity had made 
. . 
anonsense ·of the statcgic justificati:::m "for favouring the Belg!ans. 80 The 
historic cause of Polish independence had been neglected, to the· extent 
even of resisting French pro!_)osals for joint mediation before the final· 
collapse of the revolt in September 183L Obviously it would h~ve been 
too much to expect the Royal Navy to .be sent to the Baltic, given the 
passive state of public opinion, b~t Palmerston's meek attitude towards 
Russia angered the back benches. After a fierce Commons debate in 
July -1833 in which he ·had stood up for. the Tsar against the radical 
attacks, Palmerston confessed his misgivings to Bligh, Heytesbury's 
successor at St. Petersburg: 
It is indeed impossible for any hone~t man to speak 
of the conduct of Hussia towards the Polish nation 
without feeling that she has a large and fateful account 
to render providence • . • [but] I could not hold in 
Parliament different language· as to th·e violation of the 
treaties from that which I have held as Secretary of 
State in my despatches ••• 81 
The fact that the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi was signed three days before 
P~lmerston spoke on behalf of the Tsar in the Commons adds extra irony 
··to his position. The government's timidity iu 1831 had placed it in an 
uncomfortable position. . As Grey admitted to Czartoryski, he and his 
colleagues had 'not been sufficiently conscious of the means at their 
disposal'. 82 They had been content to base their protest on the violation 
of the same treaty that the Belgians and the French· had successfully 
defied in 1830, rather than embracing the cause of the PoleE. (who had 
themselves violated the Treaty of Vienna· by dethroning the Tsar) for 
its own sake. When th~ Poles rose again in 1861, Palmerston recalled 
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the government's action of thirty years previously, reminding a Commons 
. questioner th1;1t B~·itai_n._"intervene~. only in. propo~·tion. to ho\y. much $h~ ·could· 
peacefully aphieve. * It ~··as a lame but fitting epitaph to the events of 1830 
1831. The government had not even managed the Foxite :moral condemnation 
of Russia that might have been expected in the absence of a~y threat of 
intervention. 
* * * * * * * * * * . 
If the government's failure to give support to Poland damaged its 
reputation rather than its strategic interests, the rebuttal of the Sultan's 
request for naval help against Mehem.et /~li in 1832 constituted ~ serious 
miscalculatiqn. The danger to Britain's Mediterranean interests if Turkey 
should be dismembered or become a Russian protectorate was ignored for 
the sake of low Naval Estimates, anti-Turkish prejudice and short-term 
peace. One of the main consequences was. the Treaty of Unkiar-Skclessi, 
which took Palmerston eight years to unscramble. He never forgot the 
Cabinet's equivocations in 1832: 
It is true that Russia alone prevented the occupation 
of Constantinople by Ibrahim or at -least some general 
. break up in consequence of his advance_: and I humbly 
venture to think (and in that opinion I have been more 
and more confirmed by everything that has passed 
since) that no British Cabinet at any period of the 
history of England ever made so great a mistake in 
refusing to the Sultan the assistance and protection 
which the Sultan then sent Ma vroj eni and Namick Pasha 
to solicit. Our refusal at that time has been the cause 
of more danger to the balance of power and to the 
interest of England than perhaps· any one determination 
ever before produced. 8 3 
Palmerston himself was not entirely blameless. He was preoccupi eel 
* _"Hansard, ~.rd. Series, CLXIV, 233 (2 July 1861). 
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. . 
with the forcible resolution .of the Belgian question and, in common with 
most of his contemporaries, he was slow to appreciate the. importance of 
the maintenance of Turkish te:r.ritorj.al integrity for the European balance of 
· power •. We have already noted the Foxitc. attitude that 'the expulsion of 
· the Turks from Eu~ope, quoC".mque ·modo woulcl be a great good even if 
Russia should gain from it. 84 Initially, Palmerston had shared the Whig 
anti-Turkish outlook. He had condoned Wellington's non-intervention in 
the final Russo-Turkish War over the Greek boundaries in 1S29. 85 Aberdeen's 
comment, that the 'hour long since predicted_' was imminent when Turkey 
would 'crumble to pieces from its o\vn inherent causes of decay', 86 . is 
probably an accurate indication _of the British attitude at the time of the 
Treaty of Adrianople. It was not sufficiently appreciated that the harsh 
terms of tha Treaty 87 let"t the Sultan· unprotected against the demands of 
Mehemet Ali, who was already j_n possession of Egypt and Crete. In 1832, 
while Palmerston and Grey.. were preoccupied with Belgium and the Reform 
question, Mehemet sent Ibrahim Pasha into Syria 88 to. obtain reclress for 
'his supposed grievances against the S~ltan. 
·Acre fell to Ibrahim on 27 May 1832, but the news had little effect in 
Britain, in sp.ite of the explicit threat to· the Sultan's throne. Palmerston 
rejected the idea of mediation between the Sultan and the Pasha. Grey 
endorsed this decision upon which the Cabinet does not seem to have been 
consulted. He thought Mehemet a gentleman worth cultivating should Turkey 
collapse: 
With respect to Pasha of Egypt, it appears to me 
unc!oubtedly to be our i.nterest to be on good terms 
with him, and if he should succeed in extending his 
power over the Sultan, there seems to be a good 
deal of truth in the remark that the establishment o( 
sach a dominion may be of real advantage· to our 
:,. 
interests. The dissolution of the Turkish Empire 
seems to be inevitable and· though it may be 
right to do all we can to avert or allay the crisis 
which this must occasion, it is necessary that we 
should look to the means which may exist cf 
producing such a state of things as ·may attend 
us some security against· the danger, which may 
arise from it, to our Eastern Empire. 89 
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Palmerston's approach to the problem was somewhat more far-sighted 
than Grey's as he showed through his attitude to further Turkish requests 
for help. Stratford Canning had qeen in Turkey in connection with the 
settlement of Greek boundaries, and was under pressure to gi.ve the Sultan 
at least his moral support against. the threats of lVIehemet to prove British 
good will, as his despatches to Palmerston show. 90 Palmerston appreciated 
the importan~e of the Sultan as an ally in view of the recent Greek 
settlement. Furthermore if the Sultan was overthrO\'vll there was the dangt:r 
that the French, already entrenched in' Algeria, might move into Egypt 
and cut off British trade routes to the East. He surmised that the Sultan 
. ' 
was a more ir.1portant ally than Mehemet could be, but suggested to Grey 
that Cabinet dispersal could be used as an excuse for the lack of a fully 
articulated policy. 91 It is surprising to find Palmerston using an excuse of 
this sort. His awakening to the possible dangers of Turkish dissolution 
h~d not yet persuaded. him that resolute and imri:tediate action ·was 
required. Grey certainly saw no need for urgency. He replied from . 
Howick in a non-committal tone, wishing· to wait for Stratford Canning's 
opinion. 92 Their colleagues; in so far as they thought about foreign 
affairs during the reces$, were more concerned ·about possible Anglo-French 
coercion of the Dutch. 
stratford Canning returned to London on 17 September, and sent a 
memorandum to Palmerston a month later, urging the adoption of a resolute 
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-policy to keep the Sultan free from Russian domination. 93 In the meantime 
Mavrojeni, the Turkish charge d'affaires at Vienna., was on his way to 
London to ask for naval assistance for the Sultan bearing an introductory 
letter addressed to the 'Grand Vizir Earl Grey'. 94 Such an approach was 
not calculated to impress the Prime Minister as to the gravj.ty of the 
situation when- Anglo-French action in Holland was the main preoccupation. 95 
Palmerston seems to have been amused by the Turks. After reporting to 
Grey their request for a naval squadron to be despatched to Constantinople 
in return for commercial penefits to Britain, he added: 
Mavrojeni wishes to· see you. He is a respectable 
ruan, talks · Frenc}l and looks like a half-shaved old 
clothes man. 9 6 
. -
It is not ch•.ar when the Cabinet discussed the issue of naval aid to Turkey, 
but Palmerston wrote of the decision to Mandeville, the Briti.sh cha·rge at 
Constantinople*,- on 5 December: 
(Mavrojeni) has most zealously and ably pleaded the 
cause of his master the Sultan and it is not his 
fault that this letter is not d~livered to you by an · 
admiral of a fleet of 13 ships of war. But we have 
a good deal on our minds just now - we have our 
fleet blockading the Dutch and another keeping Dom 
Miguel in order and we are stinted to our peace-
establishment • • _ • if we had quite made up our . minds 
to comply with the Sultan's wishes we have not exactly 
the disposable means to allow ourselves to do so - you 
.may say that we feel strongly the importance -of 
upholding the Turkish Empire such as it is; and 
keeping it free from dismemberment. • • 9 7 
This letter is an ideal text for any discussion of the foreign policy of 
the Grey ministry. The emphasis on the limitations of the naval budget 
*There was no British ambassador at Constantinople during the crucial 
period between August 1832 and May 1833. 
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fs typical, and in this instance serves in an addit"lonal capacity as a cloak 
for the Cabinet's habitual indecision. How often was Palmerston forced to. 
report tp British and foreign anibassadors that 'we had not made up our 
minds'! Naturally, in spit~ of the rejection of the Sultan's request, the 
Cabin~t concludes with an e;,.•presslon of policy that is Foxite in its belief 
·in the power of moral declarations without any threat. One senses that 
Palmerston· had to work hard even to wring a moral declaration from his 
colleagues. He maintained later that he had tried to persuade ministers to 
sanction intervention: 
••• But Althorp and Brougham and others, some 
from ignorance of the bearing of foreign ·affairs, 
some for one foolish· reason, some for ·another, 
\vould not agree. .Grey., who was with me on the 
point, was weak and gave way, and so nothing was 
done in a crisis of the utmost importance to all Europe. 9 8 
Although, as we shall see, Palmerston exaggerated the strength of his 
own resolve at the time, he is almost certainly correct in identifying 
Althorp and Brougham, the apostles· of peace and retre!lchment, as the 
leaders of the opposition to intervention. Althorp, in one of his indiscreet 
letters to h!.s father~ Earl Spencer, showed no alarm at the prospect of 
Russian 'protection' of the Sultan: 
. Some of m.y colleagues are a good deal alarmed 
at this; I am not ••• it concerns Austria much 
more than it does us and it very probably will 
induce Austria to be a little more jealous of 
Russia which will be a very good thing. 99 
He would not have haLl to uoe such naive arguments in Cabinet - the 
commitment to retrenchment was strong enough to carry the day. As 
Dr. Bartlett has pointed out, 100 when df.scussions of foreign policy turned 
"1.32 
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to cost, Palmerston for once could not over,vhelm his critics with 
superior knowledge. It was difficult enough to fulfill the pledge to 
reduce the Naval Estimates for 18~3 with .squadron~:~ in action off .Holland 
and Portugal; a further burden would have been intolerable. Grey later 
e.xplained the difficulties that could have been expected ln Parliament: 
• • • it was not. in our power already engaged in 
the affairs of Belgium, and Portugal, to enter 
into a third business of the same nature. We had 
no force for such a [passage] • • • and I am quite 
sure Parliament would not have granted us one. 10 1 
It was on these grounds that Palmerston subsequently made his awk\vard 
explanation of British inactivity to the Commons: 
••• we were embarking on naval operations in 
the North Sea and off the coast of Holland and were 
· under the necessity of keeping up another naval 
force off the coast of Portugal, it would have been 
impossible. to have sent to the Mediterranean such 
a squadron as would have suited the purposes of the 
Porte and at the same time have compounded with 
the naval dignity of this country. 102 
Graham, who was more involved than anyone in the struggle to bring 
down the Estimates, showed a commendable grasp of the importance of 
the problem. He clearly regretted having to turn down Mavrojeni's 
request: something more than the principle of retrenchment was involved, 
as he appreciated: 
The Turkish affair is a real evil, .•• very 
embarrassing to us. It will be hard to persuade 
the People of England that they have any direct 
or deep interest in the fate of the Ottoman Empire 
yet its sudden overthrow ... will be a severe 
shock to our power in the East, ami timid 
acquiescence will only aggravate the ultim2.te 
danger. No supplies however from a refo'rmed 
House will ever be granted for a crusade and 
our pl~tce among nations mu~t depend on the 
magnanimity of Joseph Hume. Gibbon I thirik 
says "the nose of an Arab might have changed 
the destiny of the world"; iil revenge [sic] the 
vote of a ta:Hor m.ay now ca.use the fall of :the 
throne of Mahomet. 10 3 
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By hi~ strategic insight (as well as i.Jy his literary ruisattribution) Graham 
shows himself anything but Foxite. The Foxites in the Cabinet could not 
bring themselves to bolster up Turkey, even if British interests would 
benefit thereby. Grey, to his credit, seems to have realised that something 
ought to be done, but he would not overrule his colleagues. Among them 
Holland was the most prominent of those )Vho objected to intervention on 
ideological as well as finaricial ground~. He denied that the maintenance 
of the Ottoman Empi.re was necessarily in Britain's intere8t. His views 
are clearly ·reflected in his margi.nal comments* on Stratford Canning's 
memorandum. on Turkey of 19 December 1832. 104 stratford Canning argued 
in favour of the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire rather th~Ul allowing it 
to be partitioned between the Sultan and Mehemet and left a prey for the 
first invader. He believed that the Sultan could easily re-establish his 
authority in Egypt and Syria with British naval assistance and that the 
danger of Russia swallowing Turkey would be sufficient to justify Brit"ish 
intervention. He rejected mediation between the protagonists, argui.ng that 
economic sanctions against Egypt and Syria, together with British 
preparedness to support Turkey with force i.f necessary, would be required 
to meet the Sultan's needs. He thought ·all this would be better coming 
' 
from Britain than from the French whom the Sultan distrusted, although 
he appreciated that a joint intervention woulc! be preferable from the 
British point of view. 
*These notes were long attributed to Palmerston. For a full discuss·~on 
of their authorship, see App.endix II. 
·, 
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On his· own admission, Holland's criticisms did not constitute an 
alternative policy. 105 He illustrated the Whig inability to come to terms with 
the true situation in the Near East, a failing which Cabinet decisions on the 
matter reflect. His conviction that the Ottoman Empire could not be reformed 
or supported conditioned his comments. Thus he regarded the unwieldy extent 
of the Empire as the great .check to its improvement and the great cause of 
its weakness. He doubted whether a British squadron could achieve the task 
Canning set it, and in any case made no distinction between the basis of the 
power of the· Sultan and Pasha respectively - both were 'usurpers of minor 
authorities'. He disapproved of the idea of economic sanctions against Egypt 
and Syria as being injurious to British trading interests in the area. He was 
clearly alarmed at the prospect of unilateral British intervention - if any 
country was_ justified in intervening alone it was surely France, through her 
geographical position and her actual ~onnections with Turkey. 
The views of both men were outdistanced by events. Two days after 
Canning (by· then en route to Madrid) 106 presented his· mem~randum and long 
before Holland commented upon it, Ibrahim routed the Turks at Konya •. 
With Co-nstantinople now directly threatened, the Sultan was obliged to turn 
to Russia for assistance. The request was answered \Vith suspicious promptness 
and the Sultan held back, suspecting a trap. 107 Meanwhile, Namick Pasha, 
his personal represent~tive, had arrived in London to renew the appeal 
for British assistance. Namick had come armed with advice from . 
Metternich, who was anxious that Britain rather than Austria should have 
the task of confronting Mehemet. 10 8 The Cabinet, as yet ignorant of the 
events at Konya,. again refused the request. Both Palmerstun and the King 
were upset by the decision. William believed that Britain had to respond to 
the call immediately; if there was delay the decision would only have to 
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be taken later 1Under mUC.h more disadvantageOUS CirCUmStanCeS I • 10 g 
Palmerston does not seem to have been quite so concerned: 'his own 
conviction was not sufficiently stro~g', in Webster's careful words, 11? 
but he had wished fo:.; a firm statement of policy at the very least. In 
August 1833 he explained his position in a private letter to Ponsonby at 
St. Petersburg: 
My own opinion ~t the time was that without any 
naval means irn.:mcdiately disposable, we ought to 
have held strong language to Mehemet and to have bid 
him stop and I am sure he would have done sa. 
• • • others thought differently and a postponed 
decision n::.eant virtually a negative. 111 
This description rings truer than some of· Palmerston' s later accounts of 
this episode. He wa~;~ not immediately aware of the consequences of 
refusing naval support. How eve~, he was prepared to resort to a Foxite 
moral condemnation of Mehemet Ali in the absence of anything else, 1.12 
and even this failed. The Cabinet's lackof interest in the whole affair is 
.displayed by the delay in the dispatch of an official answer to the Turkish 
. 
request. It was not sent until 7 Marc.h 113 and by the time it arrived Turkey 
had already signed the Convention of Kutaya with Ibrahim. · 
British policy towards Turkey took a long time to recover from the 
misjudgement and diffidence that had been displayed over the naval 
intervention issue - indeed it needed rumours of a Russo-Turkish treaty 
to produce Palmerston 1 s definitive statement on the necessity of maintaining 
the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, for the sake of 'tranquillity and the liberty 
and the balance of power of the rest of Europe'. 114 Until then Cabinet 
attitudes ensured that British poli.cy follcw~d events rather than anticipating 
them. News of the battle at ·Konya was not sufficient to persuade Holland 
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for example to depart from a policy of ·non-intervention. All he could -
advocate was the Closest possible cooperu.tion with France and a self-
.denying or~inance on the part of the Powers. Beycnd this he could not 
'see his way orie inch' although he appreciated the· gravity· of the problem. 115 
Grey was not much ·more decisive though he was worried about the possible 
-subjugation of Turkey by Russia. He hoped for Anglo-French cooperation 
but doubted that a convention would please Parliament: 
_ Would either Parliament or the people support us 
in a war which would be generally felt to arise 
for the sake of a remote and problematical interest? 116 
For Holland and the majority of his colle3.gues there was only one answer 
to Grey's qu_estion. 
Palmerston, who seemed unsure as to how British interests could best 
be protected, attempted to launch a joint initiative to forestall _the dor.:tinat!on 
of Turkey by Russian arms. In view of the continuing attempts by the 
French to interpose themselves between the Sultan and the Russians, 117 
and M~tternich's disinclination to break with Rt~ssia, 118 the attempt was 
doomed to failure. The French were talking in terms of joint mediation, 
but only as a means ·to secure the dismemberment of Turkey and the 
· possible establishment of Mehemet as Sultan. 119 Britain nursed a 
traditional suspicion of French designs in Egypt which the- recent occupation 
of Algiers reinforced. Furthermore, Mehemet had a Napoleonic dash about 
him which appealed ·to the French. 12° For such reasons Palmerston was 
beginning to consider the maintenance of Turkish territorial integrity a 
necessary principle. He expressed his feelings to Gi·anville in a _privnte 
letter at the end of January: 
it. is impossible for Mehemet to become 
.Cal~ph or Sultan and therefore he cannot 13ucceed . 
to the unbroken empire and can only dismember it. 
• • • And surely, the injury which would thus be 
done to the great interest ('lf Europe, by placing 
the ruler of Turkey directly in the hands of 
Russia would far more than counterbalance the 
advantage we should derive ... from the establishment 
of Ecoles p·rimaires and schools of anatomical 
dissection in Syria and Mesopotamia. 12 1 
It should be noted that Palmerston was still undecided as to whether the 
Royal Navy should intervene. Throughout the spring of 1833 he \Vas 
involved in a fruitless wrangle with Metternich over the content and 
location of a European conference on the subject. 122 Meanwhile at 
ConstantiD.ople Britain was represented. only by Mandeville, the cha?'ge 
d'affaires, who played no significant part in events there. The French 
attempt through Admiral Roussin to mediate between the S~tltan and the 
Pasha ahead of Russia had failed. Thus the Western Powers could only 
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watch as the Russians camped outside Constantinople at the e.nd of March 
to protect the Sultan from the renewed attack that Ibrahim had threatened 
after his rejection of the French terms. 12 3 
At the beginning of April Palmerston, not yet aware of Roussin's 
failure, came to the conclusion that a British naval presence in the 
Eastern Mediterranean would help to encourage Mehemet to treat with 
the Sultan. He was not necessarily concerned with the maintenance ·of the 
Ottoman Empire. As Professor Temperley has pointed out, it was not 
a question of abstract principles but of whether .. Britain would fight to 
maintain Tu!'key or not. Temperley concludes that at this sta.ge Palmerston 
would only have fought had the British roaC. to India bE'!en blocked. 124 In 
the present instance, Admiral :Hotham was ordered to take his small 
detachment from Greece to Alexandria to strengthen the British consular 
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representations to Mehemet in favour of negotiation with the Porte. 12 5 
Perhaps because of Palmerston's indisposition during the first week in 
April, the Cabinet wa_s not cc~snltcd on the matter. Althorp vras furious, 
·perhaps suspecting covert British intervention and inflation of the Naval 
· Estimates. Grey apologisoo profusely: 
It was an improper omis::;ion .•• the case was 
one on which th'e opinion of the Cabinet should 
have been taken. The truth is that I attached too 
little importance to it and thought it too clear. 
He emphasised that an early settlement between Mehemet and the Sultan 
was the oniy means of preventing a collision between France and Russia. 
It was also important, in his view, to make the two Powers realise that 
thei~ naval strength in the Mediterranean had· not passed unnoticed. 126 It 
is fascinating to speculate on possible cabinet at-titudes towards naval action 
at this point. Only Graham emerges as having definite opinions on the 
necessity of. confronting Russia: 
Having settled Belgium, we shall I hope, arrange 
Portugal and then we shall be in a sti.·ong position 
to talk strongly to Russia. 12 7 
Talleyrand complained that the Cabinet showed little interest in the matter, 12 8 
although ministers supported his idea of. a self-denying ordinance with 
. 
respect to Turkey on the part of the Four Powers involved. 12 9 
Apart from the fact that the worsening of Anglo-French relations with 
the Eastern Powers made a concert approach very unlikely, 130 the 
Convention of Kutaya made such proposals redundant. Palm.e:i."ston was 
permitted ear~y in lVIay to sc:1d a squadron ~ommanded by Admiral 
Malcolm to cruise off the Dardanelles, most probably to encourage Russia 
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to withdraw as the negotiations between the Porte and the Pasha were 
reaching a conclusion. The Cabinet's acquiescence in this step is 
perhaps best e"-'Plain~ in terms of the new availability of ships for 
. . 
strategic purposes, with the lifting of the DutGh blockade, rather than as 
heralding a turn- toward~ an interventionist policy. 131 The squadron was 
strictly under orders from London and was not to enter the Dardanelles 
except under very exceptional and unlikely circumstances. In a letter to 
Grey, Palmerson .admitted that in the existing situation it was unlikely 
that Ibrahim -i.vould renew his rebellion or the Sultan invoke British aid. 
In all cases Malcolm 'was better out of the way.'. 132 One suspects that 
Palmerston gained Cabinet approval by stressing the unlikelihood of 
British action in the Dardanelles. He could justify the despatch of the 
squadron in terms of the possible diplomatic effect in encouraging the 
Russians to withdraw from Constantinople as Ibrahim's bluff had been 
called. He knew perfectly well that the Dardanelles co~lld not be forced 
by ships alone. The deci.sion was far from a commitment to intervene to 
preserve the· terri.torial integrity of Turkey. 
The Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, Russia's prize for her intercession 
on the Sultan's behalf, did much to convince Palmerston that a more 
resolute response was required. Ironically, Malcolm's squadron may have 
helped to convince the Sultan of the necessity of an agreement with Russia, 
for he misco~strued Britain's ·motives in· sending .out a naval detachment.l:i 3 
The proper construction of the Treaty, particularly its secret clause 
concerning the passage through the Straits, was long a matter of contention. 
It now seems generally agreed that the R u.ssians did not gain any new 
concessions . in thi.s area. The ancient rule excluding foreign warships 
from the Straits was reaffirmed. Such a ruling benefitted Russia, in that 
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her Black Sea coast would be free from attack in the event of a war with 
Britain and. France, but it did not arr..ount to the Turkish surrender of 
sovereignty in the Bospho:rus and the Dardanelles \Vhich was widely· 
assumed in Britain. Palmerston had a shrewd idea of what the Treaty 
c~ntained and what it did not, and he was inclined to give Russia and 
Turkey the benefit of the doubt over the Straits question. However, he 
was incensed at the Treaty, not so much because of the equivocal secret 
clause, but because' of 
the mutual agreement between the two· powers to 
consult each other confidentially upon all their 
respective interests and by which the Russian 
Ambassador becomes chief Minister of the Sultan. 134 
In publiq Palmerston maintained hi.s defence of the Tsar ag?.inst personal 
attacks and asserted his belief in Hus~ian good faith over Turkey. 135 
Nevertheless, his conviction that Turkey must remain independent was 
, hardening. Three days after the Treaty of Unk.iar-Skelessi had been sigr:.ed 
he told the Commons that: 
It is of the utmost importance for the interest of 
England and for the maintenance of the peace of 
Eur0pe, that the territories :md provinces forming 
the Ottoman Empire should be an independent · 
state • • •. undoubtedly the Government would feel 
it to be their duty to resist to the utmost any 
attempt on the part of Russia to partition the 
Turkish Empire and, if it had been necessary, 
we should equally have felt it our duty to interfere 
and prevent the Pasha of Egypt from dismembering 
any portion of the dominions of· the Sultan. 136 
Commentators have seized upon this speech as marking a new departure in 
British policy towards the Near East: in reality the Government's conversion 
to the Turkish cause was gradual and only partial during the last year of 
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the Grey ministry. Six months were to pass before the Cabinet agreed 
to the issue of the 'discretionary orders' to the fc;rce off the Dardanelles, 
which were the practical cotinterpart to Palmerston's newly stated principle. 
At first Palmerston protested· !!bout the. Treaty thr-ough the normal diplomatic 
channels. He- resisted the appeals of Ponsonby, at last installed as Ambassador 
to the Porte, to allow Malcolm's squadron to proceed to Constantinople to forestall 
any future Russian attack. He explained that such a decision would. require 
Cabinet sanction and. that ministers were scattering for the summer recese;. 137 
· Ponsonby had to wait until December for a formal reply to his request. 138 
Palmerston could not expect a prompt or informed Cabinet opinion 
on intervention in Turkey, particularly. as he himself was still feeling his 
way. During the summer the main preoccupation was with the struggle 
over Irish Church Legislation which emphasisEd the government's weakness 
in the Lords. Its popularity in the Commons had not been increased by 
internal divisions over Ireland and the Slave. Trade and the indifferent 
. . 
parliamentary performances of Cabinet members. 139 Those who were 
inclinEd to 'support British intervention. abroad such as Graham, Holland 
and Russell were, as we shall see, more interested in the Portugese 
question at this time,. not least because there was a strong ideological 
element involved. The same could not be said of Turkey, where 
Palmerston's frequent entreaties to the Sultan that he should reform his 
administration were not well received. 140 The members of the Cabinet, 
in their usual equivocal mood, hesitated. as they had done over the 
coercion of Holland the prevj_ous year. There was a world of difference 
between sending a fleet to cruise off the Dardanelles subjeet to orders from 
. . 
Londc::m and allowing the Ambassador at the Porte to order the ships into 
the Straits when he deemed it necessary. Russell appreciated that the 
Turkish situation was critical, but he was none the more determined for 
that: 
When the Sultan goes in to ·Constantinople and 
virtually assumesthe protectorate of Turkey I 
think we ought to make up _our minds how we 
are to act in such a state of things •.. I am 
quite undecided. 141 
Writing from Howick, Grey was inclined ~o let Ponsonby have the extra 
ships and the discretionary powers he wanted but was aware of the 
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difficulties of deciding under what circumstances the fleet should proceed 
up the Dardanelles. He was worried at the possibility of war (one suspects 
. he was in a 'resigning fit' at this time) and was even prepared to consider 
using .Mehemet Ali against the Russians. 142 Surprisingly, Stanley made 
a contribution to the debate in so far as he agreed with Pahnerston that 
·Malcolm's forces should be strengthed, and that the Russians should not 
be allowed to suppress a renewed revolt against the Sultan on their own. 14 3 
Holland was not apparently worried or interested: 
I am never very anxious about Turkey, but if we 
have taken a step that implies others I agree with 
Pahnerston that Russia is not in a temper to make 
·it prudent for us to shrink in the least degree from 
the consequ~nces of our actions. 144 
The matter would not be discussed until the beginning of the session 
in November. The events of the autumn had helped to distract attention 
from the issue. Grey and Palmerston l:iad quarrelled over the question as 
.to whether a formal protest should be sent to St. Petersburg. 145 Grey 
was pained when Palmerston thought that his reluctance to agree to the 
protest was due to Princess Lieven's influence. 146 In truth Grey wished 
to avoid a further ·aggravation of Anglo-Ru.ssian relations follO\\-ing the Tsar's 
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rejection of Pahnerston's nomination .of Stratford Canning as Ambassador 
to St. Petersburg. 147 The Treaty of 1\funchengratz deflected some of 
Palmerston 's ire· towards Metternich, for he believed that it contained 
a secret agreement to dismember Turkey. 148 However, the Cabinet 
appears to have discussed Ponsonby's request at the end of November and 
turnErl it down, principally because there was now no ·useful purpose that 
the Royal Navy could serve alone. After M'unchengratz the Austrains 
·could not be expected to afford any support. Palmerston stressed to 
Ponsonby that the Sultan's best defence against Mehemet was not" Russian· 
arms but internal reform. 14 9 The despatch hints at the reluctance of the 
Cabinet to take decisive steps as well as revealing Palmerston's own 
. . 
hesitation as to the best counter to further Russian aggression. 150 
The Cabinet did not see its way clear to place the Dardanelles force 
under the orders of Ponsonby until January 1834. It is not clear why the 
decision was tak;en then ·rather than in December, 151 although the 
availability of ships may have been a factor. Graham wrote in December 
1833: 
We are quietly preparing more ships of the line 
and it will depend on the explanations of Russia 
with regard to her armaments both in the Black 
Sea and the Baltic whether in the spring we 
shall be able to ma.intain the general peace. _152 
Presumably the significance of· Unkiar-Skelessi and MYmchengratz had sunk 
in and ministers had appreciated by January 1834 the need to back up its 
· diplomatic attempts to coax the Sultan away from Russia and to show 
Russia that she would not be allowed to impose her will on the Sultan 
by force. 15 3 On 10 March Ponsonby was authorised to summon the fleet 
into the Dardanelles to counter any Russian move, if the Porte asked for 
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assistance. So the 'discretionary orders' were very limited in extent, 
although they have been considered by some to have been instrumental in 
. restraining Russia and regaining some of the grmmd lost by Britain i.n 
.1833. 154 
The Grey Ministry left the problem of intervention in Turkey hanging 
in mid-air. Palmerston later admitted that the Eastern question, alone 
among the affairs with which he had to deal .during Grey's ministry, was 
·in an 'unsatisfactory state'. He blamed the Cabinet for withholding their 
moral support for the Sultan in the autumn of 1832. 155 He was probably 
wrong· in thinking moral support sufficient at that stage when he himself 
was reluctant to countenance {ntervention. ·As in the case of the Polish 
revolution, he and the rest of the Cabinet were preoccupied at the crucial 
time. There was another· factor as well: the Whi.gs did not find it easy to 
. . 
c~1ange their tune ov~r Turkey, particularly if a commitment to interventi.on 
and war might be involved. Those who had been prepared to countenance the. 
French occupation of Belgium would hardly jib at Russia's occut:ation of 
Constantinople. We have already noted Grey's description of Turkey as 
'a remote and problematical interest' for Parliament and the country. 
Ministers were later to ::..4 egret their inaction and their prejudices. Brougham 
admitted in 1838 that his earlier belief that th.e ·exclusion of Turkey fr.om 
Europe would be a great benefit was a 'refinement too ab.surd to require 
serious refutation'. 156 He ought to have added _in his own de~ence that this 
'refinement' was shared by the majority of his countrymen until the dangers 
of Russiau aggrandisement and Turkish weakness were fully appreciated. 
In retrospect it is the neglect of the Poles that is more sm1Jrising in view 
of traditional Whig attitudes. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
NON-INTERVENTION IN PORTUGAL AND THE CABINET CRISIS 
The civil war in Portugal illustrates. perfectly the dilemma over 
intei.·vention ·and non-intervention which ·exercised the Grey administration. 
The legitimist cause on ·the Pe!J.insul2.. was a rallying poi.nt for Whigs and 
Canningites alike, and after November 1830 British. policy to~ards the · 
· absciutist r~gim.e of Dom Miguel could have been expected to reflect ~he 
fact.· So it proved; for thr.ee years the government maintained a neutral 
and non-interventionist attitude but acquiesced in the exertions of private 
. citizens in the rebel cause. This stance was in the Whig tradition of scant 
regard for the letter and spirit of the Foreign Enlistment Act and a 
c~valier interpretation of the principle of neutrality, short of formai 
British intervention. When, at the end of 1833, circumstances seemed 
to demand such intervention, the equilibrium. of opinion was upset, precipitating 
the only major cabinet tlivision over foreign affairs during Grey's premiership. 
We have seen how previous disagreements about ~he wisdom. of assertive 
diplomacy were resolved by refinements of official language, the skiliul 
deployment of naval resources or even by the avoidance of the issue. On 
this occasion however, there was a direct conflict of opinion between those · 
who supported intervention, whether for .strategic or ideological reasons, 
and those favouring peace and non-intervention. For. Grey, it was b.n issue 
of principle and therefore a resigning matter. After a minority in the 
Cabinet had rejected intervention, it was only with the greatest ,reluctance that 
.. 
he consented to remain at the head of the government. 
It will be remembered that Palm.erston's criticism. of government 
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. policy towards Portugal had been instrumental in bringing him into. 
prominence as a pqssible ·Foreign Secretary .in a reformed. administration . 
. He deplored the manner in which Wellington and Aberdeen ha~r appf!.rently 
' . squandered Canning's initiative of 1826 by recalling the British force· from 
Lisbon and according Dom 1\'liguel tacit recognition. Now in Office, he had 
the opportunity of assisting the cause of Donna Maria and her Regent, Dom 
Pedro, · by . combining at} official policy of neutrality with the 'intermeddling' 
he regarded as jusifiable in certain circumstances. He had told the Commons 
in 1829 that 
• • . if by interference is meant intermeddling and 
intermeddling in every way short . of actual military 
force, I must affirm that there is n~thing in such 
interference that the Law of Nations may not in . 
certain cases permit. 1 
Palmerston was as good as his word. Indeed, it was his 'non-intervention' 
in the affairs of Portugal that occasioned Talleyrand's cynical comment 
:quoted at the beginning of this study. He went further than some of his· 
colleagues would have wished in support of the legitimist cal,lse, but, at 
least until the matter came to a head in January 1834, the differences in 
interpretation and emphasis rarely excited, the attention of the full Cabinet. 
Only i..ord Holland showed both a constant interest in Portuguese affairs 
and a desire to· help· Dom Pedro in every possible way •. He had long 
standing political and financial connections with Portugal and his sympathy 
with the legitimist cause, together \vith ·his wish to see the interest of 
British subjects there protected, were sufficient .'to outweigh his natural 
leaning towards peace and non-intervention. Throughout the period he 
bombarded Palm~rston, Grey and their less sympathetic colleagues with 
memoranda urging stronger measures to er:sure the success of Dom Pedro's 
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offensive.· 
·In 1831, the immediate prospects were not encouraging. Pedro, 
displaced as Emperor of Bra:iil, ·had brought Donna Maria to Europe 
with a view to launching an attack against Dom Miguel from the legitimist 
stronghold of the Island of 'J'erceira. Despite his barbarbarous methods, 
Dom Miguel seemed well established in Portugal, while Dom Pedro had 
to live down his reputation as an j_ncompet~nt Emperor of Brazil and 
·as the architect of the ill-fated Constitution which he had introduced prior 
to his abdication from the Portuguese throne in 1826. In Britain, only 
Holland believed that Pedro's reputation· was ill-deserved. Palmerston, 
an enemy of Miguel rather than a champion of Pedro, was under no 
illusions as to his failings and .concerned him~elf initia~ly with the protection 
of British s·ubjects against Miguellite outrages. It was also necessary to 
·restrain the French from taking drastic action to safeguard their interests, 
__ both in Portugal and in Spain, where an attempt to encourage the opponents 
of the ·r~gime of Ferdinand VII might provoke a reaction from the Eastern 
Powers. Thus Palmerston was in a defensive mood when St. Amaro, the 
Brazilian Minister in London, approached him early in 1831 about the 
possibility of British support for an expedition from Terceira, With the 
Belgian negotiations in the forefront of his mind, he contented himself on 
this occasion with a declaration to the effect that Britain's treaty obligations 
to Portugal did not involve support for the illegal regime against its internal 
enemies. It was hardly necessary for Grey to have to remind Palmerston 
that any further statement of policy would require Cabinet approval. Grey 
himself was anxious that the government should do nothing to compromise 
its neutrality over Portugal, but made it clear where his personal sympathies 
lay. 2 Pahaerston had suggested to him that a naval detachment should be 
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stationed off the Tagus· to protect British subjects, but Grey was 
. disinclined to issue -discretionary orders to 'seamen who are apt to be 
a little too prompt' and would ·have preferred to channel complaints through-
the Consul General at "Lisbon. 3 · Palmerston purported to agree, 4 but within 
a week Grey deferred to his arguments in favour of a display of force off 
the coast. Early in April, 'a few sea captains paid Dom Miguel a visit'. 5 
The evidence that survives sugges~s that this was a Cabinet decision; 
presumably Palmerston pointed out that the expedition would not contravene 
Portuguese sovereignty. 6 The British presence had the desired effect in 
settling outstanding grievances but Palmerston was warming to the. rebel 
cause and regTetted that the Navy was limited to a deterrent role. 7 Grey 
was concerned that it should stay as such. He told Palmerston that 
although Dom Miguel was indeed 'a wild ·beast', his behaviour did not 
justify Briti.sh intervention. 8 
The possibility of French inten·ention in Portugal had worried successive 
governments a.s it would challenge Britain's traditional preponderance there 
as well as being a threat to European· peace. Thus when in June Palmerston's 
hatred for Miguel led him to encourage the French to seek redress in the 
British manner, Grey was alarmed and the Opposition were furious. 9 The 
Duke of Wellington regarded the protection of Portugal and British interests 
there almost as his personal responsi~ility after the' liberation of the 
Peninsula from French domination. His indignation at the possibility of 
renewed French aggrandisement was reinforced by the commercial lobby, 
who wished .for the maintenance of the status quo in Portugal, and justified 
their s·~and by reference to Britain's long-standing commitments to defend · 
Portugal against foreign attack. 1° Fortunately for Palmerston and for the 
government, the French showed exemplary restraint in obtaining redress 
and the government was not compromised by its refusal to respond to 
Miguel's calls for as~istance on the basis of treaty obligation~. 11 In 
truth, Britain's tr8aties with :Portue;al, da_ting back to the days of John 
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of Gaunt, had long been regarded as constituting a pretext rather than an 
obligation to intervene. Canni.ng had considered Britain bound to defend 
Portugal solely in the event of her being attacked by a foreign power. He 
. . . . 
would not protect her from internal enemies. 12 · The government's ·refusal 
to protect Miguel against the French reflects Canning's view. However, 
.even dedicated- opponents of the Portuguese r~gime did not wish to see it 
topple at· French hands. Holland had thought the French justified in 
obtaining· satisfaction from Dom Miguel by- threats, but he was anxious 
that the Terceira Regency should triumph through the good offices of 
Britain rather· than France. 13 
. -Meanwhile, Dom Pedro and Donria 1\iaria had arrived in England, hoping 
to attract support for the intended expedition. Talleyrand had already 
sounded Palmerston about the possibility of joint Anglo-French action, but 
Palmerston parried the request by st3:ti ng that Britain's treaty obligations 
necessitated independent action. 14 Iri- this respect at least, the Portuguese 
treaties were a convenient excuse for waiting on events. Sebastiani 
raised the matter again on 15 July but his enquiry could not have been 
more badly timed in view of Louis Philippe's spee~h to the Chambers on 
on 23 July. 15The French King had confirmro Tory suspicions of French 
ambitions in Portugal by boasting that 'the tricoleur was fluttering under 
the walls of Lisbon' •16 Although the French retired from Portuguese 
waters soon afterwa.rds: it was unthinkable to encourage Sel:"lastiani at· this 
stage. Palmerston was thinking in terms of independent and covert support 
for Dom Pedro's expedition. He wrote privately to Granville that although. 
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warships could ·not be supplied directly, Britain might sell them to Pedro 
at a nominal price. :He went on: 
. . 
Really, when one reads what is going on in 
Portugal, one feels tempted to throw the principle 
of non-interference overboard and to send Pedro 
straight to Queluz. But nevertheless the thing 
ought to ba done in a decent manner, but done it 
should. be. IJ 
._ Holland was equally impatient ~ith the policy of neutrality: indeed he 
criticised both Graham and Palmerston for avoiding the issue by blaming 
. . 
the· King f~r the neglect of Dom Pedro. 18 Certainly the King did ~ot warm 
to the legitimist cause - he received the Queen and her father with the 
greatest reluctance 19 - but the government's equivocal stance cannot be 
blamed on the King and still less on the attitude of Palmerston or Graham, 
interveners both. The fault lay with their colleagues. The Cabinet's 
natural aversion to the use of force was strengthened by doubts about 
Dom Pedro'.s competence to lead a national movement. Furthermore, 
Portuguese affairs were overshadowed in the summer of 1831· by events in 
Belgium. The possibility of assisting the Terceira Regency" formally was 
not discussed by the Cabinet until late September, whep. the extent of the 
opposition to dramatic gestures was revealed. Holland had already expressed 
the opinion that Britain w~uld be· acqui.escing in French or Spanish 
domination of Portugal by adhering to a policy of no~-intervention. 20 Such 
sentiments had a cool reception in Cabinet; G~erich and Richmond questioned 
both th~ justice and the e>.."Pediency of an expedition against Dom Miguel 
and protestro at the hospitality afforded to the Portuguese royal couple. 
Palmerston joined Holland in emphasising the dangers of leaving the 
contest for other powers to decide. According. to Holland, 'Grey, Stanley, 
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Lord John Russell and even Althorp' inclined towards his vie\'!', but 
obviously they. did not incline far enongh. 21 Thus for the time being 
the government remr.inad. e;ommitted to a policy of neutrality in which 
Palmerston and Holland had to acquiesce. Despite the impression, Holland 
gives in his Journal, Grey for one had grave misgivings about any departure 
from such a policy, as he confessed to Palmerston a week later: 
I find it· very· di.fficult to make up my mind to t&ke 
a decided measure to overthrow a government 
establi~hed. de facto and which is submitted to by 
the people. It is a most embarrassing question 
and one on whfch it would not be prudent to take 
any decided step till we see whether we are to 
retain the power of conducting to a conclusion the 
m~asures which we may think it right to adopt. 2 2 
Grey was intermittently aware of the necessity for the Government to 
formulate a more definite policy towards Portugal in view of the imminence 
-of Dom Pedro's exPedition from Terceira and the intensifying struggle 
for the ·succession in Spain between the Apostolicals and the legitimists. 2 3 
He was prompted by a local diffculty in Lisbon in October concerning the 
use of British ships in the Pedroite cause to write both to Palmerston and 
Holland for their recommendations with regard to possible British intervention 
in the appro~ching contest. He told Palmerston that he remained unconvinced 
as to the propriety of opposing an est~blished r~gime, but he could not 
countenance direct action in its defence. l-Ie was unsure of the proper 
course .of action: 
I wish I could sea a clear course out of these 
difficulties. Supposing therP. was none, except 
joiaing with France to establish Donna M:aria, 
in what way would you set about it: or what 
ground would you take for interfering? The 
statement of a project for this purpose would 
greatly assist our deliberation8. 24 
Palmerston r~sponded promptly with the opin.ion that the Portuguese 
question 'could not be set straight without some· sort of interference'. 
He had no clear answer for Grey however; he merely stated that a 
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definite policy would have to be agreed upon by the spring, when Pedro 
was expected to mount his attack and British policy would come under 
Parliamentary scrutiny. 25 Holland replied to Grey's request26 in more 
trenchant terms. He recommended full consultation with the French prior 
to the· recognition of Donna Maria and the conclusion of a triple alliance. 
He justified such action in terms of the crimes of Dom Miguel and his 
failure to respo·nd to repeated British calls for an amnesty for political 
prisoners. Holland also recommended that the Government should make 
diplomatic representations on Pedro's behalf both to the London Conference 
and the various courts of Europe. 2 7 
Palmerston and Holland were ·both restrained in their advice, presumably 
with the full Cabinet in mind. Privately, Pahnerston wished to go beyond 
diplomatic representations: as he confessed to Esterhazy, the Austrian 
plenipotentiary, 2 8 and Holland was certainly with him. Ho\vever, some of 
their colleagues were, as we ·have seen, re~uctant even to endorse a policy 
of amicable neutrality towards the 1'erceira Regency, and Melbourne re-
emphasised his fears of the effects of British intervention at this time. 2 9 
Lansdowne was also uneasy, as on~ of his rare letters to Palmerston 
shows. He excused himself from a Cabiaet meeting on Portugal· early 
in December, admitting that he had no clear opinion on the subject. He 
lroped that a peaceful solution could be found by .appealing to the Powers to 
recognise Donna Maria in the interests of stability as well a.s legitimacy. 
As to intervention, Lansdowne was concerned lest Britain should be 
involved in a. protracted struggle: 
To raise the standard of civil war by foreign 
interference· in Portugal without reasonable certainty 
of an immediatP. as well as a successful' result 
would be . impolitic and unjust. 30 
The Cabinet which met in Lansdowne's absence was reluctant tp include 
any I'eference to Portugal in the forthcoming King's Speech. Holland 
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insisted .. that a reference was made, albeit of a neutral character: to the 
· imminent struggle. He lamented the attitude of his colleagues. Grey he 
found lacking the energy required to formulate a definite policy, while 
Pahnerston was 'either constitutionally or systematically cold and dilatory'. 31 
' ' ' 
This was unfair: Palmerston was in fact attempting to obtain international 
agreement to a plan to induce Dom Miguel to retire in favour of Donna 
Maria on condition that the unpopular Constitution of 1826 was not revived. 
He was prepared to pledge Britain to a policy of non-intervention if Spain 
and the Eastern Powers reciprocated~ Naturally, 'non-intervention' meant 
acquiescence in the private supply of ships, arms and volunteers for the 
rebel cause~ 32 
No one could doubt where Palmerston's sympathies lay, but the 
government's preoccupation with the Reform Bill aild the Belgian issue 
. prevented him, from acting upon them. He narrowed his horizons in the 
spring of 1832 and concerned himself with the protection of British subjects 
in the event of a civil war. He. wished to retain a. naval presence off 
Lisbon for the purpose as well as to serve as a deterrent to any Spanish 
attempts to cross the border to assist Dom Miguel. 33 Graham fully 
supported him, 34 but Holland could not accept a . passive role for Britain 
and urged Palm.erston to renew his efforts to win i.nternatior..al recognition 
for Donna Maria. 35 Pa.lmerston had to remind him that it was essential 
to stand by the Cabinet line of 'moral nent!"ality', at least in public, to 
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avoid embarrassment in view of the de~icate domestic situation that the 
Reform issue had created. 36 Unfortunately, Grey's concern to clarify 
British policy towards Por~ugal had not' been sustained. He was opposed 
to any grand diplomatic gestures. He feared that the King would not . 
approve of any move which might be construe<;~ as a threat to Spain and 
was E.n.xious not to antagonise William at a time when his confidence was 
most needed. 37 Holland countered with the view that 'a little maritime 
bullying before Lisbon • • • would not at all displease King William the 
Tar'. 38 This may have been true, but Grey lacked the will to prove it. 
In the event, Admiral Parker was ordered to retire from the Tagus and 
remain outside the three mile limit to a\•.rait further instructions. 39 - At 
the same time, Lord William Russell, brother of Lord John, was sent on 
a special mission to Portugal with a view to strengthening British 
representations in Lisbon. Palmerston made no secret of his personal 
desire to see Britain take Donna Maria 'decidedly by the hand', but 
emphasised to Russell that he should maintain the strictest neutrality. 40 
As he had admi.ttt:.-d on a previous occasion, 'Pedro must win his spurs for 
himself: Terceira is neither a separate state or the Portuguese monarchy'. 41 
. . 
One senses the invisible restraining hand of the Cabinet acting upon Palmerston 
throughout the spring and summer of 1832. He must have found this 
frustrating in view of his growing resolve to support the liberal cause 
throughout Europe. This new departure \vas to be most clearly demonstrated 
in August during the Commons debate on the imposition of the repressive 
Six Resolutions on the German Confederation. Palmerston rnade a powerful 
speech, w~1ich· was printed and circulated thronghout Germany, declaring 
consitutional states to be the natural ailies of Britain. 42 
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Dom PEdro proved to be an uninspiring fighter for the cause of 
.· 
constitutional government of which Palmerston was coming to be regarded 
as the patron. The Terceira fore~, supported nava!ly by the EngliF!h 
8.dmiral Sartorius, had landed at Oporto in July 1832, only to "find itself 
besieged almost immediately. The British· Government watched anxiousiy, 
if Brougham's secretary, Le Marchant, is to be believed: 
French politics are now forgotten in our anxiety 
about Portugal. Every day has some fresh report 
Dom Pedro's victory or defeat and proportional 
speculations are of course afloat respecting him. 4 3 · 
It was soon clear that Pedro's cause was hopeless without foreign assistance. 
Palmerston and Holland were hamstrung,. ·for. they realised that the permission 
and supplies. necessary for British intervention would not be. forthcoming. 44· 
·In any case, Grey was showing his habitual caution ·over military affairs and 
while he appreciated Pedro's plight, he was unwilling to expose British 
forces to the possibility of a long engagement and eventual defeat. 45 The 
Cabinet as a ,.;,hole seemed less concerned about the outcome of the struggle 
than Le· Marchant implied. Holland complained to Brougha.m: 
I owe you· all a grudge for· not having given him 
[Pedro] more moral support ·when· 1t would have 
been of service. A minister to Terceira or even 
to Oporto on his taking it (quite compatible with 
neutrality) would have made all the difference. 46 
It seemed too late to help Dom Pedro. Althorp was already communicating 
his thoughts to Palmerston on the proper fate of the Island of Terceira 
following the expected recognition of Dom Miguel·. 47 Graham still hoped 
to see British intervention, but showed himself well ~ware of the probable 
outcome of the contest: 
• • • if he [Pedro] cannot make head [sic] 
against Dom Miguel, ·we should negotiate for 
his retreat on the· condition that he retires 
absolutely from the contest and that the 
government of Dom MigU.el is to be recognised 
·by us. 48 
Graham emphasised his lack of confidence in Pedro in a letter to 
Palmerston a month later, which. Melbourne fully endorsed. 49 
In fact the struggle in Portugal did not. develop in the way the 
government expected.· Though outnumbered by ten to one, Dom Pedro 
managed to hold off the 1\Uguellite forces and remained in precarious 
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occupation of Oporto. Both Lord William Russell and Hoppner, the Consul 
General in Lisbon, urged Palmerston to interv~ne, but he was still bound 
by the Cabinet to a policy of .neutrality, as well as being aware of the 
disappointing response of the Portuguese people to Dom Pedro's requests 
for support. 50 Grey was never i.mpressed by Pedro and he was disinclined 
to cultivate him. He wrote to Palmerston on 15 November: 
Dorn Pedro does not seem to have prospect of mnch 
support even from his partisans in Oporto - we must 
· not be too nice to him. 5 1 · 
In spite of his low regard for Pedro, Grey again became conscious of 
the need for Britain's position to be made clearer, as he admitted to 
· Graham a week later. 52 Graham himself was deter]nined without being 
specific: 
I think a direct course would be found to be more 
safe and easy than any indirect proceeding, and the 
vice of our policy in Portugal has been the want of 
sufficient decision, for we have purs·ued the substance 
·of neutrality with all its inherent weakness and incurred 
all the risks and odium of host"ilities without the 
efficacious advant~.ges of war. 53 
157 
This was an admirable summary of the situation, but Grey's particular 
outlook led him to support Lord William Russell's attempts to persuade 
- Pedro and Miguel to retire from the contest prior to the esbblish~J.1ei1t 
. . 
of ~ regency for Donna Maria, the grant of an amnesty and the burial of 
the 1826 Constitution. 54 Those of his colleagues who were on hand in late 
November endorsed Russell's initiative. 55 However, it stood little chance 
of success, not least because of the turn of events in Spain. The ailing 
King Ferdinand had unexpectedly transferre4 his political support to the 
legitimist party of Queen Christina. 56 With the partisans of the .1\.postolical 
Don Carlos in retreat, it was hardly likely that the Eastern Powers, with 
their deep suspicion of constitutional movements, would agree to the 
simultaneous dispatch of Dom Miguel. Stratford ·canning was sent on a 
special mission to Madrid in December to press the legitimist cause in 
both countries and to repair the damage caused by Addington, the near-
Car list British Ambassador. 57 This intensive diplomatic activity did little 
to help Dom Pedro directly and Hoppner sent Pahnerston a memorandum 
in December re-emphasing the view that prolonged resistance to Dom 
Miguel was impossible without foreign assistance. 58 There was as little 
hope of British ~ntervention at this time as there was of Stratford Car~::J.ing 
negotiating an armistice and the withdrawal of Miguel. The Cabinet did 
·not wish to be troubled, particularly as the delicate state of Anglo-French 
relations following the surrender of Antwerp dominated foreign policy 
discussions over the New Year. Admiral Parker's force, insufficient in 
itself to influence the struggle, remained off Oporto to proteet British 
subjects if they were threatened. 
The continuation of Pedro's dogged resistance meant that affairs on 
the Peninsula remained static during the opening months of 1833. Stratford 
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Canning's mission to Madrid ·was a complete failure, fm; Ferdinand had. 
reverted to his earlier patronage of the Carlists, making Zea Bermudez, a 
former ambassador to Britain, his Prime Minister. Bermudez, Palmerston's 
bete noire~ frustrated all Canning's efforts. 59 The s'it.uation seemed to· 
have reached stalemate. Dom Pedro was still contriving to hold on at 
.. oporto, but his situation was desperate, as Palmerston recognised. 6 0 In 
Lisbon Russell, who had fallen too much under the influence oi the Spanish 
Ambassador Cordova, came to the conclusion that there was nothing to 
·choose between Pedro and. Miguel. 61 The French seemed to share this 
view, having quite lost their earlier appetite for a joint initiative with 
Britain. Broglie the Prime Minister had ·been far from enthusiastic about 
Canning's mission. 62 Given these circ.umstances, Wellington's motion deplori.ng 
the Government's departure from the· princi.ple of neutrality o•1er Portugal 
as proclaimed in the King's Speech, could not have been better timed to 
embarrass the ministry. 6 3 The government was defeated in the Portuguese 
debate and Grey was strongly tempted to resign. 64 The attack on British 
intermeddling and the government's reply mirrored the debates on foreign 
policy in the 1820's, the roles of government and opposition being reversed. 
In the previous year, Peel had attacked Palmerston's policy in Cannintiite 
terms, deploring his hypocrisy in demanding that Spain should remain 
neutral while he displayed an obvious partiality towards Dom Pedro. ~ 5 Now 
the opposition could attack the admini.stration on still stronger grounds in 
view of the repeated violations of the Foreign Enlistment Act,· as witnessed 
by British acquiescence in the troop-raising activiti.es of Mendizabel, a 
Jewish entrepreneur operating in England, and the appoin'i.ment of Sir 
Charles Napier as commander of Dom Pedro's navy. Lord Aberdeen 
produc:ed a list of expeditions to Portugal mounted from Britain which was 
, .. 
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so long that Hansard's reporter co.nfessed himself defeated. 6 6 Lord Wynford 
fulminated against Mendizabel, refusing to believe that 
Great Britain • was so degTaded as to endure 
that the Government should permit a Jew to hire 
crimps to kidnap its subjects, or parish officers 
'to relieve the burden of their parishes by sending 
them to he murderf:d in R foreign country and in a 
cause with which they had no concern. 67 
Canning's warning~:; about the dangers of falling between the two stools of 
strict neutrality and intervention v1ere especially relevant in this conteA1:. 
· Palmerston had not heeded his mentor's advice· 'away with the distinction 
bet\veen intervention and armed neutJ~ality! ' 6 8 and the government was 
reaping the fruits of his speech of June 1829,. in which he gone beyond 
the Whigs' elastic conception of neutrality to justify intermeddling by any 
means short of actual force. 
It fell to Grey to defend a policy which reflected Palmerston's 
philosophy rather than his own. He was on weak ·ground anyway, in· view 
of his previous promises to uphold the Foreign Fnlistment Act. 69 It was 
·difficult for him to explain why the unsuccessful Sartorius had been 
reprimanded for his breach of the law while Napier, under the name of 
Carlo Ponza, was allowed to set out fo:i· Portugal unhindered. Brougham 
and Lansdowne coutd add little to Grey's halting reply and the debate 
was becalmerl amidst varying interpretations of international law. In 
t~e division, the government was defeated by ten votes. Next day, the 
Cabinet met to draw up two letters to the King, one tendering resignation, 
the other requesting an answer to the address passed by the Lords, Althnrp 
and Grey were both nursing thoughts of retirement and were strongly 
tempted to send the first letter immediately. The proposals concerning 
the abolition of slavery and the redistribution of Irish Church Temporalities 
were having a rough passage even in the reformed Commons and the 
government feared suosequent defeats in the Lords. Grey in particular 
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had lost· any relish for a struggle, and his Cabinet, pever .a. homogeneous 
body, had b~en plagued by internal differences after the passage of ~h~ ~efon:n 
Act deprived; ·ministers of a common purpose. However, he eventually agreed 
that the Commons should be given the opportunity to pass an opinion on 
the recent events in the Upper House. ·A question was to be. set up for 
· Palmerston to give him a chance to deplore the Lords' verdict and the 
Cabinet would take its cue fro1;t1 the reaction of the Commons and send 
the King the. appropriate letter. 7 0 
The letter of resignation was never needed, for the response to 
Palmerston'f! statement of 5 June was favourable and there was an 
overwhelming majority in favour of Colonel Evans' motion the next day 
approving the government's Portuguese policy. 71 Ministers had feared that 
the radicals would combine with the _Irish contingent to embarrass the 
government, but both groups· fully supported British policy. 72 Pro-government 
speakers stressed the wickedness of Dom Miguel's regime in justifying 
partisan action, together with the ominous strength and ambitions of the 
Eastern Powers. In the more sympathetic atmosphere of the Commons it 
was comparatively easy for the government to sidestep accusations of 
covert intervention and defiance of the Foreign Enlistment Act - which was 
certainly Lord John Russell's approach in a speech described by Lord 
Ellenborough as 'wicked'. 7 3 Peel taunted the government with quotations 
from Canning and Fox proclaiming the adva:1tages of a strict neutrality, 
and he repeated his accusations of moral hypocrisy against Palmerston. 74 
Palmerston' s reply was uninspired but acceptable to the House. He defended 
the government's determination to see that Spain did not· intervene in Portugal 
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in terms of the cause of peace and the maintenance of the balance of 
power in Europe. He also emphasised the difficulty of enforcing the 
Foreign Enlistmer.t Act against individuals, even if such a procedure was 
just or desirable. He left the Commons in no doubt as to his personal 
view: 
_ .. 
the principle of erilbarking in tha contests 
of other countries had prevailed and had been 
acted upon in the brightest period of our history~ 7 5 
Such a statement did not bear close examination, but it satisfied the House, 
-whose members were becoming more impatient ~ri~h the Eastern Powers. 
Their growing antipathy was displayed in the violent debate on Russian 
_ policy in Poland a month later. 
In the midst of this domestic excitement, the siutation in Portugal was 
transformed both militariiy and diplomatically ·by 'Carlo Ponza', who 
destroyed Miguel's fleet off Cape St. Vincent, thus opening up the road to 
Lisbon for Dom Pedro. The Cabinet was encouraged to act more postively 
by this unexpected boost to the legiti~~st cause. Even Brougham, who had 
never cared for Pedro, wrote 'with feelings of the strictest neutrality I 
excessively rejoice'. .Lansdowne shared his opinion. 7 6 Holland immediately 
produced a project involving the recognition of Donna Maria. He appreciated 
that it was important to maintain the momentum of Predro's success, for 
the royal couple, recently reunited in L'isbon, were ~eit:J.g harried by the 
Miguellite rump under the command of the Fr~nchman Marshall Bourmont. 7 7 
For once, Holland's colleagues were not far behind him. Surprisingly, 
Stamley was delighted at the news of Napier's success and looked forward 
to a British response: 
I· sincerely_ rejoice at the Portuguese news; and 
I am inclined to think that a little more succe~s 
might justify our taking a step in advance. But 
matters are hardly ripe yet • • • 7 8 
Grey acknowledged that 
Nobody adheres more scrupulously than 1 do to 
the principle of not interfering. But this, like 
other principles, must have its limits. 7 9 
162 
The Cabinet met early in August to discuss the recognitic!l of Donna Maria. 
Ministers decided to send discretionary instructions to Russell empowering 
him to recognise the young Queen if the Terceira forces remained in 
control in Lisbon. More significantly, · the Cabinet agreed to warn Spain 
that Britain might intervene if any attempt was made to assist Dom Miguel 
from over the harder. 80 Palmcrston and Lord John Russell were disappointed 
that further action had not been agreErl, such as the reinforcement of the 
naval force off Lisbon to cover any determined Spanish action. 81 
In the event, the government was to be brought to the brink of 
intervention in Portugal by the developing ~ituation in Spain. It was obvious 
by late August that the ailing King Ferdinand •could not survi.ve much longer 
and the British Government feared that Dom Miguel would be encouraged. 
in his efforts in Portugal if Don CarlGs, his political cousin, were to be · 
proclaimed in Spain. 82 The fortunes of the two pretenders ·were inextricably 
linked, as were those of their rivals, the Infanta Isabella and Donna Ma.ria. 
Grey conceded on 8 September that 'humanity, peace and our interests may 
compel us to fntervene'. 83 A week earlier, Princess Lieven had noted 
that 
His patience was exhausted, which means Miguel 
and Bourmont are. still worrying him and that 
he threatens· to inter~ene in the matter. 84 
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While he was taking his ease: at Hawick during September, G1·ey. became 
increasingly convinced that British intervention in Portugal wo'.lld be 
necessary. 85 He was reluctant to depart from a neutral stauce, espec~.a1ly 
as his opinion of Dom ·Pedro as a statesman and a soldier had not ~hanged 
and w~s ind~ed sharErl· by the majority of _his colleagues. 86 The interventionists 
in the Cabinet, of whom Russell was becoming the most voluble, \Vere 
con~cious of the difficulty.. of persuading their colleagu~s to back Dom Pedro. 
As Russell· wrote to. Holland, past form was not encouraging: 
When the Russians saw their interests in the East 
threatened, they went in, leaving us to· lump it. 
I fear we have not the necessary spirit, 
He urged Holland to work on Grey to persuade him to sound out the members 
of the Cabinet individually on the prospect of intervention, thereby avoiding 
the necessity of a formal meeting. 87 Nothing could more eloquently 
demonstrate Russell's lack of confidence in the Cabinet as a body •. This 
initiative was unsuccessful and British policy assumed the becalmed state 
customary during the long recess. The government was . still officialiy 
neutral in the Portuguese contest, just as Palmerston was still acting as 
intermediary and broker in the business of sending out volunteer troops to 
join Dom Pedro. His letter to. Lord William Russell of 24 September is 
typical: 
I am pressing Funch:1l [Pedro's agent in London] 
daily to send out troops. He may have traine:i 
and di.sciplined Belgians by thousands and enti.re 
battalions of Scotch and Irish are to be had as 
plentiful as blackberries. 8 8 
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·Palmerston's only success during the early autumn was to obtain Grey's 
blessing for the dispatch of a force to Cork in readiness for possible 
action in Portugal. 89 
· By October the situation had apparently eased, due to the proclamation 
of the Infanta following the death of Ferdinand and Bourmont's withdrawal 
from Lisbon after a dispute with Dom Miguel. Even Palmerston had to 
~mit that the necessity for Britain to intervene had decreased· and .that 
intervention in the existing circumstances would be hard t.o justify to 
Parliament. 90 Stanley, who was retreating from his earlier position, wrote 
to Palmerston in October to warn him of the strain on military resources 
that would be involved if a substantial .force was sent. 91 However, the fear 
that other Powers might intervene if Britain . stood aside, thereby usurping 
her traditional p_redominance on the Peninsula, was strong enough to ~aintain 
an enduring case for intervention. There was a danger that France might 
follow her immediate recognition of the Infanta (under the Regency of 
Queen Christina) by intervening on her behalf, thus inviting a response from 
the Eastern Powers. 92 Britain and France had accepted each other's 
predominance in Portugal and Spain respectively, 9 3 but in the contemporary 
situation close co-operation would be essential if the interests both of the 
two countries and the two young queens were to be safeguarded. The 
legitimist cause in both countries was precariously based and Broglie 
had reversed his previous policy with regard to British intervention in 
maintaining that it was essential for the tranquillity of ~oth countries that 
Dom Miguel should be promptly expelled. 94 Grey was quick to appreciate 
the interrelation between British and French interests and revealed the 
direction in which he was moving in an important letter to Palmerston 
on 9 October: 
You know my aversion to· war you are equally 
aware of how much I deprecate all interference in 
the affairs of other countries. But this principle 
must be regulated by a just attention to our own 
safety, and looking forward to the possibility, I 
would not willingly say t!1e probability of interfel'ence, 
I feel strongly the necessity of concerting with France, 
when the proper time shall arrive, the measures which 
be required to bring the contest which may ensue to a 
satisfactory, and which is s·carcely less essential, to a 
speedy termination. 9 5 
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If Grey was jqining Palmerston, Graham and Russell in favouring· intervention, 
his change of attitude was counterbalancerl by that of Brougham, who was 
hardening in support of strict non-interv0ntion. He had hoped that Bourmont's 
withdrawal would cool the ardour of the interveners in Britain, 96 but he 
was worried at the prospect of the French marching into Spain to enforce 
the claims of the Infanta. 97 He wrote two impassioned letters to Broglie 
in October setting out at length his own philos<'phy of non-intervention and 
urging the French Premier to adopt it. His attitude towards intervention in 
Portugal was uncompromising: 
On no account could I have approved of any measures 
adopted by the English government for assisting the 
Queen's party in the contest because the same motives 
••• which had led us to interfere in favour of. liberty 
and good government might have been put forward by 
the Holy Alliance in 1821 to suppress the spirit of 
improvement and re-establis~ a despotic government in 
~taly and elsewhere. 
This is the statement of a philosopher rather than a statesman or a 
politician, for at the same time that D:cougham was writing, the Eastern 
Powers were meeting at lV!"unchengratz to determine a rationale for 
intervention in the internal affairs of other states, thus necessitating an 
. . 
adjustment in th~ approach of Western governments. Brougham was 
anxious for Britaiu and France to make a stand in favour of the highest 
principles. France should abstain from interference in Sp~in to match 
Britain's stance in Portugal: 
Whether speaking as a· French or as an English 
statesman, l should consider myself precluded from 
adopting any measures to assist the Regent and 
the Infanta against Don Carlos, because I see no 
reason that could be given for such an interference 
· that would not justify ti1e German and Northern 
Powers 0 0 • 
He· called for a joint initiative: 
While France and England are united and while they 
abstain from moodling in the internal affairs of their 
neighbours, what possible risk can happen to either 
from any combination that could be formed, even of 
all the other powers? 9 8 
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Brougham claimed to speak for his colleagues and 'all his country' in this, 
but in truth the Cabinet, dispersed. for the r~cess period, differed widely 
on the Portuguese question. In complete antipathy to Brougham, Lord John 
Russell urged Palmerston and Holland 'not to give in to the non-interveners, 
working directly or indirectly' and he believed that 'five thousand Britons 
at Lisbon and three thousand Frenchmen at the Pyrenees would solve the 
problems of the Peninsula'. 99 Grey held a middle view, at least to 
Brougham, for he assured him that he would deprecate Anglo-French 
intervention - unless Don Carlos received out~ide assistance. 100 
There was no immediate Cabinet decision on intervention when 
ministers r2assembledo The political situation on the Penlnsula remained 
finely balanced, with both Regencies expecting onslaughts from their 
16'1 
respective enemies, who had joined forces on the Portuguese border. 101 
The lack of positive response from the Cabinett for all its constitutional 
inertia, is puzzling. Admittedly the King was going through a Francophobe 
period at this time and was consequently suspicious of any attempt to 
strengthen Queen Christina 'e Regency, 1 ~ 2 but hi.s attitude cannot explain 
why the matter does not appear even to have been discussed by the Cabinet 
until January 1834. In the absenc::l of any relevant private correspondence 
or evidence of policy discussions, we must assume that the non-interventionist 
lobby in the Cabinet were able to scotch any attempt to raise the question 
of intervention or a. joint initiative with France. Thus Palmerston could 
give no answer to Villiers, Addington's permanent replacement in Lisbo.1, 
as to whether or when Britain might come to the rescue. Indeed, he sent 
his a~bassador no communi.cations of any kind between November and 
· February. 10 3 
If the autumn of 1833 was a discouragin~ time for the British 
supporters of constitutional rule on the Peninsula, they could take comfort 
from Grey's growing resolve to intervene to preserve European peace. H~ 
feared that a prolonged war might hasten Don Carlos' expected return to 
Spain and concluded that only British intervention could prevent such a 
catastrophe. By late December Vill.iers 1 reports had persuaded him that 
the situation in both .countries made the time ripe fdr a British initiative. 
The legitimist cause in Portugal had made little headway outside Lisbon and 
Oporto, while the recent failure to corner Don Carlos on the Portuguese 
border made a full-scale conflict in Spain virtually certain. Grey was 
naturaliy reluctant to depart from the principle of non-intervention, but 
he was nonetheless determined: 
I no lon~er know how to resi.st t!le arguments 
for taking measures to put an end to the war 
which by its continuance must produce so much 
distress and danger not only to Portugal but to 
to the whole Peninsula. The case has certainly 
assumed a totally new aspect from the recent 
occurrences in Spain .•. the necessity of 
maintaining peace and order could justify our 
interference jointly with the Spanish government. 104 
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He proposed that" British and Spanish forces should be stationed off Lisbon 
and on the Portuguese border respectively. In return, Dom Pedro, who 
still lacked the confidence of British observers, was to be told to refashion 
his administration to make it acceptable to the Cortes and to grant a 
general amnesty and an act of oblivion. If he agreed, ~ritain would ask 
Spain for help in eA1Jelling Dom Miguel. In view of Talleyrand's imminent 
attempt to interest Grey and Palmerston in a Franco-British alliance, it 
in significant that France did not figure in Grey's ideas. This serves to 
emphasise that Grey's motives were strategic rather than ideological. 
Palmerston welcomed Grey's propsals, agreeing that no time should 
be lost in bringing them. before the Cabinet. Although he had less trouble 
with his conscience than Grey in such matters, he suggested that it would 
be best to depart frqm non-intervention obliquely, by allowing Spain to 
defend herself from possible Carlist incursions .while British forces stood 
by. in readiness to assist either ·country. 105 Graham favoured a more 
forthright approach. He was delighted af Grey's conversion, but was 
pessimistic about obtaining a swift or sympathetic response from his 
colleagues: 
the first week in January •.• that awful 
period to which everything is postponed and in 
which nothing will be done, will be late for a 
decision which presses more and more every 
hour. 10 6 
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In the event, the first week in January came and went without 
any discussion of Portuguese policy, but in that time Palmerston had 
received two requests which ensurai that the Cabinet would have to consider 
Peninsular affairs. Talleyrand had received permission from both Louis 
Philippe and Broglie to advance his favouite scheme for an Anglo-French 
defensive alliance in . ·the event of a conflict with the Eastera Powers. 
In truth, the project was designed to gain for the two Powers the same 
primacy in Peninsular affairs that Russia enjoyed in Turkey. 1 07 British 
governments were never a,ttracted to the idea of defensive alliances; in 
this instance Palmerston's desire to restrict French influence in Spain, 
as later exemplified by his exclusion of Talleyrand from the Quad!'uple 
Alliance negotiations, put the proposal out of court. Grey supported this 
line, for he was anxious not to offend ·the Easte1~n Powers ·unecessarily. 10 8 
He and Palmerston were more interested in the simultaneous request from 
Dom Pedro for British troops to occupy Lisbon while his forces dealt ·with 
Miguellite resistance i.n the interior. In soliciting this assistance, Sarmento, 
the Portuguese Ambassador in London, stressed that Pedro was prepared to 
hold elections, summon the Cortes and calla general amnesty. 109 Although 
the plan differed from that which Grey and Palmerston had agreed, in that 
it involved co-operation with Portugal rather than with Spain, both were 
enthusiastic about it. Grey immediately drew up a memorandum for the 
King explaining his proposal. ln this document, which has fortunately 
survived among his papers, Grey argued for intervention on strategic 
grounds but did not neglect the political aspect: 
It is therefore humbly submitted to Your 
Majesty that immediate measures should be taken 
for the collection of a force of not less than 6000 
men for the purpose of taking. up a position 
at Lisbon· which may encourage the people of 
Portugal to unite under Queen Donna .Maria in 
establishing a government suited to the wants 
and wishes of the Portuguese nation. 
He stressed that the strongest representations wonld be made to Dam 
Pedro to ensure thaf. his domestic policies satisfied Western opinion. 
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In conclusion·, he justified the project on the gTound that the concentration 
of Carlist troops on the Portugue8e border forced the "British Government 
to take active measures to defend her ancient ally. 110 It was probably 
· this last point, together with his desire to see French designs on the 
Peninsula forestalled, that persuaded the King to give Grey his provisional 
approval to the plan. Grey brought the matter before the Cabinet on 
14 January. 111 
The Cabinet meeting and it.s aftermath serve as a cli.max to the 
study of Whig attitudes towards intervention during Grey's premiership. 
The accounts which survive enable us to trace the events of 14-16 January 
in some detai.l. 112 . At the meeting, Grey presented a paper which was 
essentially the same as that which he had put before the King. His 
proposal to di.spatch troops was supported by Palmerston, Holland, Russel!, 
Lansdowne, Graham, Ripon an~ in absentia. by Brougham and Carlisle. 
Althorp led the opposition to intervention, supported· by Melbourne, Richmond, 
. 
Grant and Stanley. 113 The split thus cut across traditional Whig-Canningite 
division. Grey urged British action for the sake of long-term peace and 
claimed that the presence of Carlist troops in P~rtugal constituted a 
casus focdc?'is for Britain. 11 ~ He was sure that the mere presence of 
British troops would be sufficient to arrest the civil war and prevent a 
Carlist-Miguellite alliance. He also argued that Britain should act so as 
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to forestall a French invasion of Spain. Any French move in this 
direction would threaten Britain's position on the Peninsula, as well as 
perl-..aps encouraging the Eastern Powers to renew their effors to crush 
' 
the independence of the smaller German states. 115 . Palmerston and Graham, 
who Holland describes as 'earnest for interference', added their weight 
to Grey's arguments. Alt~orp objected on grounds of principle as well 
as for the practical reason that parliament would be unlikely to sanction 
a war. Grant and Stanley were also anxious to avoid a collision with 
the Commons. Stanley had warned. Pahnerston the previous autumn of the 
difficulties he might have in obtaining the supplies necessary to mount a 
substantial expedition to the Peni.nsula. 116 Portugal was by no means a 
cause close to the hearts of the Radicals as was Poland and Ellice 
warned Grey that 'the country does not care a straw about either Pedro 
or Miguel'. 117 Palmerston .later reported to Lord William Russell that 
some ministers had denounced Dom Pedro in the meeting, asserting that 
We really could not send an expeditior. to enable 
his ministers to extend over the whole of Portugal 
the system of confiscation and proscription. 118 
If Grant and Stanley based their objections on purely practical and specific 
grounds, Melbourne and Richmond shared Althorp's opposition to the very 
principle of intervention. Melbourne had always disapproved of intermeddling 
or intervention in whatever gui.se, while Richmond could never be convinced 
that the cause of constitutional government in Europe either deserved or 
re~uired support. He was intolerant of Holland's predilection for 'foreigners 
' 
in general &.nd Portuguese in particular'. 119 Althorp himself had consistently 
deprecated Palmerston's aggressive style in foreign affairs, from the time 
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of the crisis over the election of the Due de Nemours onwards, just as 
he had con~istently camp3:igncd for a reduction in military and naval 
expenditure. Non-intervention and retrenchment were for him indissoluble 
and ·universal principles. 
Grey was in · Althorp 's words, 'very shaken' 12 0 by the Rtrength oL the 
opposition to his proposals, and consequently reluctant to rer;olve the 
. issue in terms of a majority vote. There was a possibility that ~ielbourne 
. . . 
. and Stanley could be swayed towards intervention, or SG Howiek thought, 121 
. . 
while- the resignations of l:Uchm'Jnd and Grant would not have been fatal to 
the· administration. It was A !thorp's position that made compromise 
impossibl~. His prestige both in the Cabinet and in the Commons was 
such that his support was essential to the success. of the prot:•Osal. Once 
it was clear that Althorp would not change his attitude, Grey decided to 
resign. Howick explali1ed "in his Journal the main reason for his father's 
decision: 
He thinks himself compelled to abandon this 
policy,· but he felt himself unable to retain 
this present situation and to defend the foreign 
policy of the government in the Lords when 
debarred from pursuing the only conrse whi.ch 
appeared to him safe and. honourable. 122 
There were other factors involved. Grey was weary of office and of the 
extra burden imposed upon him by virtue of the divisions in his Cabinet 
over Ireland and the slavery question. -There had been widespread rumours 
the previous August that he was on the point of resigning and had nominated 
Althorp as his successor. 12 3 With his thoughts turning towards retirement, 
!Jrey would have been reluctant to precipitate the resignation of his heir 
apparent. In view of Grey's undisguised distaste for office, it is tempting 
·'-
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to explain his decision to resign substantially in these terms,' but in 
fairness to him~ his private correspondence reveals that the need to put 
an ·end to the Portuguese civil war -.vas uppermost in his mir..d. He must 
have been prepared to argue the case in Parliament, for he was aware 
that the size of the expeditionary force he proposed would require a vote 
of supplies. 124 He seemed determined on this occasion _to put aside his 
objections to intervention and 'fly to the aid of Portugal' in thz manner ·of 
the despised Canning. Althorp was equally determined to oppose him and 
the deadlock of the second week of January serves as a telling reminder 
of the contradictions of Whig foreign policy throughout the post-war period. 
Brougham immediately sought to -make amends for his absence at 
. the· Cabinet meeting by trying to break the deadlock. His own stance 
during this episode was surprising, for despite his lectures to Broglie in 
the autumn, he had announced to Grey in December that. he would be 
prepared to countenance intervention in favour of Dom Ped,ro, subject to 
guarantees as to his future behaviour. We niust presume that Brougham 
was persuaded to change his outlook by the deteriorating situation on the 
Portuguese border, but his volte-face is none the less eA1:raordinary . 
. On the eve of the Cabinet meeting he had written to Grey 'hoping and 
trusting that Britain would intervene'. 12 5 . Brougham had a.l ways entertained 
th~ highest respect for Grey's opinions on foreign policy and his change of 
mind may be in~icati.ve of strength of Grey's resolve. However, once 
Brougham learned that the future of the administration was at risk over 
the issue, he was quick to revert to his customary position. Holland 
tells us that Brougham insisted 'with all hia customary vehemence and 
exaggeration' that the question of intervention in Portugal was 'as nothing' 
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in comparison with the prospect of Grey resigning. 126 At his instigation, 
the members of the Cabinet sent Grey a round robin on the evening of 
14 January urging him to reconsider his decision to resign. The letter 
did not touch upon the point at issue, but Brougham and his colleagues 
impressed upon Grey their belief that he must remain in offi.ce, not 
merely because of the high esteem in which t!1ey held him, but out of a 
deep and seit!ed conviction of the fatal 
consequences, which must ensue from your 
resigning, to the best interests of the country. 12 7 
Several ministers sent Grey personal letters in addition. Brougham himself 
warned Grey that 'the whole interests of the country', together with 'these 
foreign concerns which· are immediately in question' would be in jeop::trdy 
if he was tu resign. 128 Lansdowne appreciated Grey's dilemma perhaps 
better than anyone and he wrote to him 'after a sleepless night' to urge 
him to reconsider his position. Lansdowne revealed his own tentative 
attitude towards the intervention issue by stressing that his approval of 
Grey's project was conditional upon the. full. support of the Cabinet and of 
Parliament. More pointedly, he warnt:..d Grey that if the Cabinet were to 
be broken up over the question of inter-vention, 'our enemies' might conclude 
that Britain ·would not intervene in the internal affairs of foreign states, 
whatever the pretext. 129 Holland also wrote to Grey, offering him thrP-e 
choices: to capitulate to the non-interveners, at the cost of a civil war 
in Spain, to resign, or to accept the 'the irreparable loss' of Althorp from 
the Cabinet. Alone of all the members of the Cabinet, Holland put the 
cause of Spain and Portugal before the unity of the administration and he 
advised Grey to take the last course, even though it was almost as 'painful 
.,. 
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and unsatisfa.ctory' as the other two. 130 No letter from Palmerstor. has 
survived, but in terms· of lhe continuity of British policy towards Portugal; 
he had more reason tl1an anyone. to urge Grey to remain at the head of 
the Cabinet-. 131 The King, whom Grey was to meet at Brighten the next 
day (1~ J'anuary), wrote him a letter in similar terms to those of his 
· ministers'. 132 
Grey's anguish was doubtless increased by the warmth of the letters 
from his c·oneagues. On the evening of 15 January he :::ought the advice of 
his son Howick and his brother-in-law Edward Ellice. Howick urged him to 
stay on while Ellice advised resignation, and it is likely that Grey left for 
Brighton next morning undecided. 133 He could be sure on one point: Althorp 
would not retract one inch from his position. Holland and Brougham· had 
tried independe:1tly to obtain his agreement to alternative plans which placed 
the emphasis on mediation while keeping the option of intervcnti011 open. 134 
Brougham had been confident of success, believing that Althorp and his 
followers would 'go as far as we can take them, short of troops'. 135 Althorp 
would not be drawn however, and he was fully supported in this by the 
others. He told Palmerston of the decision on 15 January. 
I of course consulted Melbourne and Grant as 
well as Richmond and Stanley, the first because 
I consider his judgement better than that of all 
the rest of us put together, and the second 
because I knew he went as far as any of us in 
his opinion. 
Upon this consideration they all agreed that 
it was better that I should not make the proposal 
of a middle course to Earl Grey ••• I put my 
confidence in my own judgement and indeed I 
must say that I was satisfied with the correctness 
of these views. 136 
Althorp shows remarkable self-confidence in this letter, wh!ch was partly 
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sustained by his conviction that Grey would not resign. This wa.s by. no 
means a universal view: Graham for one was sure that Grey would go, 
believing that he could not be induced to change !a decision which !lis own 
judgement has pre-determined for the last six months'. 137 
Although Graham's analysis w~s accurate, Althorp's intuitive opinion 
_was to be p_roved right. Grey finally succumbed to the pressure which his 
· colleagues and the King had exerted upon him and he agreed to remai.n as 
Prime Minister on 16 January. He seems to have come to the decision during 
his audience with the King that afternoon. He did not attempt to disguise 
his reluctance and the letter he wrote to Lady Grey that evening reveals 
his unhappiness: 
Against my judgement, against my feeling 
and with the . conviction that I e"'-lJOSe myself to 
the greatest risk, if not ~he certainty of failure 
under circumstances no less emoarrassing to the 
country and infinitely more dangerous to my 
character and my future peace of mind, I have 
·. consented to remain. All my feelings of the 
difficulties of my situation and of the false position 
in which I place myself are undiminished, but I 
found it impossible to take upon myself the 
responsibility of breaking up the government, under 
all the circumstances of the moment, in opposition 
to the e"'-'Pressed opinion of all my colleagues and 
the King • 
• • • the King's manner was kind and affectionate 
beyond what I can express - it was indeed impossible 
to resist it ••. [but] I am very unhappy. For the 
first time I am placed in a situation of supporting 
what I think wrong . . • If I fail, I shall not, as 
heretofore, have an undisturbed conscience to support 
me.l38 
Grey's principal failing was his moral arrogance and it is nowhere better 
displayed than here. Even so, there is conviction behind his reverent 
addresses to his own conscience. His commitment to intervention in 
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Portugal, for the sake of iong term peace there, is a measure of how 
he had matured as a statesman from the years when he eXpounded self-
indulgent &.ttitudes to foreign policy from the opposition benches. He 
had observed at first hand the consequences of British inaction over 
Poland and the 'remote _and problematical' events in the Near East. The 
enduring strength of the opposition to intervention suggests that others of 
the 'Old Opposition' had not been similar~y enlightened. Althorp thought 
· the principles of non-intervention and retrenchment more importailt than 
a possible early end to the conflicts on the Peninsula, while Lansdowne 
seemed still incapable of coming to a firm decision on intervention, for 
all his sympathy for Grey. Melbourne!s views on foreign policy had been 
ever trenchant but uninformed and Cabinet office had done little to alter 
them. 1·39 While Holland and Russell were consistent in their support of 
intervention in Portugal, their vi.ews on foreign affairs generally were no 
more coherent in office than they had been in opposition, 
It is fascinating to compare Grey's experience in 1834 with that of 
Canning little more than seven years earlier. Both men had slowly 
become convinced that the situation in Portugal demanded and justified 
British intervention. Canning had been finally persuaded to intervene 
by the news of Spanish incursions into Portugal. Britain was bound by 
her treaties to cast aside non-intervention to defend her ally. 14° Canning's 
appeal to the Commons: 
The object of the address which I propose to you 
is not war; its o~ject is to take the last chance for 
peace. If you do not go forth 0n this occasicn to 
aid Portugal, Portugal will be trampled down to 
your irretrievable disgrace:- and then will come 
war, in the train of national degradation, 14 1 
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was in essence the same as that of Grey to his Cabi.net in 1834. Canning 
had receiveu warm support from both Houses, despite Hume's appeals to 
the principle of retrenchment. 142 Grey, who had, ironbally, opposed 
Canning's decision, found himself defeated by the arguments which Hume 
had been almost alone in adopting in 1826. On the surface, the decision 
not to intervene was a. victory for AI thorp and his followers; in political 
terms, it was an admission of the weakness ·of the Grey administration. 
Admittedly the House of Commons of 1834 was a vastly different body 
from that whi.ch had cheered Canning in 1826, but· i.t is likely that Whig 
and Radical members would have responded to a united front bench appeal 
to foil Dom Miguel and Don Carlos and thus out-manoeuvre the Eastern 
Powers. The Cabinet's fear of possible parliamentary criticis!n was revealed 
in successive episodes in international affairs. It had helped to excuse the 
policy of non-intervention in Poland and Turkey; in the Portuguese affair, 
where the conflict of opinion was irreconcilable, it was the principal 
reason for non-intervention. Lord Holland was so ashamed at the decision 
that he wished it to be kept secret - at least frmn the French. 14 3 It must 
have been galling for Palmerston to have to inform an astonished Sarmento 
that the British government remained committed to the policy of non-
. intervention in Portugal. 144 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
Palmerston refused to accept defeat on the question of inter-vention in 
Portugal. In February 1834 he resumed his correspondence with Villiers in 
Madrid, reminding him of the government's contir.uing neutral stance, but 
leaving the Ambassador in no doubt as to his person conviction of the need 
for Britain to show her sympathies: 
The great object of our policy ought now to be to 
form a Western confederacy of free states as a 
counterpoise to the Eastern league of the arbitrary 
governments. England, France, Spain and Portugal,. 
united as they now must be, will form a political 
and moral power in Europe which must hold Metternich 
and Nicholas i.n check. We shall be on the advance, 
they on the decline; and all the smaller planets of 
Eur0pe will have a natural tei1dency to gravitate towards 
our system. 1 
Palmerston here expresses himself in the sort of terms which might reasonably 
have been mq:,ected to appeal to his Whig Colleagues, although as we shall aec, 
his stock re1nained low. He had long cherished. hopes of a Western liberal 
allianc~ and despite the setback of January, events on the Peninsula developed 
in such a way as to allow him to achieve his ambition in the spring cf 1834. 
In January Zea Bermudez had been succeeded as Spanish Prime Minister 
by Martinez de la Rosa, who enjoyed the reputation of being a liberal and 
was anxious to scotch the ambitions of Don Carlos, then lurking on the 
Portuguese b~rder with Dom Miguel. 2 The mutual distrust between Spain 
and Portugal w::>..s su~h as to encourage the Spanish government to seek 
British support. Ari expedition was being prepared in Spain and Miraflores, 
the Ambassador in London, approached Paln1erston in March with a view to 
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forming an alliance with Britain to defeat Carlos and Miguel - and to ensu::.·e 
that Dom Pedro did. not persecute his former apponents. Palmerston was 
enthusiastic about the idea of an aliiance, but he recognised that the 
Portuguese should be involved in view of Dom Pedro's short-term importance. 
He had no thought of including Franc·a directly in the negotiations at this 
stage. 
It was clear that an undertaki!lg of this nature woufd. require full 
9abinet consultation and approval. After his own experience in January. 
Grey was doubtful as to whether such co-oper_ation would be forthcomin~: 
but he was concerned that the British force should be as large as was 
necessary, notwithstanding the opposition of the retrenchment brigade. 3 
Early in April Miraflores indicated that his government would be wiJling 
·to agree to a tripartite treaty and Palmerston immediately drew up a 
. . 
convention in which Britain undertook to blockade the Portuguese coast 
while Portuguese and Spanish troops subdued the Pretenders' forces in the 
interior. Palmerston hoped to forestall unilateral action on the Peninsula 
by the Spanish and also by the French, whom bot~ he and the Cabinet ~ 
recognised as important, if secondary parties to any agreement. Palmerston's 
report to the King of the Cabinet meeting of 12 April places great emphasis 
on the need to involve France in such a project in order to discourage her 
from crossing the Pyrenees without consulting Britaih. 4 It is unfortunate 
that we have no· informal account of the Cabinet's discussion of Palmerston's 
proposals, 5 for it would be instructive to know how he persuaded his 
colleagues to commit Britain, albeit only navally, to a definite role in the 
civil wars on the Peninsula. To judge by Palmerston's jubilation after the. 
signing of Treaty, it was a personal triumph which the experience of the 
previous three and a half ygars had not led him to e).lJect. However, there 
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were important factors in his favour, nctably the possibility that a show of 
British indifference. at this stage could have led to unilateral action and a 
subsequent general conflict. If it flatters Grey's Cabinet to ascribe to its 
members such diplomatic prescience, then the fact that the naval blockade 
of the Portuguese coast would add nothing to the Estimates would have 
. weighed heavily with ministers; after all, the crisis in January had centred 
around the extra vote of supplies which Grey's project might have entailed. 6 
. Palmerston's triumph was delayed by Talleyrand, who was warned of 
what Miraflores and the Foreign Secretary were hatching. As a ·result, 
Palmerston was unable to present France with a treaty already signErl and 
sealed by the three other Powers as he had intended. Talleyrand pressed 
for a Franco·-British alli.ance alone and when this ·plan was rejected, he hoped 
to salvage French pride by obtaining an expli.cit recognition by the other 
Powers of the special position of France in Spaino On this occasion however, 
Palmerston outsmarted 'Old Talley' during the U.eliberations as trJ the form 
of the Treaty preamble. The Quadruple Alliance,· which was signed on 
22 April, contained a recognition of Britain's special relationship with 
Portugal yet accorded France neither a preventive· role nor a vested 
interest in the civil war in Spain. The actual terms of the Treaty 7 did 
not differ from those first agreed by Palmerston and Miraflores ten days 
earlier and Palmerston had managed to obtain Cabinet approval of the finai 
arrangements after a virtuoso performance, if his famous letter to his 
brother is to be believoo: 
I carried it through the Cabinet by a coup de main 
taking them by surprise and not leavi.ng them time 
to make objections. 8 
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In his excitement, Palmerston may have overestimated the importance of 
the Treaty and the nature of his achievement in obtaining Cabinet sanction. 
The Quadruple Alliance was important as a symbol of the· Western Powers' 
opposition to the philosophy behind Metternich' s Miinchengraatz agreement of 
the previous year, but in real terms it amounted to little more than a 
British undertaking to honour long-standing obligations towards Portugal. 
It is of interest that Holland, writing in his Journal three months later, 
praised Miraflores rather than Palm.erston for providing the impetus which 
made the Quadruple Alliance a reality and hastenoo the end of the civil wars 
in Portugal and Spain. 9 However, the threat of Brj.tish action did help to 
decide t}1E; conflict in Portugal in Dom ·Pedro's favour. Miguel's army was 
defeated by the Spanish force which had mobilised in Ma:cch and both the 
pretenders had surrendered by .Tune. 
The conclusion of the Quadruple Alliance was Palmerston;s last diplomatic 
achievement during his first term at the Foreign Office. It had been 
universally recognised, at least by the summer of 1833, that the ministry 
was too fragile to survive long once the resolution of the Reform issue had 
deprived i.t of its ?'aison d'et're. 10 Wearied by the deep division in his 
Cabinet, Grey's thoughts turned increasingly towards retirement. The 
position of the Irish Church was generally the symptom, if not the cause 
of conflict between the radical element - Brougham, Durham, Russell 
and Ellice - and a conservatively inclinerl group including Althorp, Stanley, 
Melbourne and Richmond. Once Durham had left the Cabinet, ministerial 
conflicts tended to centre around Althorp, the diffident heir apparent, and 
Brougham, whose popularity amongst :..'adicals encouraged him to entertain 
hopes of succeeding Grey. During 1833, the wrangles both in Cabinet and 
in Parliament about the Slave Trade Legislation and the redistribution of 
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Irish Church Temporalities had brought both Grey and Althorp to the brink 
·of resignation. As we have seen, Grey was reluctant to· resolve the Cabi-
net differences ov~r intervention in. Portugal while Althorp was disinclined 
to prolong the life oi the ministry. Howick noted in his Journal at the end 
of January 1834 that 
• • • Althorp is in despair at the impossibility of 
getting the Cabinet to agree to anything and his 
hoping every day to provide an excuse for breaking 
up the government. 11 
Hawick's source was the· contentious 'Bear' Ellice, who was undoubtedly 
prejudiced against Althorp, ·but in truth the manner in which the radical 
element in the Cabinet had persisted in provoking divisions over the use 
and apportionment of the Irish revenues had infuriated Althorp and his 
colleagues to the point where they began to wish for an end to it all. 
The final collapse of the ministry began in May 1834, when Russell· 
'upset the . coach' through a precipitant declaration. about the secttlar use 
of Irish Church Tithes. Graham, Stanley and Richmond resigned in protest: 
Graham, for all his resolution in the face of reactionary foreign governments, 
would not tolerate an attack on the hegemony of the Established Church in 
Britain. 12 Six weeks later the ministry disintegrated after a disagreement 
over the application of the Irish Coercion Bill to pubUc meetings in 
Ireland. Althorp resigned immediately, but he was soon followed by Grey, 
who had lost the energy and patience z:equired to prolong the life of his 
ministry further. The differences within the Cabinet were clearly 
irreconcilable. Althorp admitted thnt his initiative had occ2.sioned the 
collapse of the ministry, but he identified Brougham, 'who threatened to 
embrace furious causes' as ·the chief culprit. 13 
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The summer of 1834 saw little activity on the diplomatic front. As 
Grey's ministry moved towards its end 1 Palmerston was occupied with 
problems arising from the executioll. of the Quadruple Alliance and a 
French attempt to reopen the Belgian question following rumours that 
King Leopold wished to ahdic~.te. 14 The Foreign Secretary played no part 
in the events which led to the brea.k-up of the administration, but it was 
clear that Grey's departure was a personal setback for him. Palmerston 
did not expect to survive a cnange of Prime Minister and he had confided 
to Minto in Berlin that he believed that Durham would succeed him at 
the Foreign Office. 15 Grey had been generally sympathetic towards 
Palmerston's view of foreign affairs despite his Foxite pedigree and the 
two men had rarely differed on matters of policy. The day-to-day problems 
of i.nternational relations had educ·a,ted Grey to the extent that he had 
outgrown those rooted attitudeo which he had adopted in opposition and 
which some of his colleagues still espoused. Palmerston was acutely 
aware of Grey's contribution, as he emphasised in a letter on the latter's 
resignation: 
The country has sustained a loss of the heuviest 
sort and I individually have be~n deprived of a guide 
whose direction was invaluable and whose kindness 
was unlimited. 
A daily and confidential intercourse of three years 
and 2. half has made me intimately acquainttrl wit.h one 
of the most statesmanlike minds and noblest natures 
that have ever yet appeared in any country on the scene 
of public affairs. 16 
Grey thrived on compliments such as this, but his reply was studied and 
reservP.d: 
It cannot, I hope, be necessary for me to assure 
you how deeply sensible I am of all its kindness. 
Such a proof of confidence and friendship, at the. 
moment when our official connec,tion is ending, is 
most valuable and I more than meet the desire you 
e>..1Jress that an intimacy whic:h has been. at once so 
useful and so satisfying to me should be preserved. 17 
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Grey was always cool tow·ards all but his closest political a~:;sociates, but 
·it is nonetheless surprising that he made no mention in his r0ply of 
Palmerston's very considerable achievements durine; his term at the Foreign 
Office. Palmerston could argue, as indeed he did when his return to the 
Foreign Office was opposed in 1835, that his record was second to none: 
Ali the important qu·estions connected with Greece, 
Portugal, Belgium and Spain which essentially affected 
·the interests of England I left either virtually settled 
or in a satisfactory train of adjustment. 18 
Only the Near Eastern Question remained unresolved, but that '"as as much 
the fault of the Cabinet as of Palmerston himself. King Leopold \vas to 
write to him in December 1834 after the collapse of Melbou:·ne's fi.:cst 
administration to congratulate him on his achievement: 
. . . It must be a great satisfaction to· you to think 
that without spending a farthing of public money you 
have managed since 1830 to maintain the peace of 
Europe. 19 
So it must have been; but Palmerston's labours had clearly failed to win 
Grey's full support, as we shall see when Melbourne began to form his 
second ministry in April 1835. Grey was conscious then, as he probabl:y-
was at the time of his resignation, that Palmerston's unpopularity amongst 
Whigs wa.s a threat to the cohesion of any future administration. Palmerston 
was certainly justified in doubting whether he would survive the change of 
Prime Minister if we are to believe the Duchesse de Dino, an acute 
observer: 
Lord Palmerston is the least secure of all; his 
colleagnes thi.nk little of h!m. Lord Grey does 
not deny that his speeches in the House of Commons 
are bad. The Co-rps Diplomat-ique detest his 
arrogance. The English think him ill-bred. His 
one merit • • . seems to consist in his remarkable 
facility in spe~king and writing French. 2 0 
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Of course Palmerston survived the reshuffle and remained at the Foreign 
Office nntil the fall of Melbourne's ministry in November, but he was to 
encounter stern opposition, much of it based on the shallow pretexts 
mentioned by the Duchesse, to his ret~rn to the Foreign Office following 
the end of Peel's 'Hundred Days' ministry. The episode throws a great 
deal of light on Whig attitudes to Foreign policy and the e::...i;ent to which 
Palmerston's approach conflicted with those attitudes • 
. Following Peel's resignation, William IV turned again to Grey in 
April 1835 i:J. the hope of persuading him to return to public life as 
Prime Minister. Grey was flattered, but he was not prepared to forsake 
the pleasures of retirement at Bowick and Richmond. He suggested to the 
King that h~ should approach Lord Melbourne to for·m another ministry if 
Lansdowne could not be persuaded to assume the Premiership. However, 
William was reluctant to approve a ministry which included neither Grey 
nor Althorp - who had gone up to the Lords and into retirement five 
months previously - and it was partly as a consequence of this royal 
reluctance that Melbourne and five of his colleagues wrote to Grey urgi.ng 
him to reconsider his decision and to accer>t the Foreign Office even if 
he felt himself unable to head· another administration. 2 1 Palmerston was 
among the signatories. It seems plausible to assume with Webster that 
187 
he expected Grey to refuse.22 So indeed he did, forcing the King to ask 
Melbourne, the only suitable alternative, to form his second administration. 
The problem of Palmerston a.nd the Foreign Secretaryship was uppermost 
in Melbourne's mind and he sought Grey's advice freely. Both men were 
acutely aware of the hostility which existed tow~rds Palmerston, whose 
position had been weakened by his election defeat in South Hampshire. In 
· his reply to Melbourne's request for guidance, Grey stated frankly that 
it would be inadvisable to reappoint Palmerston, because of 'the objection 
to him which is so genratly felt', notwithstanding his sincere regard for 
the fo~mer Foreign Secretary. He expressed the same opinion to Princess 
'Lieven the ne-.xt day. 2 3 . Melbourne passed Grey's letter straight on to 
Palmerston, intimating that he agreed with it. 24 Palmerston was juRttfiably 
hurt and surprised at Grey's attitude, which amounted to a subordination of 
British interests to the exigencies o{ cabinet unity and unruffled diplomatic 
relationships. Palmerston was of course prepared to offend any man and 
any country in the pursuit of the interests of England. He wrote Melbom·nc 
an angry letter in which he did not deny that the courts ·of Vienna, 
st. Petersburg, Berlin and the Hague objected to him as Foreign Secretary, 
but he reminded Melbourne that his policies towards Belgium, France, 
Portugal and Spain had been approved by his Cabinet colleagues as 
consistent with the best interest of Britain. The pel'oration of Palmerston's 
letter is worth quoting in full: 
It is always disagreeable to speak of oneself, but 
upon this occasion I must be permitted to say I consider 
myself to have conducted our foreign relations with great 
success during four years of excessive labour am! through 
. extreme difficulties arising not only from the complicated 
nature of the questions to be dealt with, but also from 
the resistance opposed to me by a combination of domestic 
with foreign opponents. 
. All the important questions connected with 
Greece, Belgi.um, Portugal and Spain wl~ich 
essentially affected the interests 'Jf England, I 
·left either virtually settled or in a sati.sfaetory 
train ·of adjustment. 
There was but one important matter whf.eh 
when we went out in November last, remained 
in an unsatisfactory state; and that was the 
condition of Turkey, with relation to Russia on 
the one hand and to England on the other. 
But wfth respect to that matter, the blame 
does not lie at my door; for if my advice had been 
taken by the Cabinet in the Autumn of 1832, and if 
we had given to the Sultan our moral support 
against Mehemet Ali, the subsequent Treaty of 
Constantinople [i.e. Unkiar-Skelessi] would never 
have been signed. 25 
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Palmerston's case was unanswerable, but hostility towards him remained 
widespread .. As he had suspected, Biilow and Pozzo di Borgo, the Prussian 
and Russian ambassadors, were working to pre'.rent his return, but such 
intrigues served if anything to strenithen b:i.s domestic position. 2 6 However, 
the. opposition of his erstwhile colleagues was much stronger than he had 
imagined. He assumed that only 'a knot of intriguers headed by Edd. 
Ellice' 27 . was involved. In fact, a number· of senior figures had misgivings 
about Palmerston.- Russell, who had cut short· his honeymoon because of 
the uncertainty surrounding the formation of the ministry, 'vrote to Grey 
to add his might to the entreaties of his colleagues that the latter should 
take the Foreign Office 'to save us from an embarrassment which I need 
not name'. 2 8 Only Holland appeared to ·give Palmerston his whole-hearted 
support. Once it was clear that Grey would not return, Holland 'hopE.'<! and 
expected' Palmerston to return to the Foreign Office. 2 9 After twenty four 
hours of hectic negotiation, Melbourne found himself virtually with no 
alternative but to reappoint Palmerston, despite the problems whi.ch his 
presence in the Cabinet might precipitate .. Unfortunately the discussions 
189 
which preceeded Palmerston's reappointment are not well documented, so 
that it is difficult to give l'.1:elbourne's reasons for so deciding with any 
certainty. However he was probably i.mpressed with the argument that 
Palmerston's exclusion would be seE:n as a triumph for his enemies 
abroad. Bulow, Esterhazy and Pozzo di Borgo had made thc~ir intentions 
too clear, so that if Palmerston was prevented from returning, it would 
appear that Melbom~ne and his colleagues were pandering to the wishes of 
. the Eastern Courts. 30 Palmerston's spirited defence of his record at the 
Foreign Office must also have impressed Melbourne. In the absence of 
full written evidence, we may assume that the principa,l reasons for the 
groundswell of opinion against Palmerston were those which the Duchesse de 
Dino had mentioned nine months earlier - his rudeness, his siugle-mindedness 
and his concern v.rith the substance of international relations at the ffii.'Pense 
of the manner in which they were conducted. 
Before we go on to examine more fully the differences of attitude 
within Grey's Cabinet over the proper style and content of foreign policy, 
it is appropriate to mention at his point a successful attempt to exclude 
Palmerston from the Foreign Office. Howick, "by then the third Earl 
Grey, together with Palmerston's perennial enemy Ellice,combined to 
prevent Lord John Russell from forming a \\t'hig administration in December 
- . 
1845 on the grounds that they could not accept Palmerston as Foreign 
Secretary. There is no need for us to follow the negotiations and 
misunderstandings which surrounded the abortive attempt to form a ministry 
on this occasion, 31 but Hawick's reasons for not wishing to serve in the 
administration with Palmerston as Forei.gn Secretary are fascinating as a 
pendant to the episode of April 1835 and to his entire career at the Foreign 
Office up to that time: 
When he fo1·merly held the office, events occurred which 
have created feelings of alienation between him and some 
of the chief statesmen and diplomats of foreign countries -
more especially of France . . . I could not· believe that 
the appointment to which I objected might very materially 
increase the danger of the country's being. involved in all 
the calamities of war • • . 32 
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We have seen from our initiai survey of Whig attitudes towards foreign 
policy whilst in opposition how moderate and radical members alike tended to 
concentrate on the form of diplomatic relations at the expense of their 
substance. By way of contrast, Palmerston had pursued a realistic rather 
than an idealistic foreign policy and had helped to preserve European 
peace by showing himself prepared to coutenance war. Furthermore, as 
Ki.ng Leopold remarked, his success had not placed any extra burden on the 
Exchequ.er. He had been faithful to the principles of peace and retrenchment, 
but his colleagues in the government and parliament generally preferred 
to see him adopt a loftier and less pragmatin stance. We have seen how 
reluctant some minis~ers were to sanction Pal.merston's uncompromising 
attitude towards France during the crucial stages of the Belgian question 
inin 1831. The fact that Palmerston \\o·a.s thereby championing the cause 
of self-determination (albeit for strategic ends) was secondary to the 
Whig concern to avoid war at all costs and to maint"ain a gentlemanly 
relationship with the liberal rJgime in France. Thus Holland, with his. 
Francophile outlook, and Althorp and Brougham, with their distaste for any 
form of military activity, were disturbed by Palmerston's threats of 
war over Belgium. They were reluctant to see Britain intervene, and were 
apparently prepared to see France capitalise on the weakness of the Belgian 
191 
state because of their desire to cultivate good relations with the much admired 
Orleanist government. Yet when the Poles needed support from the 
constitutional states of the West, no one in the cabinet was prepared to 
remonstrate with the Russians; no11-intervention in this instance was the 
product of timi.dity rather a moral decision. Holland's son Henry Fox 
commented treilchantly in August 1831 on the· way in which the principle. 
of non-intervention was applied to foreign policy: 
I admire e>..1;remely the system of 1wn-inte·rvention. 
Holland and Belgium are not to have a word to 
say in the settlement of their· own quarrels. Five 
powerful neighbours take it out of their hands -
on the jn'incijJle of non-inte·vvention. There is a 
question of vital importance to o~1e of the five 
powers [.i.e. the problems surrounding the demolition 
of certain Belgian fortresses ] in which she i.s not to 
have a voice - on the princijJle of non-inte?'Vention 
and yet these are the Cabinets of London anc~ Paris 
who could act with great consistency on the principle 
of non-inte?'Vention when only Pole~:: and Italians were 
·concerned . • 33 
Fox's criticism is itself unsatisfactory in that it ignores considerations of 
strategy and ·realpolitik but this very deficiency makes his statement worthy 
of his great-uncle Charles James. The thread ·of Whig philosophy on foreign 
policy can easily be discerned in the way the Grey administration approached 
cri.ses in foreign relations but the action (or inaction) which resulted bore 
the si.gns of a heterogeneous body of ministers offset by a determined 
-Foreign Secretary, who was prepared to· further his country's interests 
by 'intermeddling'. In a subsequent onslaught against government foreign 
policy, Fox singled out the element in the Cabinet whose pedigree was 
suspect: 
Whatevei· I have said that may appear a criticism 
of your Cabi11et arises from a strong interest I 
feel that Whigs should act Whggishly . • . you 
know that I l1ave always thm<-ght that some of 
these who joined yonr Whig -Cabinet are hollow 
friends. They do not feei activated by the same 
principles ncr do they look for the same results. 
They have however exactly the merits you Whigs 
are deficient in - long official habits and rapidity 
and precision in getting through the drudgery of 
office. When you swerve from the jus te milieu 
towards the Holy Alliance, I feel you could do 
without the hacks of Lords Liverpool and Castlereagh 
• • • their coldness on reform and the lang·uage of 
their entmlmge male and female convinces me that 
they look beyond the grove .L?] of Lord Grey's 
administration. 3~ 
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For all Fox's strictures, the foreign policy of Grey's administration generally 
·reflected the Whiggishness of its members. Howmrer traditionally British 
Palmerston's policy towards Belgium may have appeared., we know after an 
exami.nation of the Cabinet's discussions that he would probs.bly not have 
received pm:·mission actually to embark upon war. The Cabinet's failure 
· to advance the Polish cause by naval or diplomatic means shows not so 
much untypi.cal acquiescence in the designs of Russia as a customary 
disinclination to be involved in potentially explosive situation, even to the 
ro...1:ent of avoiding moral censure of the Tsar. ·The same could be said 
of the Whig attitude towards Turkey, where the presence of two autocratic 
powers in conflict reinforced the ministers' inclinations towards non-
interference in matters involving Britain's strategic interests. The 
prolonged debate over intervention or non-intervention in Portugal displayed 
· all the traditional characteristics of the 'Whig approach - on the one hand 
the hot-headed support of the rebel cause shown by Holland, and on the 
other the attempts to blur the distinction b'etween neutrality and armed 
*Italics Fox's. 
intervention whilst shying away from any open profe$sion of military 
support for Dam Pedro for fear of increasing military mqJenditure or 
disturbing the dipiomatic. calm. 
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It is perhaps difficult to credit how a coherent foreign policy emerged 
from the muddled reasoning and discussion which has been described in 
this study. Yet British policy as seen by the world appeared to be both 
resolute and largely traditional, although an element of liberalism, seemingly 
due to the reforming ch~racter of the ministry; was apparent. In spite of 
the criticism from the Tory 3ide, Palmerston can clearly be seen as acting 
according to traditi.or1 in safeguarding Britain's strategic interests iu the 
Low Countries and attempting to do the same in Turkey. Similariy, in spite 
of radical criticism,. his record in assisting the cause of national independence 
and constitntional rule in Europe~ with the notable . exception of Poland, was 
impressive, p2.rticul.arly after 1832. As his speeches of 1829 had promised,. 
his attitude towards foreign affairs and in particular the perennial. problem 
of what constituted intervention in the internal affairs of other states, 
owed mueh to Canning, but went beyond Canningism tn a willingness to 
favour constitutional causes, such as the Terceira regency, by stretching 
the conception of amicable neutrali~y to the limit of its credibility. By 
such means he helped to make the foreign policy of the Grey ministry 
appear complementary to the reforming impetus at Borne. As we have 
seen, this was achieved despite. rather than because of the efforts of 
some of his colleagues and his parliamentai·y critics, who doubted the 
strength of his attachment to the liberal cause. · 
Grey deserves a measure of credit for this achievement and it is 
appropriate in the context of a discussion of the interpretation of the 
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meaning of 'non-intervention' to quote from an article which Lord John 
Russell wrote in. the Edinbwrgh Review after Grey and Althorp had died. 
In paying tribute to Grey, Russell, whose own views on foreign· policy 
developed considerably from an original Foxite stance, praised the Premier's 
conception of non-intervention virtually in Canningite terms, whilst still 
paying. lip-service to Fox: 
It has been absurdly supposed . • • that in seeking for 
peace Lord Grey meant to preserve that blessing • . .. 
called non-interference or non-intervention - that is to 
say, totally abstaining from interference with. the affairs 
of other countries. Lord Grey has too long been a 
follower of Mr. Fox to countenance so senseless a doctrine. 
We are convinced, as the great statesman had • . . taught, 
it is only by a vigilant attention to the affairs of the 
Continent that this nation can hope to secure the continuance 
of peace; that it is the interest of Great Britain to maintain 
the independence of the various states of Europe and , 
connection and alliance are the necessary means to that. · 
end; that the· internal government of these states is frequently 
connected with their external relations; that the independence 
of a country, c,>r in other woi·ds its existence as a separate 
state, may be wounded as mortally by the support of its 
internal factions as by an attack on its eA.'iernal frontier; 
that if it is lawful for one power to intervene for the sake 
of establishing a foreign dependency, i.t is lawful for another 
to interpose for the sake of strengthening a national government. 35 
If this excellent summary of what Russell beHeved should be meant and 
embraced· by the doctrine of non-intervention is. too rational to serve as 
a description of the foreign policy· of Grey and Palmerston, it is at least 
· an invaluable key to understanding that policy. It helps to eA'Plain the 
resolute treatment of French ambitions on the· one hand and the brazen· 
. . 
breaches of neutrality with regard to Portugal on the other. It was a 
policy which oweu llluch to Canning, however loath Grey would have been 
to admit the fact, but which also reflected Palmerston's hectic brand of 
·diplomacy, tempered by Grey's caution. 
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The ffi\'Perience of the highest off!ce had purged Grey cf the more 
impractical of Fox's precepts and it is ironical that Russell should ascribe 
to Fox the credit for inspiring Grey to adopt the policies which were 
· followed between 1830 and 1834. Some of his colleagues showed themselves· 
to be truer Foxites in their attitudes towards the possibility of war with 
France over Belgium - it was Althorp, Brougham, Holland and the r.est who 
found ·most difficulty. with the doctrine of non-intervention and its proper 
application where the interests of Britain and of the liberal cause in Europe 
were involved. Whig traditions bore witness to ·prolonged periods of opposition 
and they were difficult to apply to the intricate and ever-changing situations 
which faced the Foreign Secretary. Foreign policy is the least susceptible 
of all the areas of government to changes of ministry; the qualities required 
of a Foreign Secretary in a reforming administration are a combination of 
conservatism with regard to the traditional inter~sts of the state and a 
degree of radicalism in pursuing these interests with an eye on the fortunes 
of other constitutional states. Palmerston achieved this balance, but some 
of his colleagues failed to come to terms eithei· with the problems or 
his solutions to them because of their confusion as to how the interests of 
Britain and 'the cause of liberty all over the world' could be served within 
a framework of peace, retrenchment and non-intervention. Non-intervention, 
like disarir..ament", is a policy which works only wh<:!n all the powers agree 
to adopt it; when it breaks down, it is up to the individual powers to 
improvise an alternative policy. Palmerston appreciated this, as Castlereagh 
and Canning had before him. With their lack of 'habits of business', some 
of Pahnerson' s colleagues were slow in grasping this need and even slower 
to shed their prejudices. 
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APPENDIX I 
GRANT'S PAPER ON BELGIUM, 20 JANUARY 1831* 
The conversation of last night has given birth to the following thoughts. 
Having been much engaged in my own office I have known the course of 
our foreign proceedings only from the papers in circulation and the discussions 
in Cabinet. I have not conversed with any of the Fm.·eign Ministers and have 
seen Van de Weyer [the Belgian accredited to the London Conference J but once, 
last Tuesday, since the change of this g·overnment. I have not been mixed up 
·with the current of foreign affairs and may ·be considered with regard to them 
· almost as a bystander. My impressions therefore may probably be those of the 
generality of the people. 
The congress [sic] has held conferences for two months-up to a point 
with obvious utility and efficiency-
Hostilities arrested- armistice obtai.ned- the five· powers coincident as . 
to non-intervention beyond the exclusion of certain specified persons- No Bourbons 
No Napoleons- Leopold also out of the question-
After these agreements why the del~y? The Belgian Commissioners have 
·been here 3· weeks. What are they doi.ng? What i.s the congress now doing? 
What is the cause of the delay in the final settlement? Why does not Belgium 
choose a King? If all the five powerf? honestly abstain from interference why 
should not the election be left to the. Belgians- subject to the above exclusions? 
Why should not the commrs. be told that ·the congress requires an immedi.ai;e 
election? 
The present state of things ought not to continue. 
It is dangerous- in as much as delay tends to breed mutm:tl susp1c10ns 
among the five powers and perhaps even to occasion conduct justifying such 
suspicions and iu as much as the longer Belgium continues unsettled, the more 
do the chances of war in Europe multiply-
It i.s discreditable-to all powers-most of all to G.B. 
Why should not the congress hold to tl:ie Belgians this language? 
The immediate choice of a soverei?;n is indispensable. 
Exclude the above and choose whom you will-
The five power's in good faith should keep aloof. Objection: This i.s 
throwing them into the arms of France. 
Answer: so is the further protraction of the conferences. Let them 
.choose Otto, evonwith Merode Regent. 
Objection: This is France 
Answer: The placing on the throne of Belgium of a prince connected with 
France or supposed to be under her influence may be considered in two views-
.1. In itself. 
2. In its impression on the people of this .country. 
1. In itself. I am apt to think we rath~r overrate the dangerous cons0quences 
of such an event. All history from Charles 5th. to Louis Buonaparte shows that 
these family ties and. influences have really little effect on the policy of states. 
The policy of the Belgian King, be he French of Dutch, will be Belgian-
It is true that being Belgian it does not follow that it should not be French- but 
this would only be on the supposition that Belgium itself is French in heart and 
*Grey MSS., Box 15, File 14. 
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feeling. It would be French by virtue of being Belgian. The natural policy and 
national feeling of Belgium will determine the balance one way or tl-:.e other-
In this respect I should think Belgium would be in fact more certain of 
remaining a separate and substantive power and of not being absorbed into France 
if she \Vere under a Bourbon than under any. other sovereign. In so far as the 
peace of Europe, the independence of Belgium and the ·safety of Holland are 
concerned, a Bourbon I am inclined to think would be best choice. At all 
events, (the Bourb~ns and Napoleons being out of the questi.on) these objects 
are equ2.lly attainable under any sovereign. The new King will be or become 
Belgian just as Louis Buonaparte became Dutch. 
2. This is a difficulty. There still exists an old English feeling about the 
Dutch barrier- Ma:!:'lborough's War- William 3rd. and Louis 14th. This will be 
assiduously excited by the opponents of the administration. Yet peace is· our 
first and last policy- and I believe the majority of the people would be opposect 
to a war about the Belgian throne. I cannot but think that the people would 
support a ministry that refused war on such an account, except in the single 
case of France manifestly moving against Belgium with a view to destroying 
her independence. 
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· APPENDIX II 
STRATFORD CANNING'S TURKISH MEMORANDUM, 19 DECEMBER 1832* 
Stratford Canning's memorandum of 19 December 1832 1 on the necessity 
of British naval aid for the Sult~.n in the face of the threat of Mehemet Ali 
has long been recognised as the classic statement of the interventionist 
viewpoint during the Near Eastern c:dsis of 1832-1833. Both Temperley and 
Crawley laid great stress on the document in their pioneering studies of British 
policy in the Eastern Mediterranean duri.ng this period 2 and successive scholars 
have reinforced their judgement. Unfortunately these two authors lent their 
authority to the perpetuation of an error first made by W. A. Phillips i.n 1907 3 
whereby the pencilled ma:rginal comments· on Stratford Canni.ng1s ideas were 
attributed to Palmerston. TMs mistake forced historians to employ considerable 
ingenuity to reconcile the hosW.e attitude towards the Sultan and the principle of 
Turkish territorial integrity which is expressed in the marginal comments with 
Palmerston 1 s growing conviction that the strategic consequences of the dissolution 
of the Ottoman Empire would be dis~Rtrous to British interests.. He had written 
in November 1832: . 
• • • I think it in the general interest of all except Russia 
to uphold the Suitan 1s power against the Pasha ••• The 
Turl;: is a better reformer than the Egyptian because the 
first reforms from princ.:.ple and conviction . . . the second 
·merely from a mercantile calculation. 4 
This opinion hardly coincides with that expressed in the margin of the 
memorandum that the success of Mehemet Ali :would be as advantageous to 
Britain as the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire under the Sultan. 
M. Verete was thP. first to point out that for a variety of reasons, the. 
comments were not Palmerston1s. 5 Sir Charles Webster confirmed this opinion 
in The Foreign Policy of Palmerston. 6 The most cursory comparison of the 
hand in which the comments were written (see Plate 1) with Palmerston1s 
distinctive copperplate (see Plate 3) demonstrates the truth of Verete1s contention, 
quite apart from the un-Palmerstonian attitudes which the comments express. 
Verete made the additional point that Palmerston invariably initialled comments 
on official documents while those on Canning's memorandum are unsigned.. In 
concluding his article, Verete suggested that Lord Holland was the author of the 
Comments and promised to expound this hypothesis in a subsequent article. This 
seems never to have appeared, but all the available evidence points to the 
correctness of this view. The similarity between Holland's writing as ty-pified 
by his letter to Grey reproduced below (Plate 2) and that in the _margin of the 
memorandum is striking. There is impressive additional evidence contained in the 
same letter to Grey, fer Holland actually refers to the Stratford Canning 
memorandum and his comments upon it. 7 He writes to Grey of 1my pa.per which 
only contained loose· and undigested thoughts on Sir Stratford Canning's paper' 
*See above, Chapter IV, pp. 133-134. 
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and whether or not his 'paper' was the actual memora'ndum as amended, 
(Canning wrote no other memorandum on the subject at this time), it is clear 
that he saw Canning's document and commente<;l upon it. If we add to these 
facts our knowledge of Holland's views on Turkey, as expressed over a period 
of years, 8 the case for attribu.ting the marginal comments to him becomes 
overwhelming. In his letter to Grey of January 1833 already referred to, he 
writes that he cannot bring himself 
~ • • to relish anythi.ng like an engagement to sustain 
the ottoman Porte against external, much less internal 
destruction . • . She is destined to crumble to pieces 
and that soon. 9 • 
The comments on the memorandum complement this attitude, for their writer 
constantly expressed doubt as to ·whether the Ottoman Empire des.erved to survive 
and deplored any unilateral British attempt to protect it. Holland ..:. for it must 
be he - regarded the Sultan and Mehemet. alike as 'usurpers of minor authorities'. 9 
Palmerston in contrast was developing his ideas on the strategic importance of 
Turkey away from the stereo-typed attitudes towards the Sultan's regime that 
he had previously shared with Holland and the rest. Holland's cavalier attitude 
·was a luxury that Palmerston could ·not afford in view of the advance botn of 
Ibrahim Pasha and the Russian army towards Constantinople. 
Plate 1 
A page from Stratford Canning's m e morandum of 19 December (F.0.78/211, f.342). 
[The marginal comments r ead: 'Is not the unwieldy extent of the Turkish Empire one 
great che cl2 to the improve-ment of its indu s try and resou-rces and possibly one great 
cause of its internal wealme ss?- '] 
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Lord Holland' h Plate 2 
s andwriting (letter to Gre 2 . [ 'D · y, 9 Januar 1 
ear Grey-It would y 833: Grey MSS 
loose and undz·g t be an extent oif court . ., box 34, file 1) 
· es ed th esy to ll • Ject-in truth I h oughts on Sir Strat ca my paper whi h . . . (at Konya) & th:ve fo:rned none- But cer~o:d Canning's paper, m c . only contained 
some (I in e of po ,. Rn s swn' s intrigues and a znl yth zs intelligence of ~h vzew of the sub. 
lCY absolutely necessar )'a]ctwdy s eem to make t·' e Vzzzr' s defeat y • 11.e prompt d . a optwn of 
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Plate 3 
Palmerston's handwriting (letter to Grey, 31 March 1833: Grey MSS., box 45, file 4) . 
[ 'My dear Lord Grey, Grahmn suggested to nze yesterday that some fresh inst-
ructions ought to be seut out to Hotham with the Reinjo?'cem ents which we are 
giving him, and after talking the Matter over together, we were disposed to think 
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